Tuesday, March 30, 1999

The Impact of Islam on the Christendoms

II THE GENESIS OF CIVILIZATIONS


IV. THE PROBLEM AND HOW NOT TO SOLVE IT

(1) The Problem Stated
(2) Race
(3) Environment

V. CHALLENGE AND RESPONSE

(1) The Mythological Clue
(2) The Myth Applied To The Problem


VI. THE VIRTUES OF ADVERSITY

VII. THE CHALLENGE OF THE ENVIRONMENT

(1) The Stimulus of Hard Countries
(2) The Stimulus of New Ground
(3) The Stimulus of Blows

Various examples from Hellenic and Western history are given to illustrate the point that a sudden crushing defeat is apt to stimulate the defeated party to set its house in order and prepare to make a victorious response.

(4) The Stimulus of Pressures
(5) The Stimulus of Penalizations

Certain classes of races have suffered for centuries from various forms of penalization imposed upon them by other classes or races who have had the mastery over them. Penalized classes or races generally respond to this challenge of being excluded from certain opportunities and privileges by putting forth exceptional energy and showing exceptional capacity in such directions as are left open to them—much as the blind develop exceptional sensitiveness of hearing. Slavery is perhaps the heaviest of penalizations, but out of the hordes of slaves imported into Italy from the Eastern Mediterranean during the last two centuries B.C. arose a 'freedmen' class which proved alarmingly powerful. From this slave world, too, came the new religions of the internal proletariat, among them Chrisitianity.

The fortunes of various groups of conquered Christian peoples under ‛Osmanli rule are examined from the same standpoint—particularly the case of the Phanariots. This example and that of the Jews are used to prove that so-called racial characteristics are not really racial at all but are due to the historical experiences of the communitites in question.

VIII. THE GOLDEN MEAN

(1) Enough and Too Much

(2) Comparisons in Three Terms

None the less, it can be proved that challenges can be too severe: i.e. the maximum challenge will not always produce the optimum response. The Viking emigrants from Norway responded splendidly to the severe challenge of Iceland but collapsed before the severer challenge of Greenland. Massachusetts presented European colonists with a severer challenge than 'Dixie' and evoked a better response, but Labrador, presenting a severer challenge still, proved too much for them. Other examples follow: e.g. the stimulus of blows can be severe, especially if prolonged, as in the effect of the Hannibalic War on Italy. The Chinese are stimulated by the social challenge involved in emigrating to Malaya but are defeated by the severer social challenge of a white man's country, e.g. California. Finally, varying degrees of challenge presented by civilizations to neighboring barbarians are reviewed.

(3) Two Abortive Civilizations

...Two groups of barbarians on the frontiers of Western Christnedom in the first chapter of its history were so stimulated that they began to evolve rival civilizations of their own which were, however, nipped in the bud, namely the Far Western Celtic Christians (in Ireland and Iona) and the Scandinavian Vikings. These two cases are considered and the consequences that might have ensued if these rivals had not been swallowed and absorbed by the Christian civilization radiating from Rome and the Rhineland.

(4) The Impact of Islam on the Christendoms

To conclude this part of our inquiry let us see whether the impact of Islam upon Christendom will furnish yet another of those 'comparison in three terms' with which the reader is by this time familiar. We have already noticed in another connexion a challenge from Islam which evokes an optimum response. The challenge presented to the Franks in the eighth century of the Christian Era evokes a counter-offensive extending over many centuries which not only drove the adherents of Islam out of the Iberian Peninsula but also, travelling on beyond its original objective, carried the Spaniards and Portuguese overseas to all the continents of the world. In this case, too, we may notice a phenomenon which we have already observed in considering the defeat of the Far Western and Scandinavian civilization. Before it was entirely rooted out and destroyed the Iberian Muslim culture was exploited for the benefit of its victorious antagonist. The scholars of Muslim Spain contributed unintentionally to the philosophical edifice erected by the medieval Western Christian schoolmen, and some of the works of the Hellenic philosopher Aristotle first reached the Western Christian World through Arabic translations. It is also true that many 'Oriental' influences on Western culture which have been attributed to infiltration through the Crusades' principalities in Syria really came from Muslim Iberia.

The Muslim attack on Western Christendom through Iberia and over the Pyrenees was not really as formidable as it looked owing to the length of the line of communication between this front and the fountain-heads of Islamic energy in South-Western Asia, and it is not difficult to find a quarter in which the lines of communication were shorter and the Muslim attack proved in consequence too severe. This region is Anatolia, at that time the citadel of Orthodox Christian Civilization. In this first phase of their attack the Arab aggressors sought to put 'Rum' (as they called it, i.e. 'Rome') out of addiction and to overwhelm Orthodox Christendom altogether by striking right across Anatolia at the Imperial City itself. Constantinople was unsuccessfully besieged by the Muslims in A.D. 673-7 and again in 717-18. Even after the failure of the second siege, when the frontier between the two Powers settled down along the line of the Taurus Mountains, what remained of the Anatolian domain of Orthodox Christendom was regularly raided by the Muslims twice a year.

The Orthodox Christians responded to this pressure by a political expedient; and this response was successful on a short view, inasmuch as it availed to keep the Arabs at bay. On a long view, on the other hand, it was unfortunate on account of its pernicious effects on the inward life and growth of the Orthodox Christian Society. The expedient was the evocation of a 'ghost' of the Roman Empire in the Orthodox Christian World by Leo the Syrian, about two generations before the same feat was attempted unsuccessfully (and therefore more or less innocuously) by Charlemagne in the West. The most disastrous effect of Leo the Syrian's achievement
was the aggrandizement of the Byzantine State, at the expense of the Orthodox church, and the consequent internecine hundred years war between the Eastern Roman Empire and the Patriarchate on the other. This self-inflicted wound was the death of the Orthodox Christian Society in its original form and its original home. These facts suffice to show that the challenge presented by the Islamic impact to Orthodox Christendom, unlike its challenge to Western Christendom, was excessive.






III THE GROWTH OF CIVILIZATIONS


IX. THE ARRESTED CIVILIZATIONS

(1) Polynesians, Eskimos and Nomads
(2) The 'Osmanlis
(3) The Spartans
(4) General Characteristics
Note: The Sea and Steppe as language conductors

X. THE NATURE OF THE GROWTH

(1) Two False Trails
(2) Progress towards Self-determination

XI. AN ANALYSIS OF GROWTH

(1) The Relation between Growing Civilizations and Individuals
(2) Withdrawal and Return: Individuals
(3) Withdrawal and Return: Creative Minorities

XI. DIFFERENTIATION THROUGH GROWTH




IV THE BREAKDOWN OF CIVILIZATIONS


XIII. THE NATURE OF THE PROBLEM

Of the twenty-six civilizations we have identified (including the arrested civilizations in the list) sixteen are dead and nine of the remaining ten—all, in fact, except our own—are shown to have already broken down. The nature of a breakdown can be summed up in three points: a failure of creative power in the creative minority, which henceforth becomes a merely 'dominant' minority; an answering withdrawal of allegiance and mimesis on the part of the majority; a consequent loss of social unity in the society as a whole. Our next task is to discover the causes of such breakdowns.


XIV. DETERMINISTIC SOLUTIONS

LOSS OF COMMAND OVER THE ENVIRONMENT

(a) The Physical Environment
(b) The Human Environment
(3) A Negative Verdict

III. FAILURE OF SELF-DETERMINATION

(a) THE MECHANICALNESS OF MIMESIS

(b) THE INTRACTABILITY OF INSTITUTIONS

1. New Wine in Old Bottles

Ideally each new social force released by creative minorities should beget new institutions through which it can work. Actually it works more often than not through old institutions designed for other purposes. But the old institutions often prove unsuitable and intractable. One of two results may follow: either the break-up of the institutions (a revolution) or their survival and the consequent perversion of the new forces working through them (an 'enormity'). A revolutioon may be defined as a delayed and consequently explosive act of mimesis; an enomrity as a frustration of mimesis. If the adjustment of institutions to forces is harmonious, growth will continue; if it results in a revolution, growth becomes hazardous; if it results in an enormity, breakdown may be diagnosed. Then follow a series of examples of the impacts of new forces upon old institutions, first group being impacts of the two great new forces at work in the modern Western Society:

2. The Impact of Industrialism upon Slavery, e.g. in the Southern States of the U.S.A.;

3. The Impact of Democrcay and Industrialism upon War, i.e. the intensification of warfare since the French Revolution;

4. The Impact of Democrcay and Industrialism upon the Parocial Sovereignty, as shown in the hypotrophy of nationalism and the failure of the free trade movement;

5. The Imapct of Nationalism upon the Historic Political Map

6. The Impact of Industrialism upon Private Property, as illustrated by the rise of Capitalism and Communism;

7. The Impact of Democrcay upon Education, as illustrated by the rise of the Yellow Press and of Fascist dictatorships;

8. The Impact of Italian Efficiency upon Transalpine Government, as illustrated (except in England) by the emergence of despotic monarchies;

9. The Impact of Solonian Economic Revolution upon the Domestic Politics of the Hellenic City-State, as illustrated by the phenomena of tyrannis and stasis;


10. The Impact of the Solonian Economic Revolution upon the International Politics of the Hellenic World

11. The Impact of Parochialism upon the Western Christian Church, as illustrated by the Protestant revolution, the 'Divine Right of Kings' and the eclipse of Christianity by patriotism;

12. The Impact of the Sense of Untiy upon Religion, as illustrated by the rise of bigotry and persecution;

13. The Impact of Religiosity upon Caste, as shown in the Hindu Civilization;

14. The Impact of Civilization upon the Division of labour, showing itself as esotericism in the leaders (who become ̀ιδιωται) and lop-sidedness in the followers (who become βάναυσοι). The latter defect is illustrated from cases of penalized minorities, e.g. the Jews, and from aberrations of modern athleticism;

15. The Impact of Civilization upon Mimesis, which is directed no longer, as in primitive societies, towards the traditions of the tribe, but towards pioneers. Too often the pioneers selected for imitation are not creative leaders but commercial exploiters or political demagogues.



(3) The Nemesis of Creativity: Idolization of an Ephemeral Institution
(4) The Nemesis of Creativity: Idolization of an Ephemeral Technique
(5) The Suicidalness of Militarism

(c)3.(β)The Intoxication of Victory

A theme similar to that of the preceding paragraph is illustrated from a non-literary sphere by the example of the Hildebrandine Papacy, an institution which failed after raising itself and Christendom from the depths to the heights. It failed because, intoxicated by its own success, it was tempted to make illegitimate use if political weapons in pursuit of inordinate aims. The controversy over Investiture is examined from this standpoint.





V THE DISINTEGRATION OF CIVILIZATIONS


XVII. THE NATURE OF THE DISINTEGRATION OF CIVILIZATION
(1) A General Survey
(2) Schism and Palingenesia

XVIII. SCHISM IN THE BODY SOCIAL

(1) Dominant Minorities
(2) Internal Proletariats
(3) The Internal Proletariat of the Western World
(4) External Proletariats
(5) The External Proletariat of the Western World
(6) Alien and Indigenous Inspirations

XIX. SCHISM IN THE SOUL

(1) Alternative Ways of Behavior, Feeling and Life
(2) 'Abandon' and Self-Control
(3) Truancy and Martyrdom
(4) The Sense of Drift and the Sense of Sin
(5) The Sense of Promiscuity
a. Vulgarity and Barbarism in Manners
b. Vulgarity and Barbarism in Art
c. Lingue Franche
d. Syncretism in Religion

V. C (i) (c) 2 Annex II MARXISM, SOCIALISM, AND CHRISTIANITY

e. Cuius Regio euis Religio?

(6) The Sense of Unity
(7) Archaism
(8) Futurism
(9) The Self-Transcendance of Futurism
(10) Detachment And Transfiguration
(11) Palingenesia

XX. THE RELATIONS BETWEEN DISINTEGRATING SOCIETIES AND INDIVIDUALS

(1) The Creative Genius as a Savior
(2) The Savior with the Sword
(3) The Savior with the Time Machine
(4) The Philosopher masked by a King
(5) The God incarnate in a Man

XXI. THE RHYTHM OF DISINTEGRATION

XXII. STANDARDIZATION THROUGH DISINTEGRATION




VI UNIVERSAL STATES


XXIII. ENDS OR MEANS?

XXIV. THE MIRAGE OF IMMORTALITY

A Paradoxical Misapprehension

As we have seen in the last chapter, the endings of universal states indicate that these institutions are possessed by an almost demonic craving for life; and, if now we look at them, no longer through the eyes of alien observers, but through those of their own citizens, we shall find that these are apt not only to desire with their whole hearts that this earthly commonwealth of theirs may live for ever,1 but actually to believe that the immortality of this human institution is assured—and this sometimes in the teeth of contemporary events which, to an observer posted at a different standpoint in Time or Space, declare beyond question that this particular universal state is at this very moment in its last agonies. To observers who happen to have been born into the history of their own societies at a time when these have not been passing through the universal state phase, it is manifest that universal states, as a class of polity, are by-products of a process of social disintegration and are stamped by their certificates of origin as being uncreative and ephemeral.2 Why is it, such observers may well ask, that, in defiance of apparently plain facts, the citizens of a universal state are prone to regard it, not as a night's shelter in the wilderness, but as the Promised Land, the goal of human endeavours? How is it possible for them to mistake this mundane institution for the Civitas Dei itself?

This misapprehension is so extreme in its degree that its very occurrence might perhaps be called in question, were this not attested by the incontrovertible evidence of a cloud of witnesses who convict themselves, out of their own mouths, of being victims of this strange hallucination.


The Aftermaths of the Roman Empire3 and the Arab Caliphate4

In the history of the Roman Empire, which was the universal state of the Hellenic civilization, we find the generation that had witnessed the establishment of the Pax Augusta asserting, in evidently sincere and good faith, that the Empire and the City that had built it have been endowed with a common immortality. Tibullus (circa 54-18 B.C.) sings of 'the walls of the eternal city' while Virgil (70-19 B.C.) makes his Iuppiter, speaking of the future Roman scions of Aeneas' race, say: 'I give them empire without end.' Livy writes with the same assurance of 'the city founded for eternity'. Horace, sceptic though he was, in claiming immortality for his Odes, takes as his concrete measure of eternity the repetition of the annual round of the religious ritual of the Roman city state. The Odes are still alive on the lips of men. How much longer their 'immortality' will continue is uncertain, for the number of those who can quote them has sadly diminished in recent times by changes in educational fashions; but at least they have lived four or five times as long as the Roman pagan ritual. More than four hundred years after the age of Horace and Virgil, after the sack of Rome by Alaric has already announced the end, we find the Gallic poet Rutilius Namatianis still defiantly asserting Rome's immortality and Saint Jerome, in scholarly retreat at Jerusalem, interrupting his theological labours to express his grief and stupefaction in language almost identical with that of Rutilius. The pagan official and Christian Father are united in their emotional reactions to an event which, as we now see it, had been inevitable for generations.

The shock administered by the fall of Rome in A.D. 410 to the citizens of a transient universal state which they had mistaken for an everlasting habitation has its counterpart in the shock suffered by the subjects of the Arab Caliphate when Baghdad fell to the Mongols in A.D 1258. In the Roman world the shock was felt from Palestine to Gaul; in the Arab world from Farghānah to Andalusia. The intensity of the psychological effect is even more remarkable in this than in the Roman case; for, by the time when Hūlāgū gave the ‛Abbasid Caliphate its coup de grâce, its sovereignty had been ineffective for three or four centuries over the greater part of the vast domain nominally subject to it. This halo of an illusory immortality, worn by moribund universal states, often persuades the more prudent barbarian leaders, in the very act of parcelling out their dominions among themselves, to acknowledge an equally illusory subjection. The Amalung leaders of the Arian Ostrogoths and Buwayhid leaders of the Shī̀ī Daylamīs sought title for their conquests by ruling them, in official theory, as viceregents of the Emperor at Constantinople and Caliph at Baghdad respectively; and, though this tactful handling of a senile universal did not avail, in this case, to avert the doom to which both these war-bands condemned themselves by clinging to their distinctive religious heresies, the same political manœver was brilliantly successful when executed by fellow barbarians who had the sagacity or good fortune to be at the same time impeccable in their professions of religious faith. Clovis the Frank, for example, the most successful of all the founders of barbarian successor-states of the Roman Empire, followed up his conversion from paganism to Catholicism in A.D. 496 by obtaining in A.D. 510 from Anastasius, the reigning Emperor at Constantinople, the title of proconsul with the consular insignia.6 In the history of the decline of the ‛Abbasid Caliphate there are notable examples of a corresponding practice.

Throughout the whole period of the decline of the Caliphate up to the date of the death of Musta‛sim (A.D. 1258), the Caliph was to all orthodox Sunnīs7 the Commander of the faithful, and a Successor of the Prophet he was held to be the source of all authority and the fountain of honour. The Caliph by his very name led men's thoughts back to the founder of their faith, the promulgator of their system of sacred law, and represented to them the principle of established law and authority. Whatever shape the course of external events might take, the faith of the Sunnī theologians and legists in the doctrines expounded in their textbooks remained unshaken, and, even though the Caliph could not give an order outside his own palace, they still went on teaching the faithful that he was the supreme head of the whole body of Muslims. Accordingly, a diploma of investiture sent by the Caliph, or a title of honour conferred by him, would satisfy the demands of the religious law and tranquillise the tender consciences of the subjects of an independent prince, though the ruler himself might remain entirely autonomous and be under no obligation of obedience to the puppet Caliph....Even the Buwayids, though their occupation of Baghdad was the culmination of the rapid growth of their extensive dominions, and though the Caliph was their pensioner and practically a prisoner in their hands, found it polite to disguise their complete independence under a pretence of subserviency and to give a show of legitimacy to their rule by accepting titles from him'1

Aftermaths of the Manchu,2 Ottoman,3 and Mughal,3 Empires

The Government of the Manchu incarnation of the Far Eastern universal state in China—surrounded, as the Middle kingdom was accustomed to find itself, by tributary states, such as Korea, Annam, and the Mongol principalities, whose rulers did not receive investiture from the Son of heaven at Peking—affected to believe that all sovereigns, in any part of the World, with whom the Celestial empire might be drawn into diplomatic relations, derived their title from the same unique source of legitimacy.5


5 See for example, the letter addressed in 1793, the Emperor Ch´ien Lung to King George III of the united Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland, that has been quoted in I.i.161.5

The Ottoman Empire, which became, as we have seen in an earlier part of this Study, the universal state of a Byzantine civilization, exhibited the same characteristics of illusory immortality at a time when it had already become 'the Sick Man of Europe'. The ambitious war-lords who were carving out for themselves successor-states—a Mehmed ‛Alī in Eygpt and Syria, an ‛Alī Yannina in Albania and Greece, and a Pasvānoghlu of Viddin in the north-western corner of Rumelia--were sedulous on doing in the Pādishāh's name all that they were doing to his detriment in their own private interests. When the Western Powers followed in their footsteps, they adopted the same fictions. Great Britain, for example, administered Cyprus from 1878 and Egypt from 1882 in the name of the Sultan at Constantinople until she found herself at war with Turkey in 1914.

The Mughal universal state of the Hindu civilization displays the same features. Within half a century of the Emperor Awrangzīb's death in A.D. 1707, an empire which had once exercised effective sovereignty over the greater part of the Indian subcontinent had been whittled down to a torso some 250 miles long and 100 miles broad. After another half-century it had been reduced to the circuit of the walls of the Red Fort at Delhi. Yet, 150 years after A.D. 1707, a descendant of Akbar and Awrangzīb was still squatting on their throne, and might have been left there much longer if the Mutineers of 1857 had not forced this poor puppet, against his wishes, to give his blessing to their revolt against a rāj from overseas which had, after a period of anarchy, replaced the long-extinct Mughal Rāj which he still symbolized.

Ghosts of Defunct Universal States

A still more remarkable testimony to the tenacity of the belief in the immortality of universal states is the practice of evoking their ghosts after they have proved themselves mortal by expiring. The ‛Abbasid Caliphate of Cairo8, and the Roman Empire on the shape of the Holy Roman Empire of the West9 and the East Roman Empire of Orthodox Christendom;10 and the empire of the Ts´in and Han dynasties in the shape of the Sui and T´ang empire of the Far Eastern {p. 20}Society in China. The surname of the founder of the Roman Empire was revived in the titles of Kaiser and Czar, and the title of Caliph, which originally meant successor of Muhammad, after haunting Cairo, passed to Istanbul, where it survived until its abolition at the hands of Westernizing revolutionists in the twentieth century.

The Grounds of the Illusion

These are only a selection from the wealth of historical examples illustrating the fact that the belief in the immortality of universal states survives for centuries after it has been confuted by plain hard facts. What are the causes of a phenomenon that looks strange at first sight?

One manifest cause is the potency of the impression made by the founders of universal states and their successors who enter into the fruits of their labours1--an impression that their contemporaries, who receive it at first hand as the direct beneficiaries of these great men's achievements, hand on to a receptive Posterity with an emphasis which, by the cumulative effect of transmission, exaggerates an imposing truth into an overwhelming legend. From the many famous testimonies to the impression made by the Emperor Augustus, we have singled out already, in another context, the almost lyrical tribute paid by Philo,2{p.42}who as a Jew, A Hellenist, an Allexandrian, and a philosopher, can hardly be suspected of having gone to exceptional lengths in his enthusiasms for the Roman founder of an Hellenic universal state. The prestige to which such tributes gave a flying start can be seen gathering momentum during the next two centuries.


'A very important 'virtue', which emerges and takes shape slowly is the Providentia (in Greek πρόυοια) of the ruler. This ... "foresight" or "forethought" ... as we meet it in Cicero ... appears to be a virtue at once of the wise magistrate, who foresees and so forestalls dangers, and of the loving father, who makes provision for the welfare and future of the family of which hi is head. Both these senses tend to blend and come together, as they naturally might in a ruler who was at once a magistrate ... of the Roman people and a father for the whole Empire.

'Through a hundred years it develops till it reaches its first climax under Trajan, "the most provident prince"....This aspect of the rule of Trajan and Hadrian and the Antoinine Emperors, stressed as it was on coins, on buildings, by speakers and publicists, was bound to have its effect. Slowly the common people learnt to look for help and aid to the Providentia of their all-powerful ruler--he knows, he cares, he can act: he is like some Hercules, who visits all corners of the World putting down injustice and ending misery. Remembering this, we can form for ourselves some faint idea of how tremendous the effect of Hadrian's great journey's must have been on the provincials: here was an Emperor who did not stay in Rome (or, if he left it, leave merely for campaigns), but who visited every part of his realm to put things in order and to restore.... As years pass, this Providentia of the one ruler becomes more comprehensive.... When men are in distress and trouble they turn to the one person of whose help they can be sure: oppressed tenant-farmers on an Imperial estate in Africa appeal for aid to the Divina Providentia at Rome, and the harassed colonists of Scaptopara in Thrace beg the Emperor to pity them and help them by his Θεία πρόνια.1

'There is something very touching in this faith, in this belief in the providentissimus princeps: however far away he may be in Rome, he cares for them, he pities them, he cannot be deceived, and he exerts always, to quote the fine phrase of one of Hadrian's officers, "a care that is never tired, with which he watches unrestingly on behalf of the good of Mankind, (infatigabilis cura, per quam adsidue pro humanis utilitatibus excubat)"....justice, clemency, duty, warlike prowess--these are fine things; but even more important is it that the subject peoples and provincials over this vast area should have beleied in a ruler who was not merely a soldier but who cared for them and provided for their needs.'2


{p. 43}This epiphany of the ruler of a universal state as the one shepard whose oecumenical monarchy makes one fold for all Mankind1 appeals to one of the Human Soul's deepest longings, as, in Dostoyevski's fable, the Grand Inquisitor reminds a subversive christ.


'Thou mightest have taken ... the sword of Ceasar. Why didst Thou reject that last gift? Hadst Thou accepted that last counsel of the mighty spirit, Thou wouldst have accomplished all that Man seeks on Earth--that is, someone to worship, someone to keep his conscience, and some means of uniting all in one unanimous and harmonious ant-heap; for the craving for universal unity, is the third and last anguish of man. Mankind as a whole has always striven to organise a universal state. There have been many great nations with great histories, but the more highly they were developed the more unhappy they were, for they felt more acutely than other people the craving for world-wide union. The great conquerors-- Timūrs and Chingis Khāns—whirled like hurricanes over the face of the Earth, striving to subdue its people, and they too were but the unconscious expression of the same craving for universal unity. Hadst Thou taken the World and Ceasar's purple, Thou woudlst have founded the universal state and have given universal peace. For who can rule men if not he who holds their conscience and their bread in his hands?'2



2 Dostoyevski, F.: the Brothers Karamazov, Part II, Book V, chap 5: 'The Grand Inquisitor'.

Another cause of the persistence of the belief in immortality of the universal state is the impressiveness of the institution itself, as distinct from the prestige of the succession of rulers who are its living incarnations. A universal state captivates hearts and minds because it is the embodiment of a rally from the long-unhalted rout of a Time of Troubles, and it was this aspect of the Roman Empire that eventually won the admiration of originally hostile Greek men of letters.


'There is no salvation in the exercise of a dominion divorced from power. To find oneself under the dominion of one's superiors is a "second best" alternative; but this "second best" proved to be the best of all in our present experience of the roman Empire. This happy experience has moved the whole World to cleave to Rome with might and main. The World would no more think of seceding Rome than a ship's crew would think of parting company with the pilot. You must have seen bats in a cave clinging tight to one another and to the rocks; and this is an apt image of the whole World's dependence on Rome. In every heart today the focus of anxiety is the fear of becoming detached from the cluster. The thought of being abandoned by Rome is so appalling that it precludes any thought of wantonly abandoning her.

'There is an end of those disputes over sovereignty and prestige which were the causes of the outbreak of all the wars of the past; and, while some of the nations, like noiselessly flowing water, are delightfully quiet--rejoicing in their release from toil and trouble, and aware at last that all their old struggles were to no purpose--there are other nations which do not even know of remember whether they once sat in the seat of power. In fact we are witnessing a new version of the Pamphylian's myth (or is it Plato's own?). At a moment when the states of the World were already laid out on the funeral pyre as the victims of their own fratricidal strife and turmoil, they were all at once presented with the [Roman] dominion and straightway came to life again. How they arrived at this condition they are unable to say. They know nothing about it, and can only marvel at their present wellbeing. They are like sleepers awakened who have come to themselves and now dismiss from their thoughts the dreams that obsessed them only a moment ago. They no longer find it credible that there were ever such things as wars....The entire Inhabited World now keeps perpetual holiday....so that the only people who still need pity for the good things that they are missing are those outside your empire--if there are any such people left....'1


This quaint scepticism on the question whether there were in fact any people worth mentioning outside the Roman Empire is characteristic, and is our justification for calling such institution universal states. They were universal not geographically but psychologically. Horace, for example, in one of his odes tells us that he does not bother about 'the threats of Tiridates'. The King of Parthia no doubt existed, but he simply did not matter. In a similar vein the Manchu Emperors of the Far Eastern universal state assumed in their diplomatic dealings that all governments,

1 Aristeides, P. Aelius (A.D. 117-89): In Roman

including those of the Western world, had at some unspecified period in the past received permission to exist from the Chinese authorities.

And yet the reality of these universal states was something very different from the brilliant surface that they presented to Aelius Aristeides and their other panegyrists in various ages and various climes.


(II) THE DOOM OF TITHONUS

An obscure divinity of the Nubian marches of the Egyptian universal state was transfigured by the genius of Hellenic mythology into a mortal king of the Ethiopians who had the misfortune to be loved by Eôs, the immortal Goddess of the Dawn. The goddess besought her fellow Olympians to confer on her human lover the immortality which she and her peers enjoyed; and, jealous though they were of their divine privileges, she teased them into yielding at last to her feminine importunity. Yet even this grudging gift was marred by a fatal flaw; for the eager goddess had forgotten that the Olympians immortality was mated with an everlasting youth, and the other immortals had spiritually taken care to grant her no more than her bare request. The consequence was both ironic and tragic. After a honeymoon that flashed past in the twinkling of an Olympian eye, Eôs and here now immortal but still inexorably ageing mate found themselves condemned for eternity to grieve together over Tithonus's hapless plight. A senility to which the merciful hand of death could never set a term was an affliction that no mortal man could ever be made to suffer, and an eternal grief was an obsession that left no room for any thought of feeling.

For any human soul or human institution an immortality in This World would prove a martyrdom, even if it were unaccompanied by either physical decrepitude or mental senility. 'In this sense', wrote the philosophic Emperor Marcus Aurelius (A.D. 161-80), 'it would be true to say that any man of forty who is endowed with moderate intelligence has seen--in the light of the uniformity of Nature--the entire Past and Future'; and, if this estimate of the capacity of human souls for experience strikes the reader as an inordinately low one, he may find the reason in the age on which Marcus lived; for an 'Indian Summer' is an age of boredom. The price of the Roman Peace was the forfeiture of Hellenic liberty; and, though that liberty might always have been the privilege of a minority, and this privileged minority might have turned irresponsible and oppressive, it was manifest in retrospect that the turbulent wickedness of the Ciceronian climax of the Hellenic 'Time of Troubles' had provided a wealth of exciting and inspiring themes for Roman public speakers which their epigoni in a smugly ordered Trajanic epoch might conventionally condemn as horrors, not nostri saeculi, but must secretly envy as they found themselves perpetually failing in their laborious efforts to substitute far-fetched artifice for the stimulus of importunate life.

On the morrow of the breakdown of the Hellenic society Plato, anxiously seeking to safeguard it against a further fall by pegging it in a securely rigid posture, had idealized the comparative stability of the Eygprtaic culture; and a thousand years later, when the Eygptaic culture was still in being while Hellenic civilization had arrived at its last agonies, the last of the Neoplatonists pushed their reputed master's sentiment to an almost frenzied pitch of uncritical admiration.

Thanks to the obstinacy of the Eygptaic universal state in again and again insisting on returning to life after its body had been duly laid on the salutary funeral pyre, the Eygptaic civilization lived to see its contemporaries--the Minoan, the Sumeric, and the Indus culture--all pass away and give place to successors of a younger generation, some of which had passed away in their turn while the Eygptaic society still kept alive. Eygptaic students of history could have observed the birth and death of the First Syriac, Hittite, and Babylonic offspring of the Sumeric civilization and the rise and decline of the Syriac and Hellenic offspring of the Minoan. Yet the fabulously long-drawn-out epilogue to the broken-down Eygptaic society's natural term of life was but an alternation of long stretches of boredom with hectic bouts of demonic energy, into which this somnolent society was galvanized by the impact of alien bodies social.

The same rhythm of trance-like somnolence alternating with outbursts of fanatical xenophobia can be discerned in the epilogue to the history of the Far Eastern civilization in China. The tincture of the Far Eastern Christian culture in the Mongols who had forced upon china an alien universal state evoked a reaction in which the Mongols were evicted and their dominion replaced by the indigenous universal state of the Ming. Even the Manchu barbarians, who stepped into the political vacuum created by the Ming’s collapse, and whose taint of Far Eastern Christian culture was less noticeable than their receptivity in adopting the Chinese way of life, never ceased to maintain itself underground and broke out into the open again in the T´aip´ing insurrection of A.D. 1852-64. the infiltration of the Early Modern Western civilization, in its Catholic Christian form, in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries provoked the proscription of Catholicism in the first quarter of the eighteenth century. The blasting open of the sea-gates of China for Western trade between A.D. 1839 and A.D. 1861 provoked the retort of the anti-Western 'Boxer' rising of A.D. 1900; and the Manchu Dynasty was overthrown in A.D. 1911 in retribution for the double crime of being ineradicably alien itself and at the same time showing itself incompetent to keep the now far more formidable alien force of Western penetration at bay.

Happily life is kinder than legend, and the sentence of immortality which mythology passed on Tithonis is commuted, for the benefit of the universal states of history, to a not interminable longevity. Marcus's disillusioned man of forty must die at last though he may outlive his zest for life by fifty of sixty years, and a universal state that kicks again and again against the pricks of death will weather away in the course of ages, like a pillar of salt that was fabled to be the petrified substance of a once living woman.


XXV. SIC VOS NON VOBIS

(1) The Conductivity of Universal States
(2) The Psychology of Peace
(3) The Serviceability of Imperial Institutions
Communication
Garrisons and Colonies
Provinces
Capital Cities
Official Languages and Scripts
Law
Calanders; Weights and Measures; Money
Standing Armies
Civil Services
Citizenships




VII UNIVERSAL CHURCHES


XXVI. ALTERNATIVE CONCEPTIONS OF THE RELATIONS OF
UNIVERSAL CHURCHES TO CIVILIZATIONS

(1) Churches as Cancers
(2) Churches as Chrysalises
(3) Churches as a Higher Species of Society

(a) A New Classification
(b) The Significance of the Churches Past
(c) The Conflict Between Heart and Head
(d) The Promise of the Churches Future

XXVII. THE ROLE OF CIVILIZATIONS IN THE LIVES OF CHURCHES

(1) Civilizations as Overtures
(2) Civilizations as Regresssions

XXVIII. THE CHALLENGE OF MILITANCY ON EARTH




VIII HEROIC AGES

XXIX. THE COURSE OF THE TRAGEDY

A. THE GENESIS OF A LIMES

{VIII.A.p.2}...The fluid from of a running warfare is neither so definite nor impassable a barrier as is the military frontier (limes) into which the fluid front crystallizes when the stage of stationary warfare is reached.1 The contrast in configuration and character between an original limen-zone and an eventual limes-line is the geographical expression of the conditions that generate an heroic age.

An heroic age is, in fact, the social and psychological consequence of the crystallization of a limes,* and our purpose in this Part is to trace this sequence of events by our customary empirical method of investigation. A necessary background to this undertaking is, of course, a survey of the barbarian war-bands that had breasted the divers sectors of the limites of divers universal states during the history of Man in Process of Civilization up to date. A survey of this kind has already been attempted in a previous Part.2 In that place, a considerable muster of barbarian war-bands has been reviewed, and in passing, we have also there taken note of their distinctive achievements in the two fields of sectarian religion and epic poetry. In our present inquiry this foregoing survey can be drawn upon for purposes of illustration without having to be recapitulated.

1 See V. v. 208. Ibn Khaldūn defines the frontier of an empire as the lines at which the imperial government's authority peters out. 'A dynasty is much more powerful at its seat of government than it is at the extremities of its empire'. He compares the loss of energy in the radiation of its power to the gradual dying away of rays of light streaming out from the central point, or of the circular ripple which spread over the surface of a piece of water when one strikes it (Muqaddamāt, translated by de Slane, Baron McG. (Paris 1863-8, Imprimerie Impériale, 3 vols.) vol. I, p. 332).
2 In V. v. 210-237
* {nobs Ed. pronounced lǐm-ez, i.e. limits}

(1) A Social Barrage
(2) The Accumulation of Pressure

The Wreckful Siege of Battering Days'

{VIII.C.p.13}...'A long period of 'education", in which a semi-civilized people has been profoundly affected from without by the influence of a civilized people,3 is the necessary prelude4 to the 'heroic age' in which the barbarians have their fling when a sagging and tottering limes at last collapses.

3 Chadwick, The Heroic Age, p. 458.
4 Apropos of the Serb heroic age at the climax of the Orthodox Christian Time of Troubles, after the Bulgarian and East Roman Empires and before the imposition of the Pax Ottomanica, Chadwick points out in op. cit., on p. 448, that, 'here again..., as in the Teutonic and Cumbrian heroic ages, we have the case of a semi-civilized and "juvenile" nation exposed for a long period to the influences of a civilized but decaying empire'. Chadwick has, in fact, established an historical 'law' to the effect that the precipitation of an heroic age is normally the cumulative effect of the radiation of a decaying civilization into a primitive society over a period of time that is to be measured not in years, but in generations. Since the publication of Chadwick's The Heroic Age in A.D. 1912 it had, however, been demonstrated by Hitler that a diabolically perverse process of mis-education can artificially produce the same psychological effect in a community that has advanced as far along the path of civilization as pre-Nazi Germany, and that, under these artificial conditions, the process of barbarization can be so greatly speeded up as to be 'telescoped' into the span of a single generation. The deliberate uprooting of the boys and youths of Nazi Germany from the habit, expectation, and love of a settled life by the systematic application of Modern Wetsern methods of mass-suggestion had evoked a caricature of an heroic age by a process of 'speeding-up' that was counterpart, on a psychological plane, of the visual effect produced by speeding up the display of a film.

The Impracticality of a Policy of Non-Intercourse

The erection of a limes sets in motion a play of social forces which is bound to end disastrously for the builders. A policy of non-intercourse with the barbarians beyond is quite impracticable. Whatever the imperial government may decide, the interests of traders, pioneers, adventurers, and so forth will inevitably draw them beyond the frontier.

The Barbarians Exploitation of their Civilized Neighbours' Weapons

{VIII.C.p.16} The transfrontier barbarian is not, however, content simply to practice the superior tactics which he has learnt from an adjoining civilization without proceeding to adapt them to the local terrain.
Ex hypothesi he already has the initial advantage of being at home in a theatre of military operation in which his opponent is a stranger, since the limes is situated in barbarian territory which the civilization has occupied, up to this line, by force of arms in an aggressive previous chapter of history. When the barbarian combines his hereditary mastery of the local situation with a creative adaptation of borrowed weapons and tactics, superior to his own, to suit the local conditions of warfare, he becomes formidable indeed. His best opportunities for putting his civilized adversary at this military disadvantage arise where the local terrain displays some strongly pronounced physical characteristic which is unfamiliar and adverse to the civilized belligerent and yet at the same time lends itself to the employment, with adroit modifications, of weapons and tactics that have been borrowed from him by his barbarian antagonist.

The Barbarians Exploitation of their Native Terrain

{p.19} On the local anti-barbarian frontiers of the still surviving parochial states of a Westernizing World which, at the time of this writing, embraced all but a fraction of the total habitable and traversable surface of the planet, two of the recalcitrant barbarian's faithful non-human allies had already been outmanœvered by a Modern Western industrial technique. The Forest had long since fallen victim to cold steel, while the Steppe, from its parkland fringe to its desert heart, had been penetrated by the petrol-driven internal combustion engine of the aeroplane and the terrestrial motor vehicle travelling on the treads of a revolving belt over
{p.20}terrain where wheels could no longer convey it. The barbarian's mountain ally, however, had proved a harder nut to crack, and the nineteenth-century Russian feat of taming the Caucuses and twentieth-century French feat of taming the Atlas and the Rīf had not yet been emulated by any corresponding domestication of either the western of the eastern rim of the Iranian Plateau. At this date the serried tiers of the Zagros Range, astride a theoretical Perso-Turkish and Perso-‛Irāqī frontier, were still serving as fastnesses for wild Kurds, Lūrs, Bakhtiyārīs, and the motley wild highlanders of Fars, while the Sulaymān Range and its ramifications were performing the same service for wild Pathans and Balūchīs who were hardly conscious of a theoretical Indo-Afghan frontier that had been drawn across the map of their homelands in A.D. 1893 and had been inherited in A.D. 1947 from a British Indian Empire by a Pakistan that was one of its three successor-states.

{p.22} 'The elaborate and costly equipment which had been invented on the European battlefields of the General War [of A.D. 1914-1918], in operations on level ground between two highly organised armies, was very much less effective when employed against parties of tribesmen lurking in a tangle of mountains.'1

On the other hand,

'as a fighting man the Wazīr and the Mahsūd, always more particularly the latter, when in his own country, may be classed very high, Agile and enduring, he is possessed on his own hillsides of an astonishing mobility, which is intensified by complete disregard of impedimenta, as well as by a natural hardiness that greatly simplifies all supply problems. His skill with the small -bore rifle is considerable, and is only surpassed by a great capacity to exploit the slightest weakness shown by his enemy. Disregard of methods of security on the one hand, a too slavish routine in these faults have been repeatedly penalized by the Mahsūd and Wazīr. The tribesman is gifted with untiring patience and vigilance in observing an enemy when the latter is on the move, a characteristic which makes it extremely difficult to outflank or to surprise him. He is an expert in the attack of detached posts and in the surprise of small parties. This skill may be enhanced by the employment of ruses which can justly be stigmatized as closely akin to treachery.'2

1 Toynbee, A.J.: Survey of International Affairs, 1925, vol. i (London 1927, Milford), p. 557).
2 de Watteville, H.: Waziristan, 1919-1920 (London 1925, Constable), p. 23. Evidence bearing out this appreciation will be found passim. There are striking examples on pp. 130, 156, 207-9, and 213. The quotations from this book have been made with the permission of the publishers.


The Besieged Civilization's Inability to Redress the Balance by Recourse of Organization and Technique

{p.25} In an economically complex civilization with a money economy, any increase in the numerical strength of a regular standing army entails a corresponding increase in the pressure of taxation upon national income. The division of an intolerably large, and still insatiably growing, proportion of a dwindling national income to meet rising costs of public services is the most conspicuous of the social maladies that were the death of the Roman Empire in the West in the fifth century and in the Centre and East in the seventh century of the Christian Era; and, while the cause of this cancerous growth of the fiscal burden on the backs of the Roman Imperial Goverrnment's subjects was an increase in the personnel of the Imperial Civil Service to fill an administrative vacuum arising from the progressive decay of local-government,5 a second cause—which would probably turn out to have been by far the more potent of the two, if all relevant figures were known to us—was the increase in the man-power of the Imperial Army which was required in order to meet the increase in the transfrontier barbarians' military efficiency. We do know that, in the annual budgets of the British Rāj in India during the last century of its existence, the coast of defence (which, in practice, meant the defence of the North-West Frontier) was an item that absorbed a disconcerting proportion of the revenue.6

{p. 26} Thus, if the chronic warfare between the defenders and assailants of a limes is waged in terms of competitive staying power, the defence is bound to collapse sooner or later, since, so far as it is able to hold its own, it can achieve this only by exerting an effort which becomes more and more disproportionate to the effort exacted from its increasingly efficient barbarian adversaries.1 In this situation there are two obvious courses to which the defence may resort in the hope of arresting, by one means or other, the progressive deterioration of its own capacity for organization and technique, in which a civilization is superior to its barbarian neighbours almost ex hypothesi or its barbarian adversaries' capacity for taking military advantage of the local terrain through which the limes runs. These two policies of elaborating its own organization and armaments and of recruiting barbarian man-power are not, of course, mutually exclusive, and a harassed Power behind a limes had usually resorted to both in its desperate search for some means of reversing the accelerating inclination of the scales of war in its barbarian opponents' favour which is the inexorable effect of the passage of Time on a frontier where the civilized party is content to remain passive.

1 The difference in the degree of the effort required from a civilized army and from a barbarian war-band in order to produce an equal quantum of military effect was once expressed in quanitly concrete financial terms by a correspondent of the present writer's in a comparison between the respective performances of the British Army and the Hijīzā Army against the Turkish Army in the General War of A.D. 1914-18. 'From first to last, the military operations of the Hijīzā Army accounted for 65,000 Turkish troops at the cost of less than £100 per head of subsidy, whereas in the British Army's operations against the Turks, each Turkish casualty or prisoner cost from £1500 to £2000' (Toynbee, A.J.: Survey of Internaional Affairs, 1925, vol. i (London 1927, Milford), p. 283, n. 2).

{p.28} This attempt to solve the problem of defence by an improvements in organization, which was such a brilliant failure in the military history of the Diocletianic Roman Empire, had brought in better returns to Powers burdened with anti-barbarian frontiers in a Modern Western World. General Sir C.C. Monro's lightning victory over the Afghans in A.D. 1919 was a triumph of organization in a sudden emergency; Marchal Lyautey's gradual pacification of the Atlas highlands between A.D. 1907 and A.D. 19343 was a still more signal triumph of organization applied to the deliberate execution of a long-term plan; and these are merely two illustrations out of a multitude lying ready to the historian's hand. In the policy of Modern Western imperial governments, however, the resort to organization as a means of redressing an unfavourable inclining balance in the defence of a limes was overshadowed by the resort to technique in an age when Western technology was advancing at an unprecedented pace in to a previously undreamed-of wonderland of scientific discovery and practical 'know-how'.

In such circumstance the Western parties to the conflict between Civilization and barbarism might well feel confident of being able to set so hot a pace in the progressive application of technology to border warfare that their barbarian competitors would find themselves run off their
{p.29}feet. If the barbarian had shown himself able to procure from abroad and even passably imitate at home a relatively simple product of the Modern Western technique, such as an up-to-date breach-loading rifle, was it not the obvious retort for his Western adversary to raise the technological level of competition in armaments from small-arms to artillery, from fire-arms to the aeroplane, and—in terms of the release of atomic energy—from the non-fissile to the fissile type of explosive for the manufacture of bombs? For, even if the barbarians could procure aeroplanes from abroad and could learn to become as skillful an air-pilot as he had already become a marksman, it was hardly conceivable that he could provide for the servicing of aeroplanes, not to speak of installing the plant for manufacturing them, and it was virtually out of the question for him to procure atom bombs from abroad, and quite out of the question for him to acquire and apply the 'know-how' of manufacturing them and detonating them. When Western Man had crowned a century of scientific achievement by discovering how to harness atomic energy to the service of War, it looked indeed as if it now lay in his power (if he could reconcile this with his conscience) literally to annihilate the last unsubdued territory of Barbarism in their last remaining pockets of unsubdued territory—always supposing that these condemned barbarian prisoners of a ubiquitous industrial Western Civilization were not reprieved, after all, by seeing the Western masters of the World destroy one another first in an atomic fratricidal warfare.

This thesis that technique is a winning card in Civilization's hand is forcefull presented in a passage from the pen of a brilliant observer of a campaign in which a Modern Western Power overthrew a barbarian opponent on his own ground by bringing into action against him the Western technique of the Pre-Atomic Age.

'Halfa is nearly four hundred miles from Atbara; yet it was the decisive point of the campaign; for in Halfa was being forged the deadliest weapon that Britain has ever used against Mahdism—the Sudan Military Railway. In the existence of the railway lay all the difference between the extempore, amateur scrambles of Wolseley's campaign and the machine-like precision of Kitchener's. When Civilization fights with Barbarism it must fight with civilized weapons; for with his own arts on his own ground the barbarian is almost certain to be the better man. To go into the Sudan without complete transport and certain communications is as near madness as to go with spears and shields. Time has been on the Sirdar's side, whereas it was dead against Lord Wolseley; and of that, as of every point in his game, the Sidar has known to ensure the full advantage. There was fine marchiung and fine fighting in the campaign of the Atbara; the campaign would have failed wqithout them; but without the railway there could never have been any campaign at all. The battle of the Atbare was won in the workshops of the Wady Halfa.'1

1 Stevens, G.W.: With Kitchener to Khartum (Edinburgh and London 1898, Blackwood) chap. 3, ad imit., pp. 22-23.


{p.30} A generation later, when this Western feat of harnessing steam-power had been eclipsed by the more extraordinary feat of harnessing atomic energy, it was a temptation for Western minds to assume that the problem of anti-barbarian frontiers had now been solved decisively by the progress of Western technology up to date. At the time of writing, however, atomic energy had not yet been used for the destruction of either Barbarism or Civilization; and the recent experience of Western Powers in trying to offset their barbarian opponents' skill in adapting the use of Modern Western weapons and tactics to the local terrain by bringing into action, on their own side, additional Modern Western weapons of ever more elaborate kinds, had demonstrated that the elaborations of technique, like the elaboration of organization, carried with it certain inherent drawbacks in addition to the untoward social effect of its crushingly heavy cost to the tax-payer and the untoward educational effect of its initiation of the barbarian into the ever more formidable tricks of his civilized adversary's trade.2 these inherent drawbacks to an elaboration of technique might go far towards neutralizing even the military effect of this expedient for redressing the balance of power between Civilization and Barbarism along a static limes.

2 'The development of an strategic perception or of a more far-seeing or reasoned leading among the frontier tribes is perhaps improbable. On the other hand, should any such tendencies creep into their conduct of war, and should the tribesman ever, by any chance, be supported by skilled advice, or find themselves in the possession of efficient artillery, numerous machine guns or stocks of grenades and analogous adjuncts of war, the prospect of entering on a campaign of this nature without highly trained troops is not alluring' (de Watteville, op. cit., p. 210).


The Barbarian's Military Elusiveness and Economic Parasitism

{p.35} The fact is that punitive measures defeat their own object by accentuating an already prevalent tendency in the transfrontier barbarian's social evolution which is precisely what has made him such an awkward neighbour.3 If the transfrontier barbarian had remained an unmodified primitive man living in the static Yin-state in which the genuinely primitive societiets were found as far back in Time as the existing evidence carried a twentieth-century western historian's knowledge of them, a decidedly greater proportion of his total energies would have been devoted to the arts of peace and a correspondingly greater coercive effect would have been produced upon him by the punitive destruction of the products of his pacific labours. The tragedy of a ci-devant primitive society's moral alienation from an adjoining civilization by which it has previously been attracted is that the consequent deterioration of their relation from one of progressive cultural radiation-and-mimesis to one of chronic hostilities leads the barbarian to neglect his former peaceful avocations in order to specialize in the art of border warfare—first in self-defence, in order to save himself from subjugation or annihilation at the hands of a civilization that has turned savage, and later—when his growth in military efficiency on his own terrain has gradually reversed the balance of military advantage in his favour—as an alternative means of making his livlihood. to plough and reap vicariously with sword and spear 4 is more lucrative for the barbarian now that a civilization which has been thrown on the defensive can be mulcted of its wealth by way of either loot or subsidies, and this is also more congenial to him now that the
{p. 36}has become a warrior first and foremost and has remained only secondarily a husbandman. The barbarian adjoining a limes thus ceases to be economically self-supporting and becomes an economic parasite on the civilization on the other side of the military front.

1 While this economic retrogression of the barbarian in a 'resovoir' damned back by a limes is one of the general effects of the erection of a limes in any physical environment, the effect naturally varies in degree in proportion to the extent of the difference between the regions degregated from one another by the limes in point of relative economic attractiveness of unattractiveness. Evidently the 'resevoir' barbarian will be the more prone to seek his livlihood by plundering his civilized neighbour's garden than to seek it by cultivating his own wilderness, the more forbidding the wilderness is, and the more smiling the garden. A case in point is the poverty of the Pathan highlands by comparison with the adjoining lowlands of Afghanistan as well as Pakistan (see Toynbee, A.J.: Survey of Internaional Affairs, 1925, vol. i (London 1927, Milford), p. 546-7).
This point is of some importance, because one of the considerations that are apt to decide an empire-builder to draw his limes along a particular line, short of having reached 'a natural frontier', is that, along this line, he has found himself at the limit of the area that he can reckon on being able to exploit economically, with profit to himslef, by means of the economic technique of which he is master—at whatever stage of technological 'know-how' he may happen to be at the time when he is choosing the line for his limes. This last qualification has to be added because a country-side that is economically profitable for a society at one level of economic technique may be economically unprofitable for a society at another level. For the Romans round about the beginning of the Christian Era it was economically unprofitable to saddle themsleves either with Northern European territories in which the post-glacial forest still had the upper hand over a primitive agriculturist's attempts to clear it, or with an Arabain desert which the sedentary husbandman could never hope to dispute with the stock-breeding Nomad. Accordingly the Romans drew their European limes just short of the coal-deposits in the Ruhr, and the Syrian limes short of the oil-deposits in Arabia.
The Romans did not live to regret this economic blindness of theirs, since their empire came and went before the technique for turning coal and mineral oil to economic account was discovered by the latter-day children of a Western Civilization sprung from the Roman Empire's ruins. On the other hand, there were Modern Western governments that had had the provoking experience of seeing territories in which they had lightheartedly disinterested themselves, in the belief that they were valueless, turn out to be of inestimable economic value in terms of new technological discoveries. The Powers more or less interested in a latter-day Arabia had no sooner completed the delimitation of frontiers in that peninsula after the General War of 1914-18 than they were made aware, by the subsequent pioneer work of Western oil-prospectors, that the sub-soil of the desert which they had been dividing between them was oozing with oil An equally undreamed-of wealth of oil had likewise belatedly been discovered to underlie the surface of lands in in the eastern part of the State of Oklahoma that had become the property of of Indians descended from 'the five civilized nations' who had been relegated there since A.D. 1825 in the belief that, for the White Man, this was the least desirable piece of country within the whole vast area of the United States. In A.D. 1952 there was a strange irony in the contrast between the respective current economic values of these oil lands in Oklahoma, to which 'the five civilized nations' had been deported, and the cotten-lands of Georgia, Alabama, and Mississippi, from which they had been evicted. A similar reflection was suggested at the same date in England by the grass-clad solitudes that had replaced, on the Downs, the cultivation which the Romans had once found there in an age when the forest-clad plains of Britain were inaccessible to the Celtic husbandman as the forest-clad plains of North America were to the Indian hunter at the time of the arrival of the White Man in the New World.
On the morrow of a latter-day Western discovery of the techniqu of splitting the atom of one particular chemical element, it looked as if a revolution of the planet's wealth in terms of uranium instead of gold might produce even more sensational surprises; and such surprises were bound to evoke the correspondingly poignant regrets in the hearts of the makers of frontiers in a politically divided society embracing the entire surface of the globe.

The Self-Defeat of a Policy of Setting a Thief to Catch a Thief

{p. 39} This striking inequality in the material consequences of border warfare for the two belligerents is reflected in a great and growing inequality between them in moral. for the children if a disintegrating civilization that is standing on the defensive―at any rate for a demilitarized majority that is standing in the interior, as distinct from a barbarianized minority in the marches―the interminable border warfare wit the barbartians beyond the limes spells the burden of an ever-increasing financial charge and the anxiety of a never solved military and political problem. For the barbarian belligerent, on the other hand, the same warfare has the very opposite psychological associations. For him, it is not a burden but an opportunity, not an anxiety but an exhilaration. A contest that is always harassing for the civilized party―and utterly devastating for him when he finds himself no nearer to being within sight of the end of it after he has mobilized all his resources of organization and technique―is the very breath of life for the militarized barbarian. This great and always
{p. 39} increasing inequality in 'psychological armament' makes the discomfiture of the civilized belligerent inevitable sooner or later.1

{p.41}...In this place we need only to recall our previous finding2 that this alluring expedient for averting a collapse of the limes actually precipitates the catastrophe which it is designed to forestall, and we may proceed to inquire into the explanation of this apparent paradox.

Part of the explanation is ,of course, to be found in the consideration that, in taking the barbarians into his service, the Power behind the limes is also taking them into his confidence and is thereby subjecting them to an intensive course of instruction in a military and political 'know-how' which they can afterwards employ, if they choose, to their own profit at their teachers' expense.

'It can be said of the Roman, Chinese and British Indian empires alike that the method that worked best was one of enlisting the services of the very tribes that were supposedly excluded by the boundary, thus turning them about so that they faced away from the boundary instead of toward it ... nevertheless, it was a method that haunted the imperial state responsible for it, because it created a sword of two edges capable of striking outward when held in a strong hand but of cutting inward when the had weakened. From border societies of this kind, linked with boundary-maintaining empires, were drawn the "barbarian auxiliaries" of Rome and the "tributary barbarians" of China; from a similar society the British Empire in India recruits both regular troops and tribal levies. From the same societies came invaders and conquerors of both Rome and China; and the people of the same kind
with whom the British now deal are as dangerous as they are useful.'2

2 Lattimore, O.; Inner Asian Frontiers of China (New York 1940, American Geographical Society), pp. 245-6.

{p.43} the truth is, in enlisting the barbarian in its service, the Power behind the limes is attempting, under altogether unpropitious psychological conditions, to recapture the relation between Barbarism and Civilization that prevailed in days when the civilization had not yet broken down, and the limes had not yet some into existence. The defence of the civilization by an inner ring of barbarians against an outer ring of barbarians was something that happened of itself, without any contract between the parties, so long as the growing civilization was attracting the barbarians by its charm. Under these psychological conditions an inner ring of barbarians served spontaneously both as a conductor through which the civilization radiated its cultural influence into barbarian societies at a farther remove and as a buffer which absorbed the shocks of the se outer barbarians' attempt to take by force1 a cultural kingdom which, in its heyday, had for them the fascination of the Kingdom of Heaven. In these happy psychological circumstances the inner barbarian proselytes of the one day became the cultural converts the next, while today's outer barbarian assailants became tomorrow's inner barbarian proselytes. The growing civilization progressively extended its borders through the successive assimilation of one ring after another of its barbarian neighbours―a very different story from the subsequent history of a broken-down civilization’s expansion by force, up to the

1 Matt. xi. 12.

{p.43}limit to which sheer force could carry it, at the expense of barbarians whom it has ceased to charm.

{p.44}...In these psychological circumstances a corps of barbarian foederati will never turn into a unit of the Imperial Regular Army; it will always remain an unassimilated barbarian was-band retaining its own weapons and tactics, taking its orders from its own war-lord, feeling its own esprit de corps, nursing its own ambitions. In the same circumstances a settlement of barbarian laeti5 will never turn into a civil community of imperial citizens; it will remain an unassimilated imperium in imperio which, short of being annihilated, will find its political destiny sooner ore later in becoming the nucleus of a dissident successor-state doomed to failure; and, as this expedient is the last forlorn hope of the tottering Power behind the limes, its failure is immediately followed by the limes collapse.

(3) The Cataclysm and its Consequences

A Reversal of Roles

{VIII.D.p.45}...This episode in Man's contest with Physical Nature is an apt simile of what happens in Man's struggle with Human Nature, in his neighbours and in himself, upon the collapse of the military barrage of a limes. The resulting social cataclysm is a calamity for all concerned; but in the human, as in the physical, disaster the incidence of the devastation is unequal, and in this case likewise the distribution of the damage is the reverse of what might have been expected a priori. There is, in fact, here a paradoxical reversal of roles.2 So long as the representatives of a disintegrating civilization were successful in saving a tottering limes from collapse, the tribulation which it cost them to perform this tour de force was progressively aggravated, as we have see, 3 out of all proportion to the progressive increase in the pressure exerted by the transfrontier barbarians. On the other hand, now that the disaster, so long dreaded and so long averted by the Power behind the limes, has at last duly descended upon the doomed civilization's devoted head, the principal sufferers are no longer the ex-subjects of the defunct universal state, over whose fields and cities the deluge of barbarian invasion now rolls unchecked, but the ostensibly triumphant barbarians themselves. The hour of their triumph, for which they have thirsted so long, proves to be
{p.46} the occasion of a discomfiture which they nor their defeated adversaries had forseen.


The Demoralization of the Barbarian Conquerors

What is the explanation of this apparent paradox? The answer is that the limes, whose resistance the transfrontier barbarian has been seeking all the time to overcome, has served, not only as the bulwark of the Civilization that its builders and defenders had intended it to provide against an outer Barbarism, but also as a providential safeguard for the aggressive barbarian himself against demonically self-destructive psychological forces within his own bosom.

...provided by the existence of the very limes which the barbarian is is bent on destroying for the limes, so long as it holds, supplies a substitute, in some measure, for the indispensable discipline of which Primitive Man is deprived when the breaking of his cake of primitive custom3 converts him into a transfrontier barbarian. This discipline is partly imposed on him externally; for, so long as the perennial border warfare continues, the barbarian belligerent, whether his role be that of raider, hostage, or mercenary, is being trained continually perforce in a stern yet at the same time instructive military school; but the limes disciplines him most effectively in the psychological sense of giving him tasks to perform, objectives to reach, and difficulties to contend with that call forth his highest powers and constantly keep his efforts up to mark.

With the sudden collapse of the limes sweeps this safeguard away, the nascent creative powers that have been evoked in the transfrontier barbarian by the challenge of the limes are daunted and defeated by being called upon, suddenly and prematurely, top perform new tasks that are altogether too great and too difficult for them to cope with; and in this hour of bewilderment, when there is no more spirit in them,4 these frail

3 See the phrase quoted from Bagehot in II.i.192.
4 2 Chron. ix.4.

{p.47}shoots of tender wheat are quickly stifled by the tares in the spiritual field of the barbarian's soul―his abandon1 and his ferocity―which find boundless opportunities for luxurient growth now that the former raider and mercenary has entered into his long-coveted kingdom. If the transfrontier barbarian is more brutal, as well as a more sophisticated, being than his ancestor the primitive tribesman, the latter-day barbarian who has broken through the limes and carved a successor-state out of the derelict domain of a defunct universal state becoems differentiated from his already barbarian predecessor beyond the pale in the same two senses in still a higher degree. As soon as teh barbarian has left no-man's-land behind him and set foot in a ruined world which is for him an earthly paradise, his malaise rankles into demoralization...


{p.48}...the barbarians in patribus civilium cast themselves, as we have observed by anticipation, for the sordid role of vultures feeding on carrion or maggots crawling in a carcass; and it has been noticed by Ibn Khaldūn that they are apt to display a most unheroic prudence in keeping at a safe distance from their dying victims body until the life has gone out of him that there is no danger any longer of his being able to offer any resistance.

'[The future founders of a successor-state] give way to baseless fears whenever they hear talk of the [flourishing] state of the existing empire and of the vast resources that it has at its command. This is enough to deter them from attacking it, and so their chief is obliged to have patience and to bide his time. But, when the empire has fallen into complete decadence, as invariably happens, and when its military and financial strength has suffered mortal injuries, this chief is rewarded for having waited so long by now finding himself able to take advantage of the opportunity of conquering the empire....When the will of God has made itself manifest, and the old empire is on the point of collapse, after having reached the term of its existence, and has become disorganised in all its parts, its feebleness and exhaustion attract its adversary's notice....Encouraged by this open discovery, the people of the new empire prepare with one accord to open the attack; the imaginary dangers that had shaken their resolution up to that moment now disappear, the period of waiting comes to an end, and the conquest is accomplished by force of arms.'5

5 Ibn Khaldūn: Muqaddamāt, translated by de Slane, Baron McG. (Paris 1863-8, Imprimerie Impériale, 3 vols.) vol. ii, p. 134-5.


The Bankruptcy of a Fallen Civilized Empire's Barbarian Successor-states

{VIII.D.p.52} A barbarian successor-state blindly goes into business on the strength of the dishonoured credits of a universal state that has already gone into bankruptcy; and these boors in office hasten the advent of their inevitable doom by a self-betrayal through the outbreak, under stress of a moral ordeal, of something fatally false within;1 for a polity based solely on a gang of armed desperados' fickle loyalty to an irresponsible military leader,2 while it may be adequate for the organization of a raid or, at a pinch, for the administration and defence of a march, is morally unfit for the government of a community that has made even an unsuccessful attempt at civilization.3 It is far more unfit than would have been the unsophisticated yet respectable primitive rule of custom interpreted by the living leaders of the tribe4 into whose swept and gar-

2 'Irresponsible power, uncontrolled by any traditions of ordered freedom, will often assert itself of defend itself by savage cruelty. The catalogue of such enormities is too long and monotonous to be told in detail' (Dill, S. Roman Society in Gaul in the Merovingian Age (London 1926, Macmillan), p. 133, introducing an anthology of Merovingian atrocities).

{p.53}nished house1 this gangster-constitution has forced its entry since the radiation of a disintegrating civilization has perverted that decadent society's once primitive neighbours into bands of adolescent barbarians.2


The Restraining Inluences of Aidôs, Nemesis, and Hilm.

The barbarian trespassers in partibus civilium have, in fact, condemned themselves to suffer a moral breakdown as an inevitable consequence of their own adventurous act.4 yet they do not yield to their

1 Matt. xii. 44; Luke xi. 25.
2 The moral inferiority of the adolescent barbarian to his predecessor has been pointed out by H. G. Wells in The Outline of History (London 1920, Casell). p. 298, in a passage which is a fine example of his intuitive genius. In order to transpose this passage into the terminology of the present Study, Wells' term 'barbarism' has. of course, to be construed as 'primitive life', and his term 'savage' as 'primitive'.)
'It is frequently said that Europe in the sixth and seventh centuries relapsed into barbarism, but that does not express the reality of the case very well. Barbarism is social order of an elementary type, orderly within its limits; the state of Europe beneath its political fragmentation was a social disorder. its moral was not that of kraal, but that of a slum. In a savage krall a savage knows that he belongs to a community, and lives and acts accordingly; in a slum the individual neither knows of, nor acts in relation to, and greater being.'
4 Ibn Khaldūn traces the stages of this demoralization with a masterly hand, and with a wealth of illustrations from the histories of Arab and Berber barbarian interlopers, in op. cit., vol. i, especially pp 292-7 and 342-59: Muqaddamāt, translated by de Slane, Baron McG. (Paris 1863-8, Imprimerie Impériale, 3 vols.) vol. i, p. 134-5.

{p.54} self-decreed doom without a spiritual struggle that has left its traces in their literary records of myth and ritual and standards of conduct.


'The great characteristic of [Aidôs and Nemesis], as of Honour generally is that they only come into operation when a man is free: when there is no compulsion. If you take people ... who have broken away from all their old sanctions and select among them some strong and turbulent chief who fears no one, you will first think that such a man is free to do whatever enters his head. And then, as a matter of fact, you find that, amid his lawlessness, there will crop up some possilbe action which somehow makes him feel uncomfortable. If he has done it, he "rues" the deed and is haunted by it. If he has not done it, he "shrinks" from doing it. And this, not because anyone forces him, nor yet because any particular result will accrue to him afterwards, but simply because he feels aidôs....2
'Aidôs is what you feel about an act of your own; Nemesis is what you

2 It will be seen that, in H. G Wells' term (see the passage quoted on p. 53, n. 2, above), Aidôs is essentially a virtue of 'a slum' in which 'the individual neither knows of, nor acts in relation to, any greater being.'—A.J.T.

{p.55}feel for the act of another. Or, most often, it is what you imagine that others will feel about you....But suppose no one sees. The act, as you know well, remainsνεμεσητόν—a thing to feel nemesis about; only there is no one there to feel it. yet, if you yourself dislike what you have done, and feel aidôs for it, you inevitably are conscious that somebody or something dislikes or disapproves of you....The Earth, Water, and Air [are] full of living eyes; of theoi, of daimones, of kêres....And it is they who have seen you and are wroth with you for the thing which you have done.'1

In contrast to Aidôs and Nemesis, which enter into all aspects of social life, Hilm is a vertu des politiques.4 Before the inauguration of islam the practice of Hilm had been learnt by Abu Sufyān, the father of a Mu‛āwīyah who was to found the Umayyad power, in the school of the merchantile republic of Mecca:5 a cultural as well as physical oasis in the desert of Arab barbarism where the rudiments of city-state life had been propagated by a radiation of Syriac and Hellenic influences which, at earlier dates, had produced more brilliant fruits of the kind at Palmyra and at Petra.6 Abu Sufyān's son the Caliph Mu‛āwīyah I claimed that Hilmwas an Umayyad family virtue,7 and Mu‛āwīyah himself came ot figure as the classical exponent of it.8 On of Mu‛āwīyah's dicta was that 'Hilm would be universal if everyone had Abu Sufyān for an ancestor'.9 But 'the qualities which, when found in combination, the Arabs designed by the name of Hilm' were 'as rarely met with as

1 Murray, Gilbert: The Rise of the Greek Epic, 3rd ed. (Oxford 1924, Clarendon Press), pp. 83-84.
5 Lammens, S.J., Père H.: Études sur le Règne du Calife Omaiyade Mo‛âwia Ier (Bayrūt 1908, Imprimerie Catholiquee; Paris 1908, Geuthner), p. 89.
7 See Lammens, op. cit., p. 88, n. 3.
8 See Lammens, op. cit., p. 66-67. A monograph entitled The Hilm of Mu‛āwīyah is on of the lost works of the Classical Arabic literature (Lammens, op. cit., p. 89), but Lammens has collected anecdotes on the subject, from surviving works, in op. cit. 9. 91-103.
9 ibid., p. 88, n. 3.

{p.56}they were highly prized among a passionate people whose temperment was a bundle of nerves—nerves almost showing the skin and reacting th the slightest external shock'1

1Lammens, op. cit., p. 69.


'Hilm is thus something more sophisticated than Aidôs and Nemesis, and consequently also something less attrractive. Hilm is emphatically not an expression of humility; it's aim is rather to humiliate an adversary: to surprise him by displaying the contrast of one's own superiority; to surprise him by displaying the dignity and calm of one's own attitude'3 The practice of Hilm is not incompatible with inward feelings of resentment, animus, and vindictiveness.4 Hilm is not within the competence of anyone who is not rich and powerful, and it presupposes order to injure one's neighbour without having to fear the consequences of one's action.5

'in the desert, every true "gentleman" must have in his moral coach-house (remise—or, as we are tempted to say, in his moral stable (ècurie—two steeds to choose between at his pleasure. On the one, he makes a parade of clemency. the other—is the one which he prefers to mount—allows him to show himself in his true colours....6
'At bottom, Hilm, like most Arab qualities, is a virtue for bravado and display, with more ostentation in it than real substance: one form of Nomad stoicism—a stoicism tinged with pharisaism. Among a theatrical people that is the devitalised heir of a race which has been initiated into civilization at a very early date, but which has since relapsed into the state of nature, a reputation for Hilm can be acquired at the cheap price of an elegant gesture of a sonorous mot: it does not pre-suppose a serious spiritual struggle against passions, against pride, or against desire for vengeance. It can be combined with brutality in daily life...7
'In reality Hilm (as Ahnaf has remarked with profound insight) was not so much a virtue as an attitude—a prudent opportunism serving as a safeguard against abuses of authority, which are always regrettable, under a régime which in principle was democratic; opportune above all in as anarchic milieu, such as the Arab Society was, where every act of violence remorselessly provoked a retaliation. It was no feeling of humanity, but a fear of the thar (émeute), that inspirted the Badawī with a horror of bloodshed. And thus the virtue of Hilm was revealed to him by the disagreeableness of the consequences of a passionate word or gesture. From this point of view, Hilm was something that could not be ignored by the chiefs, who obliged by their situation to maintain an equilibrium between the elements of disorder that were rife within the bosom of the tribe. Given the parliamentary intsitutions [of the Arab heroic age], Hilm became, for the depository of [political] power, a virtue of the first order....8

7
1 Lammens, op. cit., p. 69
2 Ibid. p. 67
3 Ibid. p. 68
4 See ibid, p. 69
5 See ibid, pp. 72 and 79
6 Ibid. p. 76
7 Ibid. p. 81
8 Ibid. p. 87

{p.57} 'Hilm as practiced by [Mu‛āwīyah Umayyad successors], facilitated their task of giving the Arabs a political education; it sweetened for their pupils the bitterness of having to sacrifice the anarchic liberty of the Desert in favour of sovereigns who were condescending enough to draw a velevett glove over the iron hand with which they ruled their empire.'1


As Aidôs and Nemesis thus fade from view, their disappearance draws a cry of despair from the weary watcher of the skies. 'Pain and grief are the portion that shall be left for mortal men, and there shall be no defence against the evil day'4 Hesiod is harrowed by his illusory conviction——which it never occurs to him to doubt——that the withdrawal of the glimmering light that has sustained the children of the Dark Age through their vigil is a potent of the onset of an unmitigated and perpetual night; and he has no inkling that, on the contrary, this extinguishing of beacons is a harbinger of the return of day. The truth is that Aidôs and Nemesis reascend into Heaven as soon as the imperceptible emergence of a nascent new civilization has made their sojourn on Earth superfluous by bringing into currency other virtues that are socially more constructive though aesthetically they may be less attractive. The Iron Age into which Hesiod lamented that he had been born, because it was the age that had seen Aidôs and Nemesis shake the dust of this Earth from off their feet, was in fact the age in which a living Hellenic Civilization was arising out of a dead Minoan Civilization's ruins; and the ‛Abbisids, who had no use for the Hilm that had been their Umyyad predecessors' arcanum imperii, were the statesmen who had set the seal on the Umayyad's tour de force of profiting by the obliteration of the Syrian limes of the roman Empire through the demonic outbreak of the Primitive Muslim Arabs in order to reinaugurate a Syriac universal state that had been prematurely overthrown, a thousand years before, by Alexander the Great.5

'With the ‛Abbisids, Hilm will lose its value in the sphere of government, to become a virtue of private life. After the destruction of the former

1 Ibid. p. 103.

{p.58} Arab supremacy and Arab society...,absolutism, now firmly established from one end the Islmaic world to the other, no longer felt the necessity of resorting to Hilm in order to overcome the recalcitrance of a public opinion which, thenceforward, was condemned to silence....In undermining, at its foundations, the organisation of the former Arab Society and in forcing all necks to bow before beneath the dead level of despotism, the ‛Abbisids régime was to obtain more decisive results than the lectures (mercuriales) delivered [by Umayyad governors] from the tribunes at Kūfah and Basrah.'1

1 Lammens, S.J., Père H.: Études sur le Règne du Calife Omaiyade Mo‛âwia Ier (Bayrūt 1908, Imprimerie Catholiquee; Paris 1908, Geuthner), p. 106 and 86-87. For the anti-aristocratic egalitarianism of the despotic ‛Abbisid régime, see the present Study, VI. vii. 149-52.

It was significant that, in order to ensure the salvaging of the Syriac Civilization from the chaos of a post-Hellenic Arab heroic age, there had to be a change of political régime,

The Outbreak of an Invincible Criminality

(4) Fancy and Fact
Note: 'The Monstrous Regiment of Women'




IX CONTACTS BETWEEN CIVILIZATIONS IN SPACE

XXX. AN EXPANSION OF THE FIELD OF STUDY

XXXI. A SURVEY OF ENCOUNTERS BETWEEN CONTEMPORARY CIVILIZATIONS

(1) Plan of Operations
(2) Operations According to Plan

(a) Encounters with the Modern Western Civilization
(i) The Modern West and Russia
(ii) The Modern West and the Main Body of Orthodix Christendom
(iii) The Modern West and the Hindu World
(iv) The Modern West and the Islamic World
(v) The Modern West and the Jews
(vi) The Modern West and Far Eastern and Indigenous American Civilizations
(vii) Characteristics of the Encounters between the Modern West and its Contemporaries

(b) Encounters with medieval Western Christendom

(i) The Flow and Ebb of the Crusades
(ii) The Medieval West and the Syriac World
(iii) The medieval West and Greek Orthodox Christendom

(c) Encounters between Civilizations of the First Two Generations

(i) Encounters with the Post-Alexandrine Hellenic Civilization
(ii) Encounters with the Pre-Alexandrine Hellenic Civilization
(iii) Tares and Wheat

XXXII. THE DRAMA OF ENCOUNTERS BETWEEN CONTEMPORARIES

(1) Concatenations of Encounters
(2) Diversities of Reesponse

XXXIII. THE CONSEQUENCES OF ENCOUNTERS BETWEEN CONTEMPORARIES

(1) Aftermaths of Unsuccessful Assaults
(2) Aftermaths of Successful Assaults

(a) Effects on the Body Social
(b) Responses of the Soul

(i) Dehumanization
(ii) Zealotism and Herodianism

The terms imply a clear-cut distinction between rejection and acceptance of the conqueror's êthos, but a closer examination suggests that the distinction is not as clear-cut as it looks at first. The point is illustrated by a consideration of modern japan, and of the careers of Ghandi and Lenin.
(iii) Evangelism
Note ‘Asia’ and ‘Europe’: Facts and Fantasies




X CONTACTS BETWEEN CIVILIZATIONS IN TIME

XXXIV. A SURVEY OF RENAISSANCES

(1) Introduction ‘The Renaissance’
(2) Renaissances of Political Ideas and Institutions
(3) Renaissances of Systems of Law
(4) Renaissances of Philosophies
(5) Renaissances of Languages and Literatures
(6) Renaissances of Visual Arts
(7) Renaissances of Religious Ideals and Institutions

E. THE CONSEQUENCES OF NECROMANCY

IV. THE STERILITY OF THE BLACK ART

Even, however, when a necromancer avoids or escapes the nemesis of being enslaved by a ghost that he has reanimated at his own expense by nurturing it with a transfusion of his own life-blood, the sterility to which even the least noxious achievements of the Black Art are condemned ex officio originis is exposed remorselessly when these are compared with contemporary achievements of a necromantic society's native genius.

In the field of politics, for example, it is evident that, in the Medieval chapter of Western history, the master-institution was not an Imperium Romanum Redivivum but was a newly created Papal Roman Respublica Christiana,3 and that in the Arabic Muslim history it was, not the Cairene ghost of an ‛Abbasid Caliphate, but a novel self-recruiting Mamlūks corps, that endowed this society, in its infancy, with the strength to hold its own against the world-conquering Mongols.4 In the modern chapter of Western history, again, the indigenous Western institution of parliamentary representative government eclipsed the resuscitated Hellenic institution of demagogic Democracy that was apt—first in the city-states in Italy after A.D. 1254 and then in a nation-state in France after A.D. 1789—to turn, as fast as milk turns in thundery weather, into the sour brew of a plebiscitary dictatorship. In the field of Law the genius of an Orthodox Christian Civilization revealed itself, not in a Macedonian Dynasty's revival of a dead Justinian Hellenic law, but in an antecedent Syrian Dynasty's new creation of an East Roman law inspired by Christian principles. In the field of Philosophy, likewise, the genius of a Far Eastern Civilization revealed itself, not in the revival of a dead Confucianism, but in the foregoing new creation of indigenous Far Eastern philosophies inspired by Mahayanian Buddhist though, while, in the intellectual history of a Medieval Western Christendom, the genius of Saint Thomas Aquinas revealed itself, in his Summa Theologica, not in the resuscitation of Aristotelian these but in the construction of a system that was the Angelic Doctor's own.1 In the field of Physical nature in vacuo, as if logic could do duty for verification, threatened to sterilize, and succeeded in retarding, the harvest that was to be garnered from application of an experimental method of research in accordance with the Western Civilization's native bent.2 In the field of language and Literature the all flawlessly Ciceronian Latinity of an Erasmus, who had taught himself to speak with the tongues of men and angels, was become as sounding brass or a tinkling cymbal3 in a Modern Western house of many mansions,4 that had been filled with a sound as of a rushing mighty wind5 by a vernacular poetry in a chorus of divers living Western languages, while, in a contemporary Far Eastern World, a creative art of Drama and the Novel, conveyed in a living 'mandarin' lingua franca, had likewise eventually taken the light out of a pedantic reproduction of the style and themes of the Sinic classics. In the field of the Visual Arts an orthodox Christian Civilization's miniature reminiscences in ivory of an Hellenic style of bas-relief carving in marble turn deathly pale, exquisite though they are, in the presence of mosaics glowing and vibrating with a veritable life engendered by the fruitful marriage of an indigenous Byzantine creativity with an indigenous Byzantine technique.

the last word on the comparative merits of the realm of Hades and the land of the living was spoken to Odysseus by the shade of Achilles:


'I would rather be a wretched peasant on the land, labouring as a serf with a poor portionless man for my master, than be sovereign lord of the legions of the shades of the dead and departed.'6






Issued under the auspices of the
Royal Institute of International Affairs

OXFORD UNIVERSITY PRESS

1954


XI. LAW AND FREEDOM IN HISTORY

A. THE PROBLEM

(I) THE STATE OF THE QUESTION

{XI.A.I.p. 167} WHEN the writer was planning the present Study in the summer of A.D. 1927, he saw that he would have to grapple with the problem of the respective roles of Law and Freedom in human history before he could attempt to win a Pisgah sight of the prospects of the Western Civilization. Yet in the winter of A.D. 1928-9, when, with that ulterior objective in mind, he was drafting his notes for eventually writing the present Part, he was conscious that the fateful question then still seemed academic to most people in Western countries that had been either neutral or on the winning side in the World War of A.D. 1914-18. In the June of A.D. 1950, when, after a seven-years-long interruption extending over the years 1939-46, he at last reached this point in the writing of the book, he found himself working in a new atmosphere that was decidedly more congenial to his theme.

By the year A.D. 1950 the survivors of a generation of Westerners that had fought two fratricidal world wars in one lifetime had emerged from the second of these unprecedentedly destructive conflicts of a traditional military kind only to find itself engaged in a 'cold war' which was neither less arduous nor less critical for being less barbarous than a twice-played military overture in which the encore had surpassed the first performance; and these disillusioning and disquieting experiences had brought about, in most living Western souls, a revolutionary change of feeling and outlook. By this time, most Westerners had become aware that their own civilization was in danger of coming to grief; and reflection had then reminded them that this was, after all, no novel prospect in an historical arena in which most, if not all, other human societies of the same species had come to grief already. The living generation in the West was, in fact, beginning to look at the facts of History as these presented themselves to the naked eye, instead of continuing to peer at this formidable spectacle through smoked glasses inherited from its grand-parents; and, in the light of luminous facts which they were at last allowing themselves to see, they were asking themselves questions that would have shocked their grandparents if these could ever have dreamed of formulating them.

The generation of Homo Occidentalis that had already been in its dotage in A.D. 1914 had been the latest generation to hold, with an unquestioning faith, a dogma which, by then, had been serving for a quarter of a millennium as the gist of a Late Modern Western Man's mechanically desiccated and peptonized religion. This fallaciously comfortable doctrine was that the Western Society could see ahead of it an unbroken vista of progress towards an Earthly Paradise, and that its
{p.168} triumphant advance along this open avenue was inevitable, since the only 'law' binding upon a Homo Sapiens who was free to shape his own future in every other respect was 'a law of progress' rendering a wishful thinker's desires inevitable.

In A.D. 1950 the grandchildren of these Victorian Last of the Mohicans were asking themselves questions that had been formulated for Western inquirers on the morrow of the First World War by Oswald Spengler, a pontifical-minded man of genius thinking and writing in the psychological milieu of a country which had then just suffered what, by the still moderate standards of the day, had been a shattering military defeat. Some thirty years after the publication of the first edition of Der Untergang des Abendlandes in A.D. 1919, a chorus of Western voices was echoing Spengler's prescient questionnaire. Are the great tribulations that we have suffered, and the greater tribulations that we forebode, the products of 'laws', beyond our control, that turn out to be no 'laws of progress'? If such unpleasant laws are, in truth, in operation, do these govern the whole of Human Life, or are there some provinces or planes of Life in which Man is his own master—free, within those limits, to find remedies, through his own action, for evils that are of his own making? If human affairs should prove to be thus under dual control, then what affairs are under our own control and what are governed by 'Law'? And, if we do find that Man's stable contains a loose-box, can we use this islet of freedom as a őπον στώμεν from which—by virtue, wisdom, and work—we may perhaps succeed in enlarging the borders of the province under Man's control at the expense of the province under the dominion of 'Law'?

The German philosopher who led the way in putting these disturbing new questions into once complacently sluggish Western minds went on to give to all of them one comprehensive dogmatic answer of his own. The true law of Human Social Life, he laid down, was not a law of inevitable progress; it was a law of inevitable breakdown, disintegration, and dissolution—and this within a Time-span which was perhaps even more inflexibly uniform than the life-spans of living organisms. Happily, the adoption of Spengler’s fateful questions did not commit his oracular response to his own shrewd inquiry; and, since in other contexts we have already exposed the fallacy of Spengler's confusion of societies with organisms1 and the groundlessness of his belief in the omnipotence of the savage goddess Necessity,2 we can regard the questions asked and answered by Spengler as being, pace Spengleri, still open.

1 See III. iii. 219-23.
2 See IV. Iv. 7-39.


(II) DEFINITIONS OF TERMS

{XI.A.II. p. 168} In venturing, without prejudice, to seek a fresh answer of our own to the question whether human affairs are governed by laws, our first step must be to define what we mean by 'laws' and by 'human affairs'.

In the context of our present Study, 'human affairs' manifestly mean, not Medicine, but the Humanities; not the organic chemistry, biology,
{p.169} and physiology of the human body, but the affairs of human beings in that spiritual aspect of Humanity in which Man is a person with a consciousness and a will moving on the face of the waters1 of a subconscious psychic abyss, and not in the physical aspect in which Man is a body whose chemical constituents can be analysed, weighed, measured, and priced at their current value in the market for material commodities. If, for our purposes in this Study, we define the term 'human affairs' in the spiritual sense, we can see that our field of human affairs articulates itself into four provinces occupied respectively by the Souls diverse relations with God, with its own self, with a relatively small circle of other human beings with whom it is in direct personal communion, and with a relatively large circle of people with whom it is in indirect impersonal contact through the mechanism of institutions.2 We shall be reconnoitring all four provinces in this Part of our Study.

In this same context, 'law' manifestly does not mean the man-made legislation which is, of course, the only authentic 'law' in the literal sense of the word, and which is also the only law with which we have a direct acquaintance in our immediate day-to-day human experience. The 'law' with which we are concerned in this Study resembles this familiar man-made institution in being a set of rules governing human affairs; but the differentia of this so-called law' is that it is not made by Man; and, in using the term with this transference of meaning, we are attributing the characteristics of a known human institution to the enigmatic working of a mysterious Universe. In resorting to this linguistic expedient of metaphor we are flagrantly guilty of Anthropomorphism; and, if we cannot—as indeed we cannot—reach our goal without taking this flight of the imagination, we must recognize that, in transporting a word from the social to the metaphysical sphere, we cannot help transporting the word's connotations together with the label to which these notions adhere. The inherent threat to the accuracy, as well as to the clarity, of our thought is as evident as it is unavoidable; and the most effective safeguard against it will be to remind ourselves, in advance, what these a priori connotations of the word ‘law’ are.

The most striking characteristic of man-made law is that it is intended to apply consistently in uniform circumstances in all human situations that are deemed to fall within the scope of whatever the particular law may be. By implication the law is intended to be imposed impartially, and to be enforced effectively, upon all and sundry who come within its ambit. Furthermore, the law is intended, not only to be consistently formulated and applied and to be impartially and effectively administered, but also to be, and to be recognized by all concerned as being, morally right. Since, however, Human Nature is lamentably imperfect in morals, intelligence, and practice alike, and since this all-pervasive imperfection is ubiquitously reflected in the unsatisfactoriness of Man's conduct of his human affairs, even the best law known to History is never quite just, never quite effectively or impartially administered, and never quite consistently applied or formulated.3 A perfectly consistent

1 Gen. i. 2.
2 See I. i. 454-5 and III. iii. 233-30.
3 There were on record notorious cases in which a community's will or power, or both, to administer the law impartially and effectively had lagged far behind its will or power, or both, to formulate and apply the law consistently. One instance was the state of the municipal law of the Icelanders in the tenth century of the Christian Era; another was the state of the international law of sovereign states of the Western Society in the twentieth century of the same era. The sequel in Iceland (see II. Ii. 357, n. 2) suggests that an anarchy of this repulsively sophisticated type is apt to bring itself to a speedy end by intervention of some masterful alien hand.

{p.170} formulation of the law is indeed inherently impossible, since the most acute and supple intellectual operations of the most consummate legal genius would be unequal to coping with the subtlety and complexity of the concrete human affairs with which a lawyer's abstractions have to deal.

This intractability of Life to Law accounts for the moral ambivalence which is an ineradicable trait of Law and an irrefutable testimony to the power of Original Sin. The impersonal objectivity that is the Law's acknowledged ideal had been mocked, in every actual law that had ever been enacted since the dawn of legislation, by the unmistakable reflection in it of some personal bias unjustly favouring one 'interest' by unjustly penalizing another. The perfect justice of a God who 'is no respecter of persons',1 and 'who, without respect of persons, judgeth according to every man's work',2 had never been exhibited by any human legislator. Even the least unscrupulous and most disinterested human legislation had always perceptibly reflected in some degree the play of current religious, economic, political, military, and other social forces. Yet, even if we could imagine the advent of an omnipotent human legislator who was at the same time perfect in every faculty of the Human Spirit, the disinterested impersonality that would be the glory of this imaginary paragon's legislation and dispensation of justice would be concurrently the scandal of his work, since a law that can never be sufficiently impersonal in the sense of ignoring the personal interests of the legislator, the judge, and the administrator can also never be sufficiently personal in the sense of allowing sufficiently for the personal circumstances of each and every human soul who is subject to this law and whose case is sub judice. The inherent, and consequently inescapable, dilemma of all human legislation and legal proceedings is that, in so far as the Law succeeds in being impersonal, it necessarily achieves this at the odious price of treating human souls—which are individual and unique—as if they were mass-produced, standardized non-human objects like coins or bricks or pounds of butter or sacks of coal, while, in so far as it succeeds in making allowances for personal circumstances, it necessarily achieves this at a risk of grievously departing from an impartiality that is of the essence of human justice.

This was the historical human social context from which the name and notion of 'law' had been transferred to a metaphysical context by a resort to the perilous yet unavoidable expedient of Anthropomorphism. At an earlier point in this Study3 we have noticed that the social milieu in which this flight of the human imagination is apt to be made is the experience of a disintegrating society that has won a reprieve for itself by a political union within the framework of a universal state; and we have observed that, in these social circumstances, the idea of law is apt,

1 Acts x. 34.
2 1 Pet. i. 17.
3 In. vi. 15-17.

{p.171} the act of being translated from the social to the metaphysical plane, to become polarized into two apparently antithetical concepts. For minds in whose mental vision the personality of the human legislator, judge, and administrator looms larger than the law of which he is at once the master and the servant, the metaphysical 'law' governing the Universe is the law of a unique and omnipotent God pictured in the image of a human Caesar.1 For other minds, in whose vision Caesar's figure is eclipsed by a human law that is impersonally formulated, applied,' administered, and enforced—such as 'the Law of the Medes and Persians which altereth not',2 that was the oecumenical law of the Achaemenian Empire—the metaphysical law' governing the Universe is the law of a uniform and inexorable Nature. In this diffracted vision, metaphysical 'law’ in the guise of 'a Law of God’ and metaphysical 'law' in the guise of 'laws of Nature’ present between them the double-faced countenance of a Janus, and in either face there are—as in the human law of every-day life—both consoling and horrifying features.

The horrifying feature in 'the laws of Nature' is their inexorability; for, although, in theory, these 'laws' may be scheduled as being de jure mere 'by-laws' or 'secondary causes' subject to the fiat of a 'First Cause' that will then be identified with God, in practice they will be taken as being de facto autonomous. 'The laws of Nature', in fact, fulfil the Medes' and Persians' ideal of laws that cannot ever be repealed or ever even be revised in the light of experience.3 This inhuman quality of inexorability is horrifying indeed, yet its moral enormity carries with it an intellectual compensation; for laws in which there 'is no variableness, neither shadow of turning',4 will on that very account be ascertainable, both exactly and definitively, by a human intelligence; and, while no more than isolated fragments of these 'laws of Nature' may be thus ascertainable at any particular time and place by any particular human mind, their intrinsic stability and permanence render them accessible to a process of progressive exploration by a Collective Human Intellect.5 A knowledge of Nature thus appears to be within Man's mental grasp, and there is a sense in which this knowledge is power; for human beings who know Nature's unvarying laws and who can therefore predict with certainty which way she is going to jump will not only be able to dodge this inhuman monster's aimless blows; they will also be able to harness the energy generated, released, and expended in these undesigned operations, and so to turn this energy to account for serving human purposes (in so far, of course, as individual human wills can agree on what their common purposes shall be). And thus a Collective Human Intellect, which cannot divert the inexorable course of Nature by a hair's breadth, can nevertheless make a world of difference, for good or for evil, to the effect of the play of laws of Nature on human affairs by bringing into action technological devices that can effectively control, not the operation of these laws, but the incidence of their operation on Man's life.

1 See V. vi. 33-36.
2 Dan. vi. 8 and 12.
3 'Biological progress exists as a fact of Nature external to Man' (Julian Huxley, in his 'Conclusion' to T.H. and J. Huxley: Evolution and Ethics, 1893-1943 (London 1947, Pilot Press), p. 182).
4 Jas. i. 17.
5 See pp. 697 and 701, below.

{p.172} All the same, the limits within which even the most ingenious human technology can outmanoeuvre a railbound Nature are narrowly circumscribed.

'Canst thou draw out Leviathan with an hook? Or his tongue with a cord which thou lettest down ? Canst thou put an hook into his nose ? Or bore his jaw through with a thorn ? Will he make many supplications unto thee ? Will he speak soft words unto thee ? Will he make a covenant with thee? Wilt thou take him for a servant for ever? Wilt thou play with him as with a bird? Or wilt thou bind him for thy maidens? Shall the companions make a banquet of him? Shall they part him among the merchants?'1

The Stellar Universe, which was the first field in which any exact and systematic discovery of 'laws of Nature' was ever made by the Collective Intellect of Man in Process of Civilization, had not yet been made amenable to technological manipulation at the time of writing; and a Late Modern Western Man's world-conquering intelligence had liberated him from the astrologer's mistaken belief that human affairs were at the mercy of malignant influences emanating from the inexorable courses of the stars, only to convince him of a truth that convicted him of sin. The successive discoveries of a 'know-how' for navigating the air and splitting the atom in a society that had not yet rid itself of the institution of War had made it manifest to a technologically triumphant generation that the malignity of Leviathan 'is not in our stars but in ourselves'.2

A human soul that has been convicted of sin, and been convinced that it cannot achieve its own reformation without the help of God's grace, will opt, like David, to fall into the hand of the Lord and not into the hand of Man.3 An inexorability in punishing, as wall as in exposing, Man's sin, which is the Last Judgment of 'the laws of Nature', can be overcome only by accepting the jurisdiction of a 'Law of God', The price of this transfer of spiritual allegiance is a forfeiture of that exact and definitive intellectual knowledge, with its attendant technological power, which is the material prize and the spiritual burden of human souls that are content to be Nature's masters at the cost of being her slaves, 'It is a fearful thing to fall into the hands of the living God';4 for, if God is a spirit,5 His dealings with human spirits will be unpredictable and inscrutable, as the acts of any personality always are for any other personality that has to meet its kind in an encounter. In appealing to the Law of God, a human soul has to abandon certainty in order to embrace Hope and Fear; for a law that is the expression of a will is animated by a spiritual freedom which is the very antithesis of the saeva necessitas of laws of Nature, and an arbitrary law may be inspired either by redemptive Love or by vindictive Hate, may be administered either by making a winning appeal or by exerting an overbearing compulsion, and may be designed to promote either good or evil. In casting itself upon the Law of God, a human soul is apt to find in this what it brings to it; for in the mirror of God's perfection it will see a reflection of itself, and hence Man’s notions of the Law of God have run to irreconcilable extremes of

1 Job. xli, 1-6.
2 Shakspeare : Julius Caesar, Act I, scene ii.
3 2 Sam, xxiv. 14.
4 Hebrews x. 31.
5 John iv. 24.

{p.173} diversity, in which a visio beattfica of God the Father wars with a visio malefica of God the Tyrant. This conflict of incompatible visions will exercise us throughout this Part. At the present stage we have merely to take note of the indisputable truth that both visions alike are consonant with the image of God as a personality pictured in the anthropomorphic guise beyond which the human imagination seems to be impotent to penetrate even in its farthest flights of intuition.



B. THE AMENABILTIY OF HUMAN AFFAIRS TO ‘LAWS OF NATURE’



(c) 'LAWS OF NATURE' IN THE HISTORIES OF CIVILIZATIONS

1. Struggles for Existence between Parochial States
The War-and-Peace Cycle in Modern and post-Modern Western History

{XI.B.I.(c) 1, p. 234} If, without taking our eyes off the Modern and post-Modern chapters of the history of the Western Civilization, we now focus them on the political, instead of the economic, plane of activity, we shall see that, in an epoch in which the outstanding economic phenomenon was the epiphany and dissemination of Industrialism, the outstanding political phenomenon was the earlier epiphany of a Balance of Power between parochial states and the progressive inclusion of an ever widening circle of states within the field offeree governed by this unitary system of inter-state power politics.

The Modern Western political Balance of Power resembled its younger contemporary the Modern Western industrial economy not only in tending to expand progressively over an ever wider geographical area, but also in exhibiting a cyclic rhythm in its history. Alternating phases of war and peace were the political counterparts of alternating phases of economic prosperity and depression; and a confrontation of the political with the economic series of fluctuations in Modem Western history threw fresh light on those cycles with wave-lengths of about twenty-five years, and double cycles with wave-lengths of about half a century, for which the economic evidence was so inadequate that the more cautious economic investigators had returned verdicts of 'non-
{p.235} proven' on these longer cycles’ claims to be economic realities.1 The political evidence bore out the view, entertained by judicious economic inquirers,2 that the apparitions of economic 'long waves' might not be hallucinations but might be economic reflections of political realities that had already been 'a going concern' in the Modern Western World for some three hundred years before the outbreak of the Industrial Revolution in Great Britain.3 In any case, whatever the political cycles’ relations to the economic cycles might eventually prove to be, there were indications that the political cycles, like their economic counterparts, were changing in character in accordance with a secular trend. Recurrent Western wars, for example, were, as we shall see, apparently becoming progressively shorter and sharper, while conversely the alternatingly recurrent spells of peace in Western political history had, as we shall also see, tended to occupy a progressively greater aggregate number of years in each successive peace-and-war cycle down to the outbreak of the general war of A.D. 1914-18, though at the same time these progressive chronological gains for Peace at War's expense were being offset by a progressive aggravation of the economic, the political, and (above all) the spiritual devastation produced by wars when these did recur.

In studying the evidence for the currency of 'laws of Nature' in the economic affairs of a latter-day Western Society, we have noticed that inquirers who believed such laws to be both current and ascertainable were also aware that their validity was confined to a monetary and industrial economic régime which had not established itself, even in its birthplace in Great Britain, before the later decades of the eighteenth century and which might be expected eventually to pass out of existence after an ephemeral appearance, and a still briefer oecumenical ascendancy, on the stage of History. 4 At the time of writing, mid-way through the twentieth century, the Balance of Power had had a longer innings than Industrialism had had so far in the history of the Western Civilization, since the epiphany of the Modern Western Balance of Power had been coeval with the opening of the modern chapter of Western history in the last quarter of the fifteenth century, some three hundred years before Industrialism had made its appearance. On the other hand a mortality which, in the history of Western industrialism, was at this time still no more than an academic expectation, was perhaps already asserting its dominion over the Balance of Power between parochial Western states.

A post-Modern Age of Western history which had opened in the seventh and eighth decades of the nineteenth century5 had seen the rhythm of a Modern Western war-and-peace cycle broken, in the course of its fourth beat, by the portent of one general war following hard at the heels of another, with an interval of only twenty-five years between the outbreaks in A.D. 1939 and in A.D. 1914, instead of the interval of 120 years or more which had separated A.D. 1914 from A.D. 1792 and A.D. 1792 from A.D. 1672. In the histories of civilizations that were already

1 See pp. 230-2, above.
2 For example, by W. W. Rostow, in the passage cited on p. 231, above.
3 See pp. 286-7, below.
4 See pp. 224-6, above.
5 See I. i. 1, n. 2.

{p.236} extinct, so that the twentieth-century Western historian had the advantage there of knowing the whole story, such 'non-stop' recurrences of major wars had been apt to portend historic catastrophes. When, in the second chapter of Hellenic history, the Decelean War of 413-404 B.C. had followed the Archidamian War of 431-421 B.C. after an interval of only eight years, the consequence of this Atheno-Pcloponnesian double war had been the breakdown of the Hellenic Civilization. When the Hannibalic War of 218-201 B.C. had followed the First Romano-Punic War of 264-241 B.C. after an interval of only twenty-three years, the consequence of this Romano-Punic double war had been the first relapse of a broken down and disintegrating Hellenic Society after its first rally.1 When the Great Romano-Sasanian War of A.D. 603-28 had followed the Great Romano-Sasanian War of A.D. 572-91 after an interval of only twelve years, the consequence had been the obliteration of a frontier between an Hellenic universal state and recalcitrant Iranian Power which, reckoning from the date of its original establishment by the Roman empire-builder Pompey in 64 B.C., had maintained itself for all but seven hundred years by the time when the momentary restoration of the territorial status quo ante bellum in A.D. 628 was undone, once for all, by an explosion of Primitive Muslim Arab military force that completed the liquidation of a post-Alexandrine Hellenic ascendancy south of Taurus and re-established in the shape of an Arab Caliphate the Syriac universal state which Alexander had overthrown in the shape of an Achaemenian Empire.

At a moment in the post-Modern chapter of Western history at which the denouement of the double Germano-Western War of A.D. 1914-18 and A.D. 1939-45 was not yet an accomplished fact, the approaching overturn of a Balance of Power which had maintained its precarious existence since its inauguration in the last decade of the fifteenth century had already been announced by a rise in the death-rate of Western or Westernizing Great Powers that had been as steep as it had been sudden; and this carnage was ominous, considering that the first law of every balance, political and physical alike, is that the instability of the equilibrium varies in inverse ratio to the number of its points d’appui. While a two-legged stool, chair, or table would be doomed by the unpracticality of its construction to fall over in a trice, a three-legged stool is capable of standing by itself, though a corpulent sitter would rest more securely on a four-legged chair and a careful housewife would prefer a six-legged to a four-legged table for carrying a display of her best china. Since politics are never static but are always dynamic, an apter analogy from the chances and changes of physical life is to be found in the superiority of a tricycle over a bicycle as a mount for a rider who finds difficulty in keeping his balance, and the superiority of a six-wheeled omnibus over a four-wheeled car as a vehicle for traversing the sands of the desert. In the light of these homely physical analogies, the rise and decline in the number of Western or Westernizing Great Powers between A.D. 1553 and A.D. 1952 was politically most significant.

From the first epiphany of a Modern Western system of international

1 See V. vi. 290-1.

{p.237} relations at the close of the fifteenth century down to the outbreak of the General War of A.D. 1914-18 more than four hundred years later, the precariousness of the international equilibrium in the political life of the Western World had been progressively reduced by a gradual increase in the number of participant Powers of the highest calibre.

In the first bout of Modern Western wars (gerebatur A.D. 1494-1559), in which the original constellation of Modern Western Great Powers had crystallized out of a Late Medieval nebula surrounding the city-state cosmos in Northern Italy, Southern and Western Germany, and the Netherlands, there had been a phase (durabat A.D. 1519-56)—and this the decisive phase—in which only two Powers of the very highest calibre had been face to face; and this preliminary duel between Valois and Hapsburg, which was the overture to the rhythmic fluctuations of a Balance of Power in the subsequent course of Western political history, was, in the last analysis, a civil war between Valois and Valois,1 since, in this chapter of Hapsburg history, the heart of the Hapsburg Power was that portion of the heritage of the Burgundian-Valois Duke Charles the Bold which Charles' Hapsburg son-in-law Maximilian I had managed to retain in A.D. 1477-82 for his Burgundian-Valois wife Mary, and to retrieve in A.D. 1493. This Burgundian nucleus of the dominions of a Hapsburg great-grandson and namesake of Charles the Bold who happened to be King of Castile and Aragon2 and subsequently Holy Roman Emperor,3 as well as Count of an Imperial Burgundy and a French Flanders,4 was the heart which pumped out the life-blood that nourished the Hapsburg Power's sinews of war; and, if Charles V's treasury and arsenal were thus French in their provenance in virtue of being furnished by a Flanders that was a French county, his court was French in its culture in virtue of having been moulded in the tradition of a Burgundy that was a French duchy.

The Burgundian-Valois House had been founded by an act of the French Crown as recently as A.D. 1363, when King John of France had conferred on his fourth son Philip the Bold a Duchy of Burgundy which had escheated to the French Crown through the extinction, in A.D. 1361, of the dukes of the Capetian French line; and the fortunes of this newly endowed Burgundian cadet branch of the House of Valois had been made by Philip the Bold's marriage in A.D. 1369 with the reigning Count of Flanders’ daughter and heiress Margaret; for Flanders was a fief of the French Crown that was still more important than Burgundy; and this matrimonial alliance had resulted, on the death in A.D. 1384 of Margaret's father, Count Louis II of Flanders, without male heirs, in the union of the French fief of Burgundy with the French fiefs of

1 See Fueter, E.: Geschichte des Europäischen Staatensystems von 1492-1559 (Munich and Berlin 1919, Oldenbourg), pp. 101-3, for the thesis that the fundamental cause of conflict in this cycle was not a rivalry between the two national states of France and Spain. Fueter suggests that, after Francis I's victory over the Swiss at Marignano on the 13th-14th September, 1515, Spain might have acquiesced in a partition of Italy between herself and France if the union of the crowns of Castile and Aragon with the Hapsburg-Valois Power in A.D. 1516 had not resulted in the subordination of Spanish interests to Burgundian interests in the determination of the foreign policy of Charles V.
2 Since the 23rd January, 1516.
3 Since the 28th June, 1519.
4 Since the 5th January, 1515.

{p.238}Flanders, Artois, Nevers, and Rethel and the Imperial County of Burgundy into the bargain.1

The duel between Royal French Valois and Burgundian Ducal French Valois who were thinly disguised under a Hapsburg Imperial mask did not, however, result in a reunion of these two branches of the House of France which, in the political circumstances of the Western World of the day, would have brought with it a political reunification of Western Christendom under the oecumenical rule of a resuscitated Carolingian Empire; and, in proving to have been at least an 'undecisive contest', if not a 'temperate' one,2 this opening round in a rhythmical series of Modern and post-Modern Western wars justified the inauguration of a Balance of Power involving the Western World as a whole3 if the value of this political device is to be measured by its capacity to obtain for a society a maximum amount of political decentralization and maximum degree of cultural diversity at a minimum cost in terms of political friction and military conflict. Thereafter, as the further fluctuations of this Modern Western Balance followed their rhythmic course, they long continued on the whole to serve the interests of a Homo Occidentalis who was at once their perpetrator and their victim, if we may find an index of their beneficence in the concomitant net increase in the number of participant Great Powers from the figure of two, at which it had stood on the eve of the abdication of Charles V in A.D. 1555/6, to the figure of eight, at which it stood in A.D. 1914.

In the course of those three centuries and a half, the number of Great Powers in the Western World had gradually risen. It rose from two to three through the fission of the Burgundian-Valois-Hapsburg Power into a Spanish Hapsburg Monarchy and a Danubian Hapsburg Monarchy after the abdication of Charles V in A.D. I555/6,4 and then, during

1 The Imperial County of Burgundy (Franche-Comté) had been inherited in A.D. 1347 by Jeanne, the wife of Count Louis II of Flanders and the daughter of another Jeanne who had been the 'wife of King Philip V of France and the daughter of Count Otto IV of Franche-Conité . Philip of France had married this older Jeanne in A.D. 1307, ten years before he himself had come to the French throne in A.D, 1317, and Franche-Comté had thus temporarily fallen into the possession of the French Crown; it had then passed into the hands of the Capetian duke of the French Duchy of Burgundy, Odo IV, in A.D. 1330 through his marriage with Margaret, the daughter of Jeanne the elder and sister of Jeanne the younger; thereafter, in A.D. 1347, it had been inherited by Jeanne the younger upon Duke Odo IV of Burgundy's death; and, through Jeanne the younger, it was subsequently inherited by her daughter Margaret upon the death of Jeanne the younger's husband and Margaret's father. Count Louis II of Flanders, in A.D. 1384.
2 See Gibbon, E.: The History of the Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire chap, xxxviii, ad finem: 'General Observations on the Fall of the Roman Empire in the West',
3 A local Balance of Power, involving the city-states of Northern and Central Italy, had been in operation during the quarter of a millennium running from the death of the Holy Roman Emperor Frederick II in A.D. 1250 to the invasion of Italy by King Charles VIII of France in A.D. 1494.
4 The first step towards the construction of a Danubian Hapsburg Monarchy had been taken as early as A.D. 1532, when, by a treaty signed at Brussels on the 7th February of that year, Charles V had invested his brother Ferdinand with a regency over the hereditary possessions of the House of Hapsburg, The second step had been taken in A.D. 1526, when the Crowns of Hungary and Bohemia had been conferred on Ferdinand after the Hungarians' disastrous defeat by the 'Osmanlis at Mohaess (see II. ii, 177-9). The third step was taken when Ferdinand was elected Holy Roman Emperor, in succession to Charles V, on the 28th February, 1558.
The separate existence of a Spanish Hasaburg Monarchy may be dated from Philip II's succession to Charles V in A.D. 1556 in Spain and in the Burgundian dominions, which were thereby reduced to the status of Spanish dependencies.

{p.239} the first of the regular cycles of war-and-peace in this series (currebat A.D. 1568-1672), the number rose again from three to five through the successful self-assertion of a United Northern Netherlands that had broken out of the Spanish Monarchy and a Sweden that had broken out of the Danish Monarchy.

During the second of these three regular cycles (currebat A.D. 1672- 1792) the number threatened to fall as sharply as it had risen during the preceding cycle; for Spain, as well as the Netherlands and Sweden, now proved unequal to staying the course, while the sixteenth-century fission of the Hapsburg Power into a Spanish and an Austrian branch came into danger of being neutralized by an eighteenth-century union of the Spanish Monarchy with France to create a Bourbon Power which, in the hands of Louis XIV, would have outclassed all the other Powers of the Western World as decidedly as the undivided Hapsburg Power had out-classed its French rival before the abdication of Charles V. None of these possibilities, however, materialized; for the replacement of a Hapsburg by a Bourbon dynasty at Madrid did not, after all, 'abolish the Pyrenees’;1 a Bourbon Spain remained at least as separate from a Bourbon France after A.D. 1713 as a Hapsburg Spain had been, since A.D. 1556, from a Hapsburg Austria; and the casualties among the parvenues 'just-great’ Powers were made good by replacements. A United Kingdom of England and Scotland took the place of a United Netherlands who had exhausted herself in winning a General War of A.D. 1672-1713 in which she had been the protagonist in the anti-French coalition; Prussia took the place of a Sweden who had exhausted herself in waging the Northern War of A.D. 1700-21; and, though an eighteenth-century Spain who succeeded in retaining her independence did not succeed in becoming a Great Power again, this gap in the ranks of the Great Powers of the Western World was filled by the enlistment of an Orthodox Christian Russia whose decisive victory over Sweden had demonstrated the effectiveness of her reception of the Western Civilization, at any rate on the military plane.

During the third cycle (currebat A.D. 1792-1914) a number which had thus remained constant during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries at the figure of five was raised once more, and this time from five to eight, by the successive additions of a United Italy, a United States of North America, and a Westernizing Japan. A nineteenth-century Italy attained the stature of a 'just-great' Power that had been attained by a seventeenth-century Holland and Sweden. A twentieth-century Japan won her spurs by defeating Russia, as an eighteenth-century Russia had won hers by defeating Sweden. The United States emerged through a fission of an eighteenth-century British Empire which ultimately had the same effect of making two Great Powers out of one as the fission of the Hapsburg Power after the abdication of Charles V, though the secession of the United States from the British Empire was achieved by the force of arms with which Sweden and the United Netherlands had

1 'II n'y a plus de Pyrénées’ was Louis XIV's comment on the accession of his grandson to the throne of Spain in A.D. 1700 according to Voltaire, Le Stiècle de Louis Quatorze, chap. 28.

{p.240} won their independence from Denmark and Spain, and not by the pacific and amicable process through which the Danubian and the Spanish Hapsburg Monarchy had parted company.1

Thus, on the eve of the outbreak of a General War of A.D. 1914-18 which was to open the fourth regular cycle in the series, it looked, in the light of the experience of the past 350 years, as if the current Balance of Power in the Western World had ensured its own perpetuation for an indefinite time ahead by progressively increasing the number of the bases on which it rested until it had come to stand steadily upon eight legs instead of shakily upon two; and this appearance of security was enhanced by the spectacle of a row of ninepins standing in between the legs; for the increase in the number of Great Powers in the Western system of international relations between A.D. 1556 and A.D. 1914 had been accompanied by an increase pari passu in the number of 'buffer states' on which the mutually frustrating jealousies of rival Great Powers around them had bestowed an independence that these pigmies would have been incapable of either winning or keeping by force of their own arms. Such 'buffer states' had emerged and survived in so far as the balanced pressures of their powerful neighbours upon one another had happened to create and preserve here and there some nook or cranny in which a militarily impotent minor state could nestle and thrive like a rock-plant in an interstice between the rugged faces of the untooled stones in a wall of cyclopean masonry.2

The United States, for example, in her military and political infancy, had been able to win her independence in the war of A.D. 1775-83 in North America thanks to a temporary neutralization of British sea-power by French sea-power, and had then been able to expand westwards across the Continent by securing the reversion of the Mississippi Basin through the Louisiana Purchase thanks to a preponderance of British sea-power over French sea-power in the General War of A.D. 1792-1815 which had made it impossible for Napoleon to take delivery for France of a Transatlantic territory which he had compelled Spain to retrocede to France on paper. The Latin American republics, in their turn, had owed their independence to a mistrust of the Continental European Powers that had moved Great Britain to co-operate with the United States by tacitly putting the sanction of British sea-power behind President Monroe's announcement of his doctrine on the 2nd December,

1 The first step in the rise of the United States to the rank of a Great Power was the winning of her independence in the Revolutionary War of A.D. 1775-83. The second step was the development of her potential strength through the political acquisition and economic exploitation of a trans-continental territory (a stage corresponding to the geographical expansion of the Danubian Hapsburg Power in and after A.D. 1526). The third step was the maintenance of the Union by force of arms in the Civil War of A.D. 1861-5 (to which the counterpart in Hapsburg history was the Thirty Years War of A.D. 1618-48). The fourth step was the victory of the United States in the Spanish-American War of A.D. 1898, which drew the United States out of a political isolation that she had been maintaining since A.D. 1783, and involved her in commitments overseas.
2 This generation of minor states as a by-product of the pressures exerted by rival Great Powers upon one another, when these pressures neutralize one another, is an outcome of the Balance of Power which has been noticed in this Study already, apropos of the emergence of the city-states of Northern and Central Italy in an interstice between the Holy Roman Empire and the Hildebrandine Papacy (see III. iii, 345-6; IV, iv. 534; and p. 394, below).

{p.241} 1823, in order to make sure that the current insurrections in the Spanish American Empire against the Spanish Crown should not end in a reestablishment of Spanish rule there through the arms and under the aegis of the Powers of the Holy Alliance. The Monroe Doctrine had prescribed that American communities which had declared and maintained their independence were not to be allowed to fall again under the control of any European Power; and, since at the time there were no Great Powers in the Western system of international relations that were not located in Europe, the Monroe Doctrine had been tantamount to a declaration that no Great Power was to be allowed to profit by the break-up of the Spanish Empire in the Americas. It was because the United States was not yet either able or willing to play the part of a Great Power in the European cockpit of Western power politics1 that the Great Powers of the day acquiesced in her purchase, in A.D. 1803, of Louisiana from France; in her veto, in A.D. 1823, on the entry of any Great Power into the political vacuum created by the collapse of Spanish rule in the Americas; and in her annexation of the northern fringe of the former Spanish dominions in North America, from Texas to California inclusive, after waging a victorious war of aggression against the Spanish Empire's local successor-state, Mexico, in A.D. 1846-7.

A principle thus first established in Western history in respect of the Americas was promptly applied in the Near and Middle East when, on the morrow of the General War of A.D. 1792-1815, 'the Eastern Question' became interwoven with the older strands of Western diplomacy. The break-up of the Ottoman Empire, like the break-up of the Spanish Empire, created a political vacuum that would have been dangerous for the preservation of peace if the Great Powers had engaged in a scramble for Ottoman spoils with an eye to a competitive self-aggrandizement; and, just because this risk of a disturbance of the existing balance might have been impossible to counteract by any means less drastic than a resort to war, it was prudently parried by the concerted institution of a Near Eastern equivalent of the Monroe Doctrine which was none the less efficacious for not being explicitly enunciated.

The measure of the efficacity of this tacit Near Eastern Monroe Doctrine in practice is given by the contrast between the respective destinies of the territories lost by the Ottoman Empire after the year A.D. 1815 on the one hand and before that date on the other hand. While the Ottoman Empire's territorial losses between A.D. 1815 and the final debacle in A.D. 1918 were far larger than the losses between the turn of the tide in Ottoman-Occidental relations in A.D. 1683 and the end of the Western General War of A.D. 1792-1815, the amount of ex-Ottoman territory that passed under the sovereignty of Western or Westernizing Great Powers in the course of the later of these two periods was trifling compared to the extent of the gains made by the same Powers at Ottoman expense between A.D. 1683 and A.D. 1815. After A.D. 1815 the only gains made by

1 In the message in which President Monroe warned the Great Powers off the former Spanish dominions in the Americas, he was careful to assure them, in the same breath, that the policy of the United States in regard to Europe was one of benevolent non-interference.

{p.242} Great Powers at the Ottoman Empire's direct expense1 were the acquisition of the tiny Caucasian districts of Akhaltzik and Akhalkalaki after the Russo-Turkish War of A.D. 1828-9 by Russia2 and the acquisition of Qars-Ardahan-Batum, Bosnia-Herzegovina, and Cyprus by Russia, Austria-Hungary, and Great Britain respectively after the Russo-Turkish War of A.D. 1877-8. All other territories lost by the Ottoman Empire after A.D. 1815 went to the making of the national states of Greece, Serbia, Rumania, Bulgaria, and Albania. The Hapsburg Monarchy did not even reacquire a Northern Serbia and a Western Wallachia that it had held from A.D. 1718 to A.D. 1739. By contrast, the territories permanently lost by the Ottoman Empire between A.D. 1683 and A.D. 18153 had all been acquired by one or other of the two adjoining Great Powers in the Western system. Between those two dates the Danubian Hapsburg Monarchy had acquired the whole of the Ottoman portion of Hungary and Croatia, together with the Bukovina, and Russia the whole northern and north-eastern hinterland of the Black Sea, from the east bank of the Pruth to the south bank of the Rion, that had formerly lain under Ottoman sovereignty or suzerainty.

These clusters of newly created minor states on the American and the Near Eastern fringes of the Western World were not, however, such remarkable by-products of a latter-day Western Balance of Power as the states of the same small calibre that emerged or survived nearer to the centre of the system, where the political pressure was more severe. The classic case here was the success with which, from A.D 1667 to A.D. 1945, first France and then Germany had been prevented from acquiring the Southern Netherlands by coalitions of Powers which had taken up arms to preserve the sovereignty of Spain, Austria, and Belgium in turn over this small but strategically important piece of territory. A corresponding play of the Balance of Power had enabled Portugal in the seventeenth century to anticipate the Spanish American countries' nineteenth-century achievement of breaking away from Spain, and had enabled Spain herself, as well as the United Netherlands and Sweden, in the eighteenth century to retain her independence after she had fallen out of the ranks of the Great Powers. On the eve of a General War of A.D, 1914-18 which was to open with Germany's unprovoked violation of the neutrality of Belgium, the existence of nine small neutral states in Western Europe—the three Low Countries, the three Scandinavian Countries, the two Iberian Countries, and Switzerland—looked like an even better augury for the future maintenance of a Western Balance of Power than the existence of eight Great Powers in the World at large at the same date.

Thus, at the time by when the Western Balance of Power had been 'a going concern' for rather more than four hundred years, the international

1 The North African territories which France and Great Britain respectively brought under their control between A.D. 1830, the date of the beginning of the French conquest of Algeria, and A.D. 1881-3, which witnessed the establishment of a French protectorate over Tunisia and a British military occupation of Egypt, had already ceased to be Ottoman de facto, though they were still Ottoman de jure.
2 See IX. viii. 193, n. 1.
3 The Morea, which was conquered from the Ottoman Empire by Venice in and after A,D. 1684, had been reconquered in A.D. 1715.

{p.243} outlook wore a deceptively promising appearance. Even if, as was being prophesied by the more sensational-minded publicists at the turn of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, a Danubian Hapsburg Monarchy that had prolonged its life by coming to terms with Magyar nationalism in the Austro-Hungarian Ausgleich of A.D. 1867 were nevertheless to break up, after the death of the venerable King-Emperor Francis Joseph, under the pressure of Slav national movements which the partial settlement of A.D. 1867 had left unsatisfied, the effect on the general system of international relations in the Western World that was expected to follow from a local Danubian debacle was merely a reduction of the number of the Great Powers from eight to seven. In A.D. 1912 even the boldest prophet would not have dreamed of forecasting that by A.D. 1952 the number would have been reduced, as it actually had been, from the figure of eight which it had reached at the turn of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries to the figure of two at which it had stood between A.D. 1519 and A.D. 1556;1 yet this drastic reduction had taken place within a span of thirty-two years running from A.D. 1914 to A.D. 1945 inclusive.

The break-up of the Danubian Monarchy, which had duly resulted from the General War of A.D. 1914-18, had proved in the event to be only the first of half a dozen casualties. On the morrow of the General War of A.D. 1939-45 a Prussia-Germany which had gone from strength to strength, until she had come, twice in one life-time, within an ace of conquering the World, now lay not only prostrate but partitioned, with her eastern frontier pushed back westwards to the line at which it had stood eight hundred years earlier.2 In Germany's Assyrian fate an Israelite prophet would have seen God's judgement on Germany's Assyrian crimes of deliberately inflicting on Mankind, twice in one life-time, the awful sufferings of a general war and cold-bloodedly violating, in the course of her two orgies of aggression, the neutrality of seven out of those nine West European minor states whose immunity from the blood-tax that was the price of counting as a Great Power had been the touch-stone of the moral worth of a latter-day Western system of international relations. Milder chastisements had requited the punier outrages committed by a National-Socialist Germany's accomplices, Italy and Japan; but the death that had likewise been the fate of the other Great Powers who had been less guiltily involved in the Western general wars of A.D. 1914-18 and A.D. 1939-45 could not be interpreted so convincingly as having been the wages of sin.3 Great Britain and France, as well as Italy and Japan, had failed to stay the course, as the Netherlands and Sweden had failed two hundred years earlier, though the British Empire, like Prussia-Germany, had grown, during the two hundred years ending in A.D. 1914, to a stature at which these two Powers had

1 The undivided Hapsburg Power which Charles V had held together before his abdication in A.D. 1555/6 had come into his hands by successive stages during the years A.D. 1515-19. On the 5th January, 1515, he had inherited the Burgundian dominions; on the 23rd January, 1516, he had succeeded King Ferdinand as King of Aragon and Castile; on the 12th January, 1519, he had succeeded Maximilian I as ruler of the hereditary dominions of the House of Hapsburg; on the 28th June, 1519, he had succeeded Maximilian I as Holy Roman Emperor.
2 See II. ii 169.
3 Rom. vi. 2.

{p.244} latterly overshadowed all the rest, while France had held the same position of preeminence from A.D. 1648 to A.D. 1815.

In A.D. 1952 the Soviet Union and the United States alone were still standing erect; and from a strategico-political standpoint the respective stances of these two Powers vis-à-vis one another were reminiscent of those of France and the Burgundian-Hapsburg Power some four hundred years earlier. In an arena which had expanded in the meanwhile beyond the bounds of Western Europe till it had come to be co-extensive with the entire surface of the planet, a prize that had expanded pari passu beyond the bounds of Italy, until it had come to embrace the whole of the Old World outside the limits of Russia's present domain, was being contended for in A.D. 1952 between a Russia which enjoyed the advantages of interior lines, compact metropolitan territory, and centralized autocratic government, once enjoyed by France, and a United States whose overwhelming superiority in aggregate strength on paper, when the assets of her dependencies and her allies were added to her own, was largely offset in practice, like the strength of the Count-King-Emperor Charles V, by the liabilities that these assets brought in their train and by the wide dispersion of the scattered territories and populations whose resources America had to defend in order to be able to draw upon them. It was easier for a twentieth-century Russia, as it had been for a sixteenth-century France, to take her adversary by surprise, in making sudden sorties in divers directions, than it was for a twentieth-century United States to mobilize her own and her friends' forces effectively for the arduous task of containing her adversary all the way round a line of circumvallation which, scale for scale, was proportionate in its length to the line which Charles V had once set himself to hold. The strategico-political bearings of a confrontation of two Great Powers, and two only, were thus much the same circa A.D. 1952 as they had been circa A.D. 1552. Yet, in these geographically similar circumstances, the Western Balance of Power's expectation of life was, for ideological reasons, decidedly less promising in the twentieth century than it had been in the sixteenth.

If the division of power in the Western World between no more than two competitors during the years A.D, 1519-55 had resulted, not in an increase in the number from the dual to the plural but in the reduction of a duality to a unity, the most likely way in which this unification would have been achieved would have been through the negotiation of one more felicitous dynastic marriage; and, even if a miscarriage of matrimonial diplomacy had made it impossible to avoid resorting to the barbarous alternative of unification through force of arms, the unifying war would still have been a temperate one, like those 'undecisive contests' through which the number of the Great Powers was, not diminished, but augmented in the course which history actually took during the three centuries and a half running from A.D. 1556 to A.D. 1914. The Royal French Valois and the Imperial Burgundian Valois were divided by nothing more serious than a dynastic rivalry that could have been removed painlessly by a marriage and almost painlessly by a conquest. They were not estranged from one another by any impassable gulf of incom-
{p.245} patible religious or ideological faith or practice, such as had come, by A.D. 1952, to be fixed between the U.S.S.R. and the U.S.A.

It is true that the ostensible point of difference between the twentieth-century American and the twentieth-century Russian Weltanschauung and way of life was not insuperable; for ostensibly the two Powers were at issue over the question of the ratio in which private economic enterprise and public economic enterprise ought to stand to one another in a predominantly industrial society; and this was a question to which the correct answer could not be any absolute 'right or wrong' or 'yes or no', but only an arguable and adjustable 'more or less’. In every phase of every civilization known to History, the economy had always been a combination of public with private enterprise in proportions that had varied continually in response to changes in the social circumstances; the determination of the best mixture for meeting the practical needs of a particular time and place was a question, not of principle touching the religious foundations of life, but of expediency in regulating its economic surface; and, if this had really been all that was at issue between the United States and the Soviet Union in A.D. 1952, their conflict need have been no more tragic than the quarrel between the Burgundian ducal branch and the French royal branch of the House of Valois. The duel in A.D. 1952 was more formidable than the duel in A.D. 1552 because in A.D. 1952 the ostensible economic issue, which was no more serious in itself than the dynastic issue had been, masked a moral issue between the principles and practice of a Totalitarian Autocracy on the one hand and those of a Parliamentary Democracy on the other, in which the then still unanswered question

utrorum ad regna cadendum
Omnibus humanis esset terrâque marique1

was a matter of life and death for every living human being.

Thus the reversion of the number of Great Powers in a latter-day Western international arena from a maximum figure of eight to a previous figure of two, after a run of some four hundred years of precariously maintained equilibrium between a larger number of gladiators, was an indication that the cyclic rhythm, which was the first law governing this international balance of political power, was itself governed by an overriding law that convicted this system of mortality—as the gyrations that keep a spinning top temporarily in balance are subject to an oscillatory movement that inclines farther, with each gyration, until at last it brings the gyrations to a stop by bringing the top to the ground. This diagnosis was confirmed by other symptoms which pointed the same way as the drastic reduction in the number of the Great Powers between A.D. 1914 and A.D. 1945. All these symptoms, taken together, suggested that the cyclic rhythm which had been keeping the political Balance of Power going during the Modern and post-Modern chapters of Western history was being accompanied by a secular movement that was working steadily towards an eventual overturn of the unstable equilibrium between a plurality of parochial states and towards the replacement of this by an at

1 Lucretius: De Rerum Naturâ, Book III, 11. 836-7.

{p.246} least temporarily stable oecumenical régime in which political power would be a monopoly administered from some single centre.

On a political plane which was the field of cycles of war and peace, on an economic plane which was the field of 'booms’ and 'slumps', the strength of this secular tendency towards integration was indicated in the failure of a concomitant tendency towards geographical expansion to counteract it. By A.D. 1952 the world-wide extension of the tentacles of a Western Industrial System of Economy that had made its epiphany in Great Britain during the later decades of the eighteenth century have been matched by the attraction of all the states then still surviving on the surface of the planet into a Western system of international relation that had made its epiphany in the last decade of the fifteenth century as a local West European political vortex round the nucleus of a Late Medieval city-state cosmos in Italy. In A.D. 1952 the prize at stake in the contest between the United States and the Soviet Union was nothing less than the command over all other habitable lands and navigable sea routes and airways; and the General War of A.D. 1939-45 had been already 'global', and no longer merely 'European'; for in this war the battlefields had not been confined to a Lombardy and a Flanders that had been the cockpits of latter-day Western warfare during its overture and its first three regular cycles (currebant A.D. 1494-1914), and had not been confined, either, to the wider Continental European arena of the General War of A.D. 1914-18, with its western front stretching from the North Sea to the Alps and its eastern front stretching from the Baltic to the Carpathians. The General War of A.D. 1939-45 had been literally 'a world war' in which one battlefield embracing Europe, the Mediterranean, and the Eastern Atlantic had been matched by another embracing the Western Pacific and the Far East.

This twentieth-century integration of international relations all round the globe into a single system, centering on a Balance of Power that had originated in Western Europe and had then progressively brought the rest of the Earth's surface within the field of its magnetic attraction, presented a striking contrast to the configuration of the field of force in earlier chapters of the same story. The overture (currebant A.D, 1494-1559) had ranged no wider than the areas involved in a competition for hegemony over Italy between nascent adjoining Great Powers in the Transalpine and Transmarine provinces of Western Europe; and even Flanders had then been only a secondary theatre of military operations, though the two Great Powers of the day actually marched with one another there, without being insulated on this front by any intervening political vacuum or buffer. The civil war between Catholics and Protestants in France (gerebatur A.D. 1562-98) went on its way more or less independently of the contemporary civil war between Dutch and Spaniards in the Spanish Hapsburg Monarchy (gerebatur A.D. 1568-1609). The civil war in England (gerebatur A.D. 1642-8) likewise followed its own course without becoming implicated in the contemporary civil war in the Holy Roman Empire (gerebatur A.D. 1618-48). The Americas and the Indies were drawn into the main vortex of Western warfare only in the course of the first regular cycle (currebant A.D. 1568-1672); and,
{p.247} though during the second regular cycle (currebat A.D. 1672-1792) the decisive military operations on Flemish and Lombard battlefields were usually accompanied by 'side-shows' in North America and in Continental India in which the same belligerents were engaged, the synchronization of the local conflicts in the West European and the overseas theatres of war was still inexact. As often as not, the eighteenth-century campaigns on American and Indian soil would open later or earlier and close later or earlier than the corresponding campaigns in Western Europe, so that there were years in which France and Great Britain were at war with one another in Europe while at peace with one another overseas, or conversely at war overseas while at peace in Europe.1

As for the wars which the eastern border-states of the Western World were waging with a Muscovite Orthodox Christian Power in the continental hinterland of the Baltic, and with an Ottoman Iranic Muslim Power in the Danube Basin and the Mediterranean, these sequels to the Crusades were at first carried on in virtual independence of the Western Powers' fratricidal warfare with one another. The move made by France in A.D, 1534-62 to redress the balance between herself and the Hapsburg Power by allying herself with the Hapsburgs' Ottoman adversary was an obviously expedient application of a Machiavellianly rational statecraft which struck a contemporary Western Christian public, including the French themselves, as being so shocking that France forebore to follow this policy up, notwithstanding the importance of the military and political advantages that she stood to gain by it and the extremity of the straits in which she found herself at the time;3 and, as late as A.D. 1664, Louis XIV gave precedence to the oecumenical interests of Western Christendom over the parochial interests of France when he permitted French volunteers to help a rival Western Power in the shape of the Danubian Hapsburg Monarchy to stem an Ottoman invasion whose success would have been advantageous to France on a Machiavellian reckoning.4 France did not exploit, as she could have done, the predica-

1 For example, in the General War of A.D. 1672-1713 the respective war years were 1672-8, 1688-97, 1702-13 in Western Europe; 1690-7, 1702-10 in North America. In the epilogue to the General War of A.D. 1672-1713 the respective-war years-were 1733-5, 1740-8, 1756-63 in Western Europe; 1744-63, 1775-83 in North America; 1746-9, 1750-4, 1758-61, 1778-83 in India.
The synchronization of the local conflicts continued to be inexact in the third regular cycle (currebat A.D. 1792-1914). In the General War of A.D. 1792-1815 the respective war years were 1792-1802, 1803-14, 1815 in Europe; 1812-14 in North America; 1799-1805, 1816-18 in India. In the epilogue to the General War of A.D. 1792-1815 the respective war years were 1848-9, 1859, 1864, 1866, 1870-1 in Europe; 1861-7 in North America (taking of the French expedition to Mexico, 1862-7); 1838-42, 1843, 1845-6, 1848-9, 1857-9, 1878-81 in India; 1839-41, 1853-6, 1875-8, 1882, in the Near and Middle East.
2 In May 1534 France made a treaty with the Ottoman Corsair Khayr-ad-Dīn Barbarossa; in February 1536 she made a commercial treaty with the Porte that served as a cloak for a political entente.
3 See Fueter, E.: Geschichte des Europäischen Staatensystems von 1492-1559 (Munich and Berlin 1919, Oldenbourg), pp, 47-49. There was no sequel to the Franco-Ottoman combined naval operations of A.D. 1543/4, in which an Ottoman fleet was harboured in the French naval base at Toulon.
4 A regular French expeditionary force, as well as a flow of French volunteers, came to the aid of the Venetians in A.D. 1668-9 during the last agonies of the siege of Candia, but this French support of the Venice against the ‘Osmanlis was less meritorious than the French support of the Danubian Monarchy against the same assailant, considering that Venice, unlike the Danubian Monarchy, could not be regarded by France at this date as a rival Power, while on the other hand the French might have hoped, if their intervention against the ‘Osmanlis at Candia had been successful, to enter into Venice’s heritage in at least a remnant of her dominion in Crete.

{p.248} ment of a Hapsburg Power that was implicated in Western Christendom's border warfare with the 'Osmanlis as well as in the Hapsburgs' family quarrel with France; and, thanks to this French forbearance, whether it was deliberate or inadvertent,1 the Danubian Hapsburg Monarchy, throughout the sixteenth, seventeenth, and eighteenth centuries, usually found itself able to avoid simultaneous engagements on its French and on its Ottoman front.

The same policy of limiting her military liabilities to a single front at a time was followed by Russia after she had become implicated in the Western Balance of Power at the turn of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries; and, until after the close of the General War of A.D. 1792-1815, the insulation of the vortex round the frontier between Western Christendom and the Ottoman Empire from the vortex in the interior of the Western World usually proved to be practical politics. 'The Eastern Question’ began to enter into the Western Balance of Power only when Napoleon's failure to expand a French ascendancy over the debris of a Medieval city-state cosmos into a French ascendancy over the whole of a Modern Western and Westernizing World2 left a victorious Russia and a victorious Great Britain free to pursue a rivalry with one another in the Near and Middle East.

Even the vortex round the frontier between Western Christendom and Russian Orthodox Christendom did not coalesce completely with the vortex in the interior of the Western World till more than a hundred years after the date of Peter the Great's victory at Poltava in A.D. 1709 over Charles XII of Sweden. It was not so surprising that, before Russia had been received into the Western Society as a result of Peter's life-work, the Great Northern War of A.D. 1700-21 should have been waged without becoming implicated in the Western World's General War of A.D. 1673-1713, just as the Great Northern War of A.D. 1558-83 had been waged without being implicated either in the last cadences of the overture (currebat A.D. 1494-1568) to a latter-day Western series of cycles of War and Peace or in the first cadences of the first regular cycle in this series (currebat A.D. 1568-1672). It was more remarkable that the partitions of Poland-Lithuania in A.D. 1772-95 between Russia and the two eastern march-Powers of the Western World, and also even Russia's acquisition of Finland from the Scandinavian march-State of the Western World in the Russo-Swedish war of A.D. 1808-9, should still have taken place in the margin, and not in the centre, of the Western system of international relations. It is true that Russia was a belligerent in the Seven Years War from A.D. 1756 to A.D. 1762, and that her withdrawal from this war in A.D. 1762 may have marked a turning-point in the fortunes of Frederick the Great. Yet the first Western general war in which Russia played a principal part was the war of A.D, 1793-1815, and

1 According to Fueter, op. cit., p. 48, no special consideration was shown to the Danubian Hapsburg Monarchy or to Venice by other states of the Western comity in return for the public service which these two anti-Ottoman march-states were performing for Western Christendom as a whole.
2 See V. v. 619-42.

{p. 249} even in this war it was not till A.D. 1812 that Russia's role came to be a decisive one. On the other hand, from A.D. 1812 onwards down to the War of A.D. 1939-45 inclusive, there was no general war in the Western World in which the part played by Russia was not one of first-class importance. There were, however, down to the eve of the outbreak of the General War of A.D. 1914-18, still certain local wars—fought in outlying regions only recently incorporated into a Westernizing World—which followed independent courses of their own without being drawn into the central vortex of the Western Society's international relations. The Russo-Japanese War of A.D. 1904-5 was one case in point; the Spanish-American War of A.D. 1898 and the British-Afrikaner War of A.D. 1899-1902 were two other instances.

The geographical expansion of an originally West European system of international relations to a world-wide range had not, however, sufficed to counteract the play of a centripetal force that, since A.D. 1914, had made itself felt by reducing the number of the Great Powers in this system from eight to two; and this carnage revealed a secular tendency in the history of a latter-day Balance of Power in the Western World for this unstable equilibrium, fluctuating in recurrent cycles, to bring about its own eventual overturn through the inversion of a competition into a monopoly. This tendency might prove to be no peculiar feature either of this Western political balance or indeed of political balances as a species of the generic social structure represented by any Balance of Power between any competitors.

'The experiences of our age refute the notion, which has been governing people's thinking for more than a hundred years past, that a Balance of Power between freely competing units—be these states, businesses, artisans or what you will—is a system that can maintain itself in this condition of unstable equilibrium for an indefinite length of time. Today, as in the past, this state of equilibrium in a competition that is free from monopolistic restrictions has a nisus to pass over into some form of monopoly or other.’1

This nisus was presumably traceable in the last analysis to the working of some law of human dynamics that came into play wherever and whenever a balance of human forces had been set up on any plane of social activity; where the plane of activity was politics and the parties to the encounter were parochial states, the particular mode of this general law's operation was a matter of common knowledge.

The difficulty of maintaining in perpetuity a political Balance of power between parochial states was due, at bottom, to the sinfulness of the vein of Human Nature that was the raw material of statesmanship, in politics, men and women who in other walks of life might be conscientious workmen, faithful friends, and devoted parents were apt to behave as idolatrous tribesmen; and, in their worship of their tribal idols of collective power, pride, passion, prejudice, and covetousness, they were prone to break moral laws that they would never have dreamed of breaking, and to perpetrate crimes that they would never have dreamed

1 Elias, N.: Über den Prozess der Zivilisatian, vol. ii: Wandlungen der Gesellschaft: Entwurf finer Theorie der Zivilisation (Basel 1939, Haus zum Falken), p, 436.

{p.250} of perpetrating, in their private affairs. This immoral temper was not an auspicious psychological setting for the execution of the delicate and laborious task of constantly adjusting a balance in answer to constant changes in the relative strengths of parties whose strengths were bound to change in virtue of their being, not inanimate objects, but living creatures. The tribesmen of a tribe that had forged ahead of its neighbours in population, wealth, technique, or other constituent elements of military and political power were apt to yield to the temptation to try to take advantage of their relative gain in collective strength in order to make a bid for collective aggrandizement; and such criminally childish collective ambitions were not easily discouraged by merely diplomatic counter-measures. When the parties whose interests were threatened by the baleful rise of a new Mars in the international constellation had resorted to the crude device of a reversal of alliances and the subtle device of a general self-denying ordinance binding all Great Powers alike to abstain from competing for the spoils of some derelict empire, there were not many other pacific cards left in a diplomatist's hand; in the history of every political Balance of Power between parochial states whose story was on record, it had invariably proved to be beyond the resources of Diplomacy to save the balance from being overturned without at least an occasional recourse to inter-state war; and the institution of War, which was, itself, an outcome and expression of the tribal spirit, had proved, time and again, to be unamenable to rational regulation and control and, when out of control, to be destructive.

War had proved to be deadly, not only for a political Balance of Power that it had been called in to redress, but also for the civilization in whose body politic the maintenance of a balance was being attempted; and this destructiveness of War was not just incidental to its clumsiness, but was inherent in its nature. A collectively organized resort to violence was, indeed, so rough and ready a method of attempting to adjust a political balance that, even when successfully used to restore equilibrium in one quarter, it usually also had the effect of producing a new derangement of the balance in some other quarter. A diplomatist driven to resort to War faute de mieux was in the unhappy quandary in which a watchmaker would find himself if he were instructed to mend a broken watch and were given no tools for doing the job except a sledge-hammer. War was, however, also destructive in its essence, quite apart from the incongruousness of its diplomatic use, and its destructiveness tended to grow greater progressively, at each fresh hammer stroke. The toll taken by War tended to rise with the passage of Time because, in any society in which War was an established institution, the service of Mara was apt to be the first charge on the society's energies; and the maintenance of a competition by means of War, in default of Diplomacy, between parochial states was therefore apt to drive the competing military Powers into devoting to War an ever increasing proportion of their strength. Even while a society was still in growth, the increase in the demands made by War would thus outstrip the increase in the society's capacity to satisfy them; the rate of the blood-tax would rise with every improvement in the technical ability to mobilize the society's non-human and
{p.251} human resources; and, even when the mounting strain of War had produced a social breakdown, a still belligerent society would still continue to devote to War an increasing proportion of a strength that would now be, not increasing, but diminishing.

In an earlier context1 we have watched the Hellenic Civilization following this fatal road during its disintegration, and in that instance we know what fate it was to which an unconscionably belligerent society condemned itself. In the course of an Hellenic Time of Troubles the toll taken by War eventually rose to a height at which the Hellenic Society would have died, forthwith, of the mortal wounds that it had already inflicted on itself if the then imminent dissolution of the body social had not been postponed (without being ultimately averted) in consequence of a sudden overturn of the Balance of Power itself. In the Hellenic World within the fifty-three years 220-168 B.C. a Balance of Power between parochial states was inverted into a monopoly of power in the hands of a universal state through a swift succession of 'knock-out-blows' with which four out of five Great Powers were laid low by one victorious survivor.2 This dramatic episode of Hellenic history bore an ominous likeness to the dramatic course of Western history since A.D. 1914; and both stories alike threw light on a mortality that seemed to be the inevitable doom of all Balances of Power.

While Balances of Power thus appear to be intrinsically unstable and transitory, it is still more clearly evident that they could not follow this secular course from their original installation to their eventual overture if they were not kept going in the meanwhile, like spinning tops, by rhythmically alternating fluctuations. Our next task is therefore to analyse the regularly recurrent characteristics of the cycle as these present themselves in Modern Western, post-Alexandrine Hellenic, and post-Confucian Sinic history, and to put our analysis to an empirical test by identifying the successive occurrences of the operation of this cyclic 'law of Nature' in a Western, an Hellenic, and a Sinic international arena.

Considering the dominance of the part played by War in the working of a political balance among parochial states, it is not surprising to find that the most emphatic punctuation in a uniform sequence of events recurring in one repetitive cycle after another is the outbreak of a great war in which one Power that has forged ahead of all its rivals makes so formidable a bid for world dominion that it evokes an opposing coalition of all the other Powers implicated in this particular system of international relations.

The storm that thus breaks in the form of ‘a general war'—as we may conveniently label a great war of the all-engulfing kind just indicated—has usually been brewing in the course of a spell of fair weather following the calming down of the last preceding atmospheric disturbance. The derangement of an established equilibrium that is registered so sensationally in the outbreak of a general war is usually the cumulative outcome of gradual processes of growth, decay, and divers other forms

1 In III. iii. 150.
2 See the quotation from Polybius in III. iii. 312-13, and also IV. iv. 310-14.

{p.252} of change that Life is always experiencing in Time. An equilibrium retrospectively designed to serve as a response to one particular set of already past challenges is thus virtually bound, with the sheer passage of Time, to fall farther and farther out of gear with current facts and needs, as these change in the flow of the Time-stream; every one of these changes adds to the mounting strain on the established equilibrium by increasing the discrepancy between an Epimethean dispensation and a Promethean reality; and, while it may be arguable that the consequent tension would never have exploded into a general war, but for the disproportionate increase in the relative strength of one of the Great Powers, it will usually also be arguable that the aggressor would never have ventured to challenge his peers for the prize of world dominion if he had not been able to count on reinforcing his own strength, and masking the egotism of his own ambitions, by presenting himself as the champion of other forces which could likewise claim that an antiquated equilibrium was no longer giving them fair play.

The storm in which this cumulative tension eventually discharges itself sometimes breaks unheralded from a clear sky. Sometimes, on the other hand, it is preceded by premonitory showers that are ominous for observers who have eyes to see. A burst of short local minor wars is a characteristic prelude to a general war, though it is not a symptom that invariably displays itself.

When, with or without such a prelude, a general war does break out, its immediate outcome is apt to be negatively decisive without being positively constructive. The outstanding direct result is usually the defeat of the arch-aggressor; but, in this act of the play, he is apt to be temporarily foiled rather than permanently ham-strung or sincerely converted to a good-neighbourly state of mind and feeling; and the other, perhaps ultimately more important, problems that had found no solution within the framework of the old order are now apt to be shelved, rather than solved, in a patched-up peace that is improvised primarily in order to meet the urgent immediate need for giving the society a rest in which it may recover from its exhaustion.

Even if the urgency of restoring peace for its own sake did not thus force the peace-negotiators' pace, they would, no doubt, find it difficult or impossible to map out a blue print for the summary and comprehensive solution of problems that were not open to being solved either all at once or all in the council-chamber. The passage of Time, which, in the spell of peace preceding the general war, had maleficently created intractable problems by turning an accomplished settlement into an anachronism, now beneficently ripens these still unsolved problems to a point at which a solution of them at last becomes attainable. Yet, even when Time is thus working to facilitate Diplomacy, instead of working, as before, to aggravate the difficulties of the statesman's task, Diplomacy once again proves incapable of doing its job without again employing the instrument of War to carry its policy over the stiles of collective obtuseness and inertia. A spell of peace that gives a war-stricken society the necessary breathing-space is therefore apt to be followed by a further burst of warfare over the still unsettled issues on which the recent
{p.253} general war was fought; but this martial epilogue to a general war usually differs auspiciously from the antecedent general war itself in producing more constructive and more lasting solutions for the social problems with which both these bouts of warfare are concerned, and in achieving this at a lower cost in terms of destruction and exhaustion.1

Though this martial aftermath of a general war usually outclasses the martial prelude to the general war in its scale, it also usually resembles the prelude in taking the form of a burst of short wars, some, at least, of which are only local, in contrast to the protractedness and the ubiquity that are a general war's characteristically noxious features; and, though the peace-settlements following these supplementary lesser wars may be partial and piecemeal by comparison with the grand essay in comprehensive and definitive peace-making after the antecedent general war,2 their aggregate effect is often to find more or less adequate and enduring solutions for the problems which have precipitated the general war and which have been left still unsolved by the abortive peace-making after it. Thereby the disturbed equilibrium is temporarily restored by more positive measures than the mere frustration of a single Great Power's bid for world dominion that is the negative achievement of the opposing coalition in a general war. For this reason the interval of general peace that elapses between the constructive settlement achieved in the martial epilogue to a general war and the outbreak of another general war as the result of the ultimate explosion of gradually pent up new forces is more genuinely peaceful, and hence also more creative, in its quality, even when it is not longer in its duration, than the breathing-space between the end of a general war and the beginning of its martial epilogue.

The foregoing analysis has brought to light the composition and structure of the uniform sequence of events constituting one war-and-peace cycle in a repetitive series of cycles of the kind. The uniformly recurring sequence consists of alternating bouts of War and spells of Peace; there are four of these altogether, namely two of each, but these couples are not pairs of twins; for, in both the couple of spells of Peace and the couple of paroxysms of War, one of the two beats is more sharply accentuated than the other. The tranquillity of the interval of general peace following the martial epilogue to a general war presents as sharp a contrast to the uneasiness of the breathing-space between the

1 This sequence of events is not, of course, invariable, and, even when it does duly present itself, it does not always conform exactly to the standard pattern delineated here.
In Modern Western history, for example, the Thirty Years War (gerebatur A.D. 1618-48) did set the seal on the frustration, in the foregoing general war (gerebatur A.D. 1568-1609), of the Hapsburgs' bid for World dominion; but, at any rate in the Central European theatre of hostilities, this conclusive confirmation of a previous military and political decision took, not a lighter, but a heavier toll than the general war had taken.
Similarly, in post-Alexandrine Hellenic history, the toll taken by the supplementary •wars of 90-80 B.C. was greater in Italy—and indeed in the Aegean Basin as well—than the toll taken by the civil disturbances and social revolutions of 133-111 B.C., which had taken the place of a general war in this chapter of Hellenic history, as the civil wars in the Spanish Hapsburg Empire and in France had taken the place of a general war in the chapter of Western history within which the Thirty Years War fell.
2 Here again the Thirty Years War presents an exception to the normal rule, inasmuch as the peace-settlement of Westphalia, by which it was followed, was actually the first Modern Western essay in peace-making on an oecumenical scale.

{p. 254} general war itself and its martial epilogue as the mildness of this epilogue presents to the severity of the antecedent general war.

Now that we have plotted out the typical physiognomy of a war-and-peace cycle, our next step must be to set out in tabular form1 the successive occurrences of this sequence of phenomena in the Modern and post-Modern chapters of Western history.

This table shows that, in the course of the four and a half centuries that had elapsed between the last decade of the fifteenth century of the Christian Era, when this particular Balance of Power had been installed in the Western World, and the year A.D. 1953, the repetitive cycle through which a precariously unstable equilibrium had been turbulently maintaining itself had so far revolved five times over, counting in the overture to the series as well as the still uncompleted fourth round of the subsequent cycles. The table also shows that this fourth cycle, as well as the overture, had departed from the norm represented by the three regular cycles that had occurred between A.TX 1568 and A.D. 1914, and that, among these three, the second and the third cycle were closer replicas of one another than the first cycle was of either of them.

The departures of the overture and the fourth cycle from the norm were not of the same kind; for the fourth cycle differed from the overture and from the preceding three regular cycles alike in its structure, whereas the overture resembled the regular cycles in its structure and differed from them only in its wave-length.

The structural novelty of the fourth cycle was, as we have seen,2 the portentous one of capping one general war with another one of still greater severity, atrocity, and inconclusiveness, instead of following it up with a burst of milder, but nevertheless more conclusive, supplementary wars that, on the precedent of the uniform sequence of events in each of the preceding cycles, were to be expected as the sequel to a breathing-space. There was no such radical difference of structure between the three regular cycles and the overture. In the overture, as in the regular cycles, a breathing-space after a general war had duly been followed by supplementary wars which had duly been followed, in their turn, by a general peace. The difference in this case was merely a chronological one. The overture's duration of seventy-four years (currebat A.D, 1494-1568) had been not much longer than the maximum wave-length of a single ‘Kondratieff cycle' on the economic plane of latter-day Western history, and not quite so long as the sum of a couple of minimum wave-lengths of the same economic 'long cycle',3 whereas the duration of the second and third regular cycles (currebat A.D. 1672-1792 et A,D. 1792-1914), running, as it had done, to 120 years in the one case and 122 years in the other,4 had been equal to the sum of a couple of maximum 'Kondratieff

1 See Table I, opposite.
2 On p. 235, above.
3 These 'Kondratieff cycles' with wave-lengths ranging between maxima of about sixty years and minima of about forty years have been noticed on pp. 231-2, above.
4 These are the respective wave-lengths found for Cycles II and III by measuring the intervals between outbreaks of general wars; and the durations of 104 years and 74 years, found for Cycle I and for the overture respectively, are obtained by measurements on the same basis. This basis is the obvious one to take, since the outbreak of general wars are, as we have observed, the most emphatic of all the punctuations marking out the uniform sequence of events composing each of these repetitive cycles, An alternative basis -would be to measure the intervals between restorations of general peace; and on this basis the length of Regular Cycle I would work out at 89 years (1550-1648), that of Cycle II at 115 years (1648-1763), and that of Cycle III at 108 years (1763-1871).






{p. 255} TABLE I. Successive Occurences of the War-and-Peace Cycle in Modern and post-modern Western History







{p.256} wave-lengths, while the first regular cycle (currebat A.D. 1568-1672), with its duration of 104 years, had been equal to the sum of a couple of 'Kondratieff cycles' of average length.

It is also noticeable that the shortness of the total span of the overture by comparison with the spans of the three regular cycles was accounted for mainly by the abnormal shortness of its two spells of Peace, and that, by contrast, its two bouts of War were not appreciably shorter than those of the regular cycles. The breathing-space after the general war had lasted for 11 years in the overture, as compared with 9 years in the first cycle, 20 years in the second, and 33 years in the third; the general peace after the supplementary wars had lasted for 9 years in the overture, as compared with 24 years in the first cycle, 29 years in the second, and 43 years in the third. On the other hand the general war had continued for 31 years (A.D. 1494-1525) in the overture as compared with 41 years each (A.D. 1568-1609 and A.D. 1672-1713) in the first and second cycles, and 23 years (A.D. 1792-1815) in the third cycle, while the bout of supplementary wars had continued for 23 years (A.D. 1536-59) in the overture as compared with 30 years each (A.D. 1618-48 and A.D. 1733-63) in the first and second cycles and 23 years (A.D. 1848-71) in the third cycle.

Our table also brings out a tendency, which we have already noticed by anticipation,1 for the number of war years in a cycle to diminish, and for the ratio between the numbers of war years and of peace years to change to the numerical advantage of the peace years, with each successive repetition of the sequence.

This tendency does not, it is true, pronounce itself so sharply when measured in terms of individual years as when measured in terms of the groups of years, representing alternate bouts of War and spells of Peace, into which the sequence has been analysed; for, though the overall length of the bout that we have labelled 'the general war' falls off strikingly from the figure of 41 years at which it stands in the first and second cycles to its 23 years in the third cycle and its 4 years in the fourth, these reductions of the span are partly offset by concurrent eliminations of intercalated peace years. No less than 15 peace years, for example, were intercalated in the general war of A.D. 1672-1713—consisting, as this did, of three constituent bouts separated by two truces lasting from A.D. 1678 to 1688 and from A.D. 1697 to 1702, whereas in the General War of A.D. 1792-1815 the truces following, in A.D. 1802-3, the abortive conclusion of peace at Amiens and preceding, in A.D. 1814-15, 'the Hundred Days’ were matters, not of years, but of months, while the sole truce during the General War of A.D. 1914-18 was the fraternization on the first Christmas Day after the outbreak of hostilities. When, however, the overall figures have been duly corrected to allow for such intercalations of peace years and peace months, the tendency towards a diminution in the relative lengths of the war periods still stands out

1 On p. 235, above.

{p.257} conspicuously in a comparison of the four-years' span of the General War of A.D. 1914-18 with the corrected figures of approximately 21 years for the General War of A.D. 1792-1815 and approximately 26 years for the General War of A.D. 1672-1713.'1

At the same time a synoptic view of the later and the earlier general wars in this Western series also shows that, in the act of becoming shorter, Western general wars had been becoming more concentrated, more intense, and more relentless, and that, so far from the progressive shortening of the lengths of bouts of general warfare signifying an alleviation of the scourge of War, the progressive concentration of general warfare within an ever smaller number of years at an ever higher degree of intensity had resulted in the recurrent general wars working greater havoc in the life of the Western Civilization than they had worked when they had been carried on more desultorily over longer Time-spans. While it was true that under this older dispensation the plague of War had been more or less endemic in the Western body social, it was also true that a relatively mild perennial malady was in many ways more tolerable and less dangerous than a series of occasional sudden violent epidemics breaking in upon spells of relatively good health. This abrupt alternation of Total War with Total Peace was, indeed, manifestly more trying to the constitution of Society than an earlier condition in which the difference between spells of health and bouts of sickness had been less sharply accentuated. In the Early Modern Age of Western history the war-ridden society had been affected like a victim of chronic malaria, whose vitality is permanently lowered by his complaint without his life being brought into jeopardy. In the Late Modern Age the Western Society had been relieved of its malaria thanks to a gratifying improvement in the day-to-day performance of Western political preventive medicine, but the patient had been made to pay for this rise in his normal level of health by becoming subject to thunderbolt 'strokes' which were as unpredictably sudden as they were lethally violent.

While the deadliness of War had thus been increasing by geometrical progression with each further repetition of a Western war-and-peace cycle in which the bouts of War had been becoming shorter, and the spells of Peace longer, every time, the respective stances of the competing Powers had been as uniform, throughout the series of recurrent cycles, as the sequence of events in which, cycle by cycle, the resolution of political and military forces had recurrently worked itself out.

We have already noticed2 that the Western international tableau of

1 The average figure for the length of time by which each successive Western general war was becoming shorter than its immediate predecessor thus works out at eleven years as between the latest three general wars in this series according to the corrected calculations of their spans. When the writer was doing this sum on the morning of the 2nd August, 1950, he had at his elbow his original notes, written in A.D. 1929; and, considering that at that date the possibility of constructing an atom bomb was still beyond the mental horizon of a layman like himself, he was startled to read in his own handwriting, jotted down twenty-one years ago: 'Since the General War of A.D. 1914-1918 lasted little more than four years, we find, on following out the progression, that the next general war, which might be expected to break put about A.D. 2035, would be instantaneous in duration, i.e. annihilating in effect. This mathematical fantasy is borne out by all the empirical evidence available for a forecast in this year A.D. 1939.
2 On p. 244, above.

{p.258} A.D. 1952, in which the Soviet Union was striving to break out of a ring within which the United States was striving to contain her, was a reproduction of the tableau of A.D. 1552, with a twentieth-century Russia playing a sixteenth-century France's part and the United States playing Charles Vs. We can now see that this disposition of forces was not peculiar to the situation existing at those two dates, at each of which the number of Great Powers had been no more than two. In every round with the sole exception of the first regular cycle (currebat A.D. 1568-1672), the aggressor Power had invariably been a continental Power in a central position occupying a compact territory with sally-ports opening into the back-yards of the countries that were the arenas of combat, the stakes of contention, and the prizes of victory.

In the overture (currebat A.D. 1494-1568) this role had been played by a France who marched with Italy along one land frontier and with Flanders along another; and, after a temporary eclipse that had been the penalty of her civil war of A.D. 1562-98, France had recaptured this role from a Spanish Hapsburg Monarchy that had acquired it, in France's temporary absence, during-the General War of A.D. 1568-1609 which had inaugurated Regular Cycle I (currebat A.D. 1568-1672).1 In the

1 This General War of A.D. 1568-1609 took, like the contemporary warfare in France during the years A.D. 1562-98, the form of a civil war between conflicting local interests and religious persuasions as far as the two principal belligerents were concerned. This civil war between the Spanish Catholic and Dutch Protestant subjects of Philip II was converted into a general war by England's entry into the lists as one of Spain s adversaries. This English intervention gave an oecumenical significance to what would otherwise have remained a domestic conflict within the body politic of a single Great Power, because, if the Spanish Armada had conquered England in A.D. 1588 and had installed there a minoritarian Roman Catholic Government dependent on Spanish backing, this increase in the power of the Spanish Hapsburg Monarchy would presumably have ensured, not merely the eventual resubjugation of the Protestant insurgents in the Netherlands, but the temporary supremacy of Spain in the Western international arena, since Spain would then have been able to take full advantage of the opportunity, offered to her by the civil war in France, for bringing France too under a Spanish hegemony through the agency of a Roman Catholic Government in France that would likewise have had to look to Spain for support.
The insurrection of the Netherlands against the Spanish Crown in A.D. 1568 and the increasing provocation of the Spaniards by the English in and after A.D. 1572 gave the measure of the temporary paralysis of French power during the French civil war of A.D. 1562-98. The inability of Spain to profit by the chance of winning world dominion, with which the temporary eclipse of France had presented her, gave the measure of Spain's intrinsic permanent weakness under her temporary outward appearance of strength. Whenever France was her normal mighty self, her neighbours Spain, the Netherlands, and England, none of whom was a match for France singly, had a strong interest in holding together against the Central Power that was a menace to all of them alike. The marriages between Henry VIII and Catharine of Aragon in A.D. 1509 and between Philip II and Mary of England in A.D.1554—like the Anglo-Spanish combined military operations in the Iberian Peninsula in A.D. 1811-13—were the reflection of a community of Spanish and English interests that was normal until France fell out of the competition for world dominion after A.D. 1815; and it was a fatality that both these matrimonial alliances should have been exceptions to a rule which made the political felicity of Hapsburg—if not of Spanish—marriages proverbial.

An even greater portent, however, than the breach between England and Spain during the French civil war of A.D. 1562-98 was the alacrity with which the English and the Dutch fell out with one another over the scramble for Spanish and Portuguese spoils overseas, and the tardiness with which they eventually made up their minds to call a truce to their feud with one another in face of a menace from a rehabilitated France which was more dangerous for both of them than the menace from Spain had ever been. The treaty made by England with France on the agth May, 1527, on the morrow of the crushing defeat of the French at Pavia on the 24th February, 1525, was not, on any Machiavellian reckoning, a precedent that could justify the treaty made on the 1st June, 1670, on the morrow of the French invasion of the Spanish Netherlands in May 1667.
Though Louis XIV's premonitory attack on the Spanish Netherlands in A.D. 1667 had moved the United Netherlands and England to make peace with one another in that year and to enter into an anti-French triple alliance, including Sweden, in A.D. 1668, France nevertheless had England for her ally against Holland for the first three years (A.D. 1672-4) of a general war in which a French attack on the Dutch was the first move in a fresh French attempt to win world dominion.
The Spanish danger to the liberties of Western parochial states was never so great as the French danger—not even at the height of the power of Philip II—for the Spanish Power was an idol with feet of clay in a Western international arena in which the economic sinews of war were coming progressively, with each further round in the game, to count for more and more by comparison with mere military valour, The descendants of the, Iberian Western Christian barbarians who had defeated the Maghribi Berber Muslim barbarians in a contest for the spoils of an Andalusian Umayyad Caliphate that had collapsed in A.D. ipio were born soldiers in the Gothic and the Vandal vein; and, in their socially parasitic profession, they displayed an impressive adaptability when, in the Western General War of A.D. 1494-1525, they mastered a new-fangled Swiss infantry technique which, in this phase of a Western art of war, was the talisman of victory. This Spanish stock of military material was, however, as inadequate in quantity as it was outstanding in quality; for the Christians in sixteenth-century Spain were no more than an 'ascendancy' in a population which mustered perhaps no more than seven million souls in all, as against the fifteen or sixteen million culturally and communally homogeneous inhabitants of a contemporary France; and the Muslim and Jewish subject communities were Spain's economic mainstay. Whereas the Castilian and Aragonese soldiery of a sixteenth-century Spain were shepherds and herdsmen in civil life, her agriculture, such as it was, was carried on by a Morisco and a Catalan peasantry in the valley of the Wadi'l-Kabir and along the seaboard of the Mediterranean, while the Jews were the life of the trade and industry of the Spanish cities. Whereas France could feed her sixteen millions from home-grown cereals, Spain could not feed her seven millions without importing cereals from Sicily and from Northern Europe; and, as if these economic handicaps were not serious enough as they were, the Spanish 'ascendancy' did its worst to aggravate them by oppressing and evicting the Moorish and Jewish producers of Spanish wealth. Simultaneously, even the reservoir of Castilian Christian military man-power was depleted by the draining off of conquistadores to live happily ever after as rentiers taking toll of subject peasant populations in overrun Mexic and Andean worlds.
A brilliant portrait of sixteenth-century Spain has been painted by Eduard Fueter in his Gesckichte des Europäischen Staatensystems von 1492-1559 (Munich and Berlin 1919, Oldenbourg), pp. 79-103.

{p.259} general wars of A.D. 1672-1713 and A.D. 1792-1815 France had played the aggressor's part once again; but in the meantime a Western World that had been engaging in these domestic conflicts with one hand had been enlarging its territorial domain with the other hand; and this change in the Western World's geographical scale and structure had eventually deprived France of her central position.

France's last chance of winning world dominion had passed away at Waterloo upon the final failure of her third bid for it in the General War of A.D. 1792-1815. Thereafter the Western World's continental centre of gravity had shifted eastward from France to Germany as a result of the reception of the Western culture first in a Russian and then in an Ottoman Orthodox Christendom. These sweeping cultural conquests, which had carried the eastern marches of a Westernizing World as far as Alexandria and Vladivostok, had also substituted the Near and Middle East for Italy and Flanders as the arena in which the stakes were held, the wars were fought, and the prizes were to be won; and this reflected on the political and military plane in the transfer of the role of aggressive Central Power from France to Prussia-Germany in the course of the supplementary wars (gerebantur AD. 1848-71) following the General War of A.D. 1792-1815, Germany's tenure of a role which she had thus captured from France was, however, to be very much briefer
{p.260} than her predecessor's. The slower tempo of the Modern Western World's expansion during its earlier stages had enabled France to cling to this role—albeit at the price of bringing ever direr disasters upon herself—from A.D. 1494 to A.D. 1870, with no more than a temporary eclipse circa A.D. 1562-98. But the Western Civilization's transit from a Modern to a post-Modern Age of Western history at the very moment at which Germany was supplanting France had been accompanied by a sudden immense acceleration in the tempo of Western geographical expansion; and a change of geographical scale which had wafted Germany into a commanding position by A.D. 1871 had by then already begun to gather an impetus that in A.D. 1945 was to bring Germany lower than France had ever yet fallen.

In a Western system of international relations which, in the meantime, had continued to expand until it had attained a literally world-wide range, a Germany who had bid for world dominion twice within one lifetime, in a brace of general wars fought in swift succession (gerebantur A.D. 1914-18 et A.D. 1939-45), had been compelled, in her turn, by A.D. 1945 to surrender the role of aggressive Central Power to a Soviet Union who occupied a commanding position in a geographical setting that was oecumenical now and no longer merely regional. In A.D. 1952, when an arena of competition which had originally been confined to Italy and Flanders had come to embrace the whole of the Old World outside the Soviet Union's own borders, the Soviet Union possessed sally-ports opening into the back-yards of Scandinavia, Western Europe, the Near and Middle East, the sub-continent of India, South-East Asia, Indonesia, China, Korea, and Japan. In the course of four centuries the geographical scale of a Western system of international relations had thus been enlarged to a stupendous degree; yet the lay-out of the arena and the stance of the gladiators face to face within it was recognizably the same in A.D. 1952 as it had been four hundred years earlier.



(d) The Disintegrations of Civilizations
(e) The Growth of Civilizations
(f) ‘There is no armour against Fate’

(2) Possible Explanations of the Currency of ‘Laws of Nature’ in History
(3) Are Laws of Nature current in History inexorable or controllable?

XXXVII. THE RECALCITRANCE OF HUMAN NATURE TO LAWS OF NATURE

XXXIII. THE LAW OF GOD






XII THE PROSPECTS OF THE WESTERN CIVILIZATION

XXXIX. THE NEED FOR THIS INQUIRY

XL. THE INCONCLUSIVENESS OF A Priori ANSWERS

XLI. THE TESTIMONIES OF THE HISTORIES OF THE CIVILIZATIONS

(1) Western Experiences with Non-Western Precedents
(2) Unprecedented Western Experiences

D. TECHNOLOGY, WAR, AND GOVERNMENT

(I) THE ORIGIN AND NATURE OF THE PROBLEM

{XI.D.I. p. 473} THE problem with which the heirs of a Western Civilization were being confronted by the institution of War in A.D. 1952 had been set by the impact of an unprecedentedly potent latter-day Western technique on a literally world-wide Westernizing Society that was still articulated into a plurality of parochial states, since these states were still at liberty—and, because individually free, were collectively under pressure of a mutual fear and competition—to continue to go to war with one another as the penalty for being still severally sovereign and independent.

This problem was, as we have seen, by no means peculiar in itself to the Western World in the twentieth century of the Christian Era; it had likewise beset, in their day, all the civilizations that by this time were demonstrably extinct, fossilized, petrified, or moribund; but, as we have also observed, the extreme difference of degree between a latter-day Western and a previous human mastery over Non-Human Nature was tantamount to a difference in kind, because the additional 'drive’ that it had put into the traditional institution of War had heightened the hazard of War for Humanity from a limited to an unlimited risk. In the situation as it was in A.D. 1952 the continuance of a possibility of War was no longer only a menace to the survival of another man-made institution, the now oecumenical Western Society. Since the invention of the atomic bomb and the incubation of further, and perhaps still more deadly, new weapons, War had also become a menace to the survival of all human beings implicated in this society—and, by the time of writing, the membership of the Western Civilization on the technological and military planes had come to include the entire living generation of the Human Race.

(II) THE SITUATION AFTER THE SECOND WORLD WAR

(a) A PROGRESSIVE CONCENTRATION OF POWER

{XI.D.II.(a) p. 473} On the morrow of the Second World War, a World that had now been unified within a Western framework found itself in the midst of a revolution generated and propelled by the double shock of two blows dealt by a Western technology that had been raised to an unprecedented degree of potency. The impact of Technology on the Human Psyche had detonated two world wars within twenty-five years of one another and had thereby reduced the number of the Great Powers in a Western system of international relations from eight to two within the thirty-one years 1914-45. The impact of Technology on Mankind's means of communication had brought these two surviving Great Powers within
{p.474} point-blank range of one another round the circumference of the globe by 'annihilating distance’. The situation thus created was so formidable, as well as so novel, that it called for a closer analysis.

The deadliness of the rate of the casualties among the Great Powers during these first thirty-one years of a new bout of Western warfare was grimly evident in retrospect. It was now clear that political and military power—and, by implication, economic power as well, in an industrialized and mechanized world—were being concentrated at a headlong pace; and the effect of a now manifest tendency upon its victims' minds and feelings was the sharper inasmuch as this dominant undercurrent of international affairs had been concealed, in and after the peace-settlement following the General War of A.D. 1914-18, by a short-lived tendency in the opposite direction that, at the time, had been conspicuous1 just because it had been superficial.

By breaking up one Great Power, the Danubian Hapsburg Monarchy, and one ci-devant Great Power, the Ottoman Empire, and temporarily maiming and crippling two other Great Powers, Germany and Russia, the War of AJD. 1914-18 had permitted a previously dammed-back wave of Nationalism—rampant among politically un-unified and un-liberated peoples who had been dazzled by the historic success of the classical nation-states of Modern Western Europe2—to increase, at those four stricken Powers' expense, the number of the states of a medium and a small calibre in the Western international comity. During the preceding forty-three-years-long lull (durabat A.D. 1871-1914) between the end of the aftermath of the Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars and the outbreak of the First World War, the political unification of Italy and of Germany had reduced the number of the lesser states in the Western system to a minimum and had indeed temporarily removed from the map all remaining states of a medium calibre with the sole exception of Spain. In the peace-settlement of A.D. 1919-21 this medium class of states had been reintroduced on to the political map by the reconstitution of Poland and by the aspiration of Brazil to have outgrown the stature of a small state even if she might not yet be deemed to have attained the dimensions of a Great Power.3

In the constitution of the League of Nations the success of the lesser states' self-assertion during the first decade after the close of the First World War had been registered in A.D. 1922 in the raising of the number of non-permanent seats on the Council from the provisional minority figure, originally agreed in A.D. 1919, of four, as against the minimum number of five permanent seats then reserved for Great Powers,4 to the majority figure of six, as against four;5 and in A.D. 1926 the Great Powers

1 See Toynbee, A. J.: The World after the Peace Conference (London 1925, Milford), pp. 24-43, especially the comparative table, on pp. 32-34, of states, below the rank of Great Powers, which were playing an active part in international affairs before and after the War of A.D. 1914-18.
2 See IV. iv. 185-90.
3 See Toynbee, A. J., op, cit., pp. 35-36, and Toynbee, A. J., and Boulter, V. M.: Survey of International Affairs, 1926 (London 1928, Milford), p. 21.
4 See the original text of Article 4 of the Covenant of the League of Nations.
5 See Toynbee, A. J., and Boulter, V. M.: Survey of International Affairs, 1926 (1928, Milford), pp. 10-14.

{p.475} on the Council had been prevented by the minor states' obstruction from securing Germany's admission to membership in the League with a permanent seat on the Council until they had consented to pay the price of agreeing to the institution of three 'semi-permanent' seats for the benefit of Poland and other medium-sized states of her kind.1 The Wilsonian illusion, thus created, that the comity of states was being 'democratized', had been fostered at the time by the self-restraint of the three Great Powers—France, Great Britain, and the United States—that had emerged from the First World War as temporary victors; for it had been incompatible with these Powers' principles, and not imperative for their interests, to treat the lesser states very high-handedly.

The brutal truth that had been hidden under this amiable but brittle mask had, however, been quickly exposed by the resurgence of Germany under a National-Socialist régime; and, after a criminal Power that had taken full advantage of having been let off lightly in the Paris peace-settlement of A.D. 1919—20 had paid in A.D. 1945 for her abominable crimes by being first blasted, then invaded, and finally dismembered like the Hapsburg Monarchy in A.D. 1918, it had become clear that the significant event in the First World War had been the destruction of the weakest of the Great Powers of the day, not the spawning of a litter of new minor states. The temporary erection of minor states in a political vacuum produced by the break-up or mutilation of former Great Powers, so far from militating against the concentration of power, had created an opportunity for it. The nominal 'liberation’ of 'successor-states’ had indeed been illusory from first to last. They had been created to be enslaved; for no other fate than enslavement could await minor states, new or old, in a world in which the concentration of power was being ordained inexorably by Technology's relentless progress.

In this world, states of anything less than the highest calibre were not any longer either economically or militarily or politically 'viable'; their presence on the map was an invitation to an aggressor, and the opportunity had been perceived by Hitler's intuitive genius and had been exploited by his criminal lust for power as a key that was to open for Germany her way to a world-wide domination. Hitler's strategy of aggression had been to equip Germany with the material resources for dominating the World by capturing the defenceless pawns that had taken the ci-devant Hapsburg and Romanov Empires' places on a Central and East European political chess-board; and his eventual catastrophic failure to win for a Third German Reich this Hapsburg and Romanov heritage had merely bequeathed to the Soviet Union the chance of snatching out of a slain Third Reich's dead hands, and concentrating in her own giant grasp, the whole of the Hohenzollern Empire's, as well as the Hapsburg and Romanov Empires', legacy of 'successor-states' as far west as the Elbe, Thuringia, and the Boehmerwald.

This progressive liquidation, since A.D. 1938, of the successor-states of destroyed or mutilated Great Powers in Central and Eastern Europe had indicated what the fate of all other successor-states in other regions was likely to be, The only reason why West Germany and South-West

1 See ibid., pp. 16-78.

{p.476} Austria had not, by A.D. 1952, yet followed East Germany and North East Austria into Russia's maw was that these two other fragments of dismembered a Third Reich had come meanwhile under the control the United States and her West European allies Great Britain and France; and by this date it had become clear that the substitution of a United States protectorate for an untenable independence was the only insurance against Russian domination that promised to be effective in the long run for any state anywhere in the World.

This role, which was a new role for the United States in the Old World, was a familiar role of hers in the New World; for the substitute of a covert for an overt subjection through a process of nominal liberation was a tragi-comedy that, before being played in Central and Eastern Europe between A.D. 1918 and A.D. 1945, had been played in Latin America more than a hundred years earlier, between A.D. 1810 and A.D. 1823. From the days of the Holy Alliance to the days of the Third Reich the Monroe Doctrine had saved the successor-states of the Spanish Empire in the Americas from falling under the domination of some other Continental European Power at the price of replacing a Spanish imperial administration by a United States political hegemony, that had been none the less effective for being exercised light-handedly, and a no less alien economic ascendancy that had been enjoyed for a hundred years by the United Kingdom before this, too, had passed into North American hands. Since the reversal of the ratio of the relative strength of the United States and Great Britain as a result of Great Britain's lo and the United States' gain, in economic strength in the War of A.D. 1914-18, the underwriting of the Monroe Doctrine by British sea-power had ceased to be a necessity for the United States at the moment wt it had ceased to be a possibility for the British Empire.

In a nineteenth-century Western World in which all the Great Powers except Great Britain had been situated on the European peninsula of I Eurasian Continent, the sea-power of the United Kingdom had *cidentally screened the Americas in the act of screening the British Island the Transoceanic possessions of the British Crown against danger of attack by any other Great Power then in existence. The temporarily favourable politico-geographical situation that had made it possible for the British Navy thus to provide strategic security for the enl English-speaking and overseas world had, however ceased to be: when, at the turn of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries of the Christian Era, two new Great Powers—the United States herself and Japan—had arisen outside the British naval cordon round Continental Europe at the moment when, from within the cordon, British naval supremacy was being challenged by Germany; and the United Kingdom's inability in these radically altered circumstances, to continue to give effective naval protection to the whole of the British Empire, not to speak of the United States and the Latin American republics, had been demonstrated in the course of half a century ending in A.D. 1945.

Even before the outbreak of the First World War, the challenge from Germany had constrained Great Britain to seek a reinforcement of her naval strength—in the Pacific and the Indian Ocean by enter
{p.477} into an alliance with Japan in A.D.1902 and in European waters by making an entente with France in A.D. 1904. In the Second World War, in which both the Japanese and the Italian Navy had gone into action on the anti-British side, even the countervailing aid of the by this time immense sea-power of the United States had not enabled British sea-power to save Hong Kong, Malaya, and the Dutch Empire in Indonesia from being temporarily overrun by the Japanese at a time when the whole strength of the British Navy was having to be employed nearer home on the three-fold task of holding the Levant, screening Great Britain herself from invasion, and keeping open the western approaches to the British Isles. In other words, the British Empire's tribulations during the Second World War had proved conclusively that, on the strategic plane, the British Empire was now no longer the unitary Power that it had been so long as the sea-power of the United Kingdom had been able effectively to protect the whole of the Empire, from its frontage on the North Sea and the English Channel to its frontage on the China Seas inclusive; and this dissolution of the British Empire's former strategic unity had been discounted on the political plane in advance, A British statesmanship that had never forgotten the lesson of Great Britain's disastrous intransigence towards her North American colonies in A.D. 1775-83 had been forestalling the violent break-up that had been the Spanish, the Ottoman, and the Danubian Hapsburg Empire's fate by transforming the British Empire into a Commonwealth of fully self-governing states since A.D. 1867, 1848, 1841, or even as early as 1791 if the local landmarks in the constitutional history of Canada are taken as indicators of the progress of political devolution in the British Empire as a whole.1

The voluntary, gradual, and pacific transformation of a once unitary empire into a free association between an ever-increasing number of fully self-governing states had been a triumph of good feeling and good sense which was perhaps almost unique in the political annals of Mankind in Process of Civilization up to date; and this political achievement reflected credit on the parties that had been willing to receive self-government in instalments, as well as on the party that had been willing to make progressive cessions of political power on its own initiative without waiting to be compelled. The creditableness of the political process in this British case could not, however, prevent the political effect of a dissolution of the British Empire by agreement from being much the same, in the stark terms of power politics, as the political effect of the break-up of the Spanish, Ottoman, and Danubian Hapsburg Empires by force. In this case, as in those, the effect had been the creation of a dangerous political vacuum which the champions of a dissolving Hapsburg Monarchy had diagnosed and deprecated when they had given it the pejorative nickname 'Balkanization' in allusion to the sequel to the previous break-up of the Ottoman Empire in Rumelia. The hard fact was that, by A.D. 1952, the sea-power of the United Kingdom

1 A convenient list of the dates when responsible government was granted in the various British colonies with populations of West European origin will be found in Nathan, M.: Empire Government (London 1918, Allen & Unwin), pp, 47-48.

{p.478} had ceased to be able, unaided, to protect the United Kingdom itself or what remained of its dependent empire, while the other now fully self-governing dominions of the British Crown, which had ceased to be able to count upon effective protection by the United Kingdom's Navy, had not become capable, unaided, of providing for their own security; and this meant that all continuing or former states members of the British Commonwealth, like all Continental European states west of the Soviet Union's 'iron curtain', must become protectorates of the United States as the only practicable alternative to their becoming satellites of the Soviet Union.

This was another way of saying that, in A.D. 1952, the Soviet Union and the United States found themselves confronting one another as the only two Great Powers still surviving on the face of the planet; and, in any international balance of power, two was bound, even at the best, to be an awkward number. It was true that in this current chapter of Western international history—in contrast to the situation during the chapter that had been opened in A.D. 1931 by Japan's initial act of aggression in Manchuria and had been closed in A.D, 1945 by the overthrow of both Japan and Germany—the two rival Great Powers were, both of them, economically 'sated’ countries, either of which could find peaceful employment for the whole of its man-power, for many decades to come, in cultivating its own garden and developing the still untouched reserves of human and non-human resources within its own frontiers; and in this respect the international situation was less dangerous in A.D. 1952 than it had been before and during the Second World War, when Germany and Japan had been led into committing aggression by their belief that they could not continue to provide for a growing population at an acceptable standard of living within their own frontiers. By contrast, both the United States and the Soviet Union enjoyed, and admitted to enjoying, in A.D. 1952, a freedom from want that made both these surviving Great Powers immune to one of the historic motives for aggressiveness. Unfortunately, however, they did not, either of them, enjoy an equal freedom from the mutual fear that had been the other powerful motive for aggressiveness in the past; and their fear of one another was engendered and kept alive by the convergent operation of several different causes.

To begin with, the Russian and American peoples differed in êthos. The Russian people's habitual and characteristic temper was one of docile resignation, the American people's one of obstreperous impatience; and this difference of temper was reflected in a difference of attitude towards arbitrary government. The Russians acquiesced in this as an evil that some six hundred years of experience had schooled them to regard as inevitable, whereas the Americans' experience of successfully revolting against arbitrary government by ministers of a British King George III and successfully preventing any domestic recrudescence of arbitrary government during the first century and three quarters of the history of the United States had led them to think of arbitrary government as an evil which any people could banish if it had the will. In consequence, the Americans—including a middle-class-
{p.479} minded American industrial working class—saw their summum bonum in a liberty that they equated with equality, whereas a Russian Communist dominant minority saw their summum bonum in an equality that they equated with liberty. These temperamental and doctrinal differences made it difficult for the two peoples to understand, and therefore difficult for them to trust, one another; and this inevitable mutual distrust bred a no-less-inevitable mutual fear in the hearts of the two strong men armed, now that the arena in which they menaced one another had been transformed out of all recognition by the unprecedentedly rapid and far-reaching recent progress of Technology in Western hands.



The Significance of Hitler's Bid for World-Dominion

{XI.D.II(c), p. 500} The opportunity for political crime on an oecumenical scale which had been opened up by a recession of Militarism in Western Europe had indeed been visible to Hitler as early as the morrow of the First World War.

Hitler had perceived that, in a World whose peoples were all now miserably war-weary and war-shy, world-dominion might be the easy prize of any nation that could still be coaxed, duped, doped, or flogged by an audacious demagogue or despot into being one degree less unwarlike than its neighbours. 'In the realm of the blind the one-eyed man is king.’ On the strength of this intuition Hitler had cold-bloodedly remilitarized Germany and then attacked Poland, four small West European countries, and France; and the sensationally successful results of these successive criminal acts had testified to the correctness of Hitler's calculations up to that point. The German people, for the second time in one lifetime, had duly allowed themselves, not only to be used by a German Government as instruments for the commission of an international crime, but to be induced to play this criminal role with all their heart, soul, mind, and strength;4 a Polish people that had remained exceptional in having lost nothing of its martial spirit had been overwhelmed by a German aggressor's crushing superiority on the plane of Military Technology; and the collapse of Hitler's West European victims had justified Hitler's thesis that, in the state of mind and feeling then prevalent in Western Europe, a small margin of superiority in martial spirit might earn for a boldly wicked aggressor a fabulous dividend in military conquests. Hitler was reported to have said, and this not in jest, that all good pacifists ought to wish him success because the con-

1 Aeschylus: Agamemnon, 1. 177, quoted in this Study, passim.
2 Heb. xii. 6.
3 Put your trust in God, my boys, and keep your powder dry' (Blacker, Valentine: Oliver's Advice).
4 Mark xii. 30.

{p.501} centration of a monopoly of military and political power in Germany's hands was the only practical means, in the World as it was, of translating the ideals of Pacifism into reality. Hitler was, in truth, offering the World, at his own price, a commodity—freedom from fear of further world wars—of which Mankind stood in dire need, and for which they were therefore already prepared to pay dear.

In psychological principle, therefore, the business of world-conquest on which Hitler had embarked was as 'sound' as it was immoral; and, if in the event this would-be world-conqueror, so far from making Germany's and his own political fortune, brought down upon his Third Reich and upon himself a disaster that eclipsed the previous downfall of the Hohenzollern Reich and Dynasty, this was because Hitler was guilty of two fatal errors, of which the second, at any rate, might have been avoidable.

The builder of a Third Reich who had also been the creator of National Socialism had made the price of a Pax Teutonica so intolerably high in requiring submission to a Nazi German domination that, at the first glimmer of a prospect that this tyranny might ultimately be foiled and overthrown, resistance movements sprang up in even the tamest of the countries that Hitler's armies had overrun, while a British people which had allowed its governing class to practise 'appeasement' towards Japan, Italy, and Germany from A.D. 1931 to 1939 falsified the not irrational expectations that Hitler had founded on his observation of this decidedly un-martial and apparently persistent British temper by refusing to accept peace at Hitler's price even when the collapse and capitulation of France in A.D. 1940 had left Britain fighting on alone without any apparent prospect of staving off imminent defeat and subjugation.

Hitler's second fatal error was his abandonment of a hitherto brilliantly successful policy of administering his aggression to his victims in successive doses nicely 'calculated to be, each time, just not too large for a docile patient to swallow; and this error looks like a gratuitous one, since an historian cannot descry any contemporary change in the international situation that could have forced Hitler's hand in this crucial issue. By his seizure of Bohemia and Moravia on the night of the 15th-16th March, 1939, Hitler made it certain that, when he went on to attack Poland, he would find himself this time at war with Great Britain as well; by ensuring the belligerency of Great Britain, he converted a local war into a general war; by thus bringing on a general war, he ensured the eventual intervention of the United States (whatever assistance his Japanese accomplices might or might not eventually give in driving the United States into belligerency); and, by thus condemning Germany, sooner or later, to be smitten by the full force of an industrial war-potential in the United States that amounted to more than half the aggregate industrial war-potential of the whole World at the tune, Hitler was condemning Germany to receive a knock-out blow. Moreover, as if this chain of inevitable and inevitably fatal consequences of a false step taken on the 15th March, 1939, was not enough to make sure of Hitler's frustrating his own purposes, he gratuitously attacked the Soviet Union
{p.502} after he had failed to subdue Great Britain and had succeeded in moving the United States to convert herself into 'the arsenal of Democracy’.

It will be seen that Hitler's eventual failure to impose peace on the World by force of arms was due, not to any flaw in his thesis that the World was ripe for conquest, but to an accidental combination of incidental errors in his measures for putting into execution a nefarious grand design that, in itself, was a feasible scheme for profiting by a correctly diagnosed psychological situation. A twentieth-century World, that had thus, in A.D. 1933-45, been reprieved, thanks only to a chapter of lucky accidents, from a fate which Mankind's patently increasing defeatism and submissiveness had almost provocatively invited, could hardly count upon any future would-be world-conqueror's being so clumsy as to let the same easy prey escape for the second time by allowing himself to blunder in his turn into an Hitlerian combination of egregious errors; and, if a future follower in Hitler's footsteps was unlikely to make Hitler's mistakes, he could, on the other hand, be sure of profiting by his Nazi forerunner's pioneer work in clearing the ground for a successor to cultivate; for, in failing by so narrow a margin to win the prize of world-dominion for himself, Hitler had left the prize dangling within the reach of any successor capable of pursuing the same aim of world-conquest with a little more patience, prudence, and tact.

The yeoman service that Hitler had performed for some future architect of a Pax Oecumenica was his historic achievement of forcing an oecumenical society that had already been devastated by one world war to inflict upon itself, within the lifetime of the generation that had been smitten by that shattering catastrophe, a Second World War that had brought still more grievous tribulations upon the World at large, and especially upon Europe. An Hitlerian 'revolution of destruction'1 was an irrevocably accomplished fact by the time when Hitler came to grief; and the collapse of all Hitler's designs for the aggrandizement of Germany left this negative result of his criminal career intact. In A.D. 1953 it was manifest that, in failing to win world-dominion for his own abortive Third German Reich, Hitler had bequeathed, to any successor with the ability to take advantage of this opportunity, the legacy that Assyria had bequeathed to the Achaemenidae, Ts'in She Hwang-ti to Han Liu Pang, and Pompey and Caesar to Augustus.2 Hitler, finding the peoples of a twentieth-century Westernizing World already psychologically devastated by the experience of one world war, had left them more than doubly devastated by a more harrowing repetition of the same experience within the same lifetime. A field that in A.D. 1914-18 had been scored by trenches and pitted with shell-holes had been ploughed up by bulldozers and effaced by bomb-craters in A.D. 1939-45. An Oikoumenê that in August 1914 had been under cultivation as a chequer-board of national allotments had now become a waste-land open to a unitary occupation. For a post-Hitlerian empire-builder, Hitler's derelict legacy was a gift of the Gods.

1 Rauschning, H.: Germany's Revolution of Destruction. English translation (London 1930, Heinemann).
2 See V. vi. 186-7.



(III) ALTERNATIVE POSSIBLE APPROACHES TO WORLD ORDER

{XII.D.III, p. 524} Our foregoing survey of the situation after the Second World War has shown that, at the opening of the second half of the twentieth century of the Christian Era, a Westernizing World found itself in a plight that can be summarily described as follows. Three recent achievements of Western technology—the coalescence and simultaneous shrinkage of the Oikoumenê and the invention of atomic weapons—had made it imperative for Man in Process of Civilization to abolish War; War could not be abolished unless the control of atomic energy employable for military purposes could be concentrated in the hands of some single political authority; this monopoly of the command of the master-weapon of the age would enable, and, in enabling, compel, the authority controlling atomic energy to assume the role of an oecumenical government; the seat of this oecumenical government must be either Washington or Moscow in the constellation of political forces that had emerged from the overthrow of Germany and Japan in A.D. 1945; but in A.D. 1952 neither the United States nor the Soviet Union was prepared voluntarily to place itself at the mercy of its sole surviving peer by submitting, without fighting, to seeing this rival arrogate to itself the world-wide political ascendency that would be conferred automatically on either Power by a monopoly of the control of atomic energy for military purposes.

What was to be the denouement of this political problem-play ? The line of least psychological resistance would, no doubt, be a resort to the old-fashioned expedient of ordeal by battle. Now that four centuries and a half of recurrent warfare in a Western arena had left only two gladiators still erect and aktionsfähig, a third world war might be expected to elicit a knock-out blow that would leave only one Power alive, with no competitor now remaining in the lists to dispute the sole survivor's monopoly of a control of atomic energy that would carry world-dominion with it. This catastrophic denouement was evidently feasible, since a world war fought with atomic weapons would be likely to have at least as conclusive an ending as the first and second world wars, both of which had ended in the decisive defeat of one side, though both these wars had been waged with relatively ineffective pre-atomic armaments. It could therefore be predicted that a third world war between the two remaining Powers would prove to be the final round in a series of contests that, since A.D. 1914, had already reduced the number of the Powers in this arena to two from eight. The outcome of a third world war thus seemed likely to be the imposition of an oecumenical peace of the Roman kind by a victor whose victory would leave him with a monopoly of the control of atomic energy in his grasp.

This denouement was foreshadowed, not only by present facts, but by historical precedents, since, in the histories of other civilizations, a Time of Troubles had been apt to culminate in the delivery of a knock-out blow resulting in the establishment of a universal state; but the precedents also suggested that Mankind could not afford in A.D. 1952
{p.525} to resign itself to sanctioning a reperformance of this familiar tragedy. Whenever, in the histories of other civilizations, a series of cycles of warfare had eventually been brought to a close by the destruction of all the contending Powers except one single survivor, this barbarous remedy for a desperate malady had not availed either to save the sick civilization's life or to rid a war-stricken world of war in perpetuity, because the cost of arriving at a world order by this rough road had been mortally heavy. In the past the forcible establishment of an oecumenical peace had been purchased by a war-stricken society only at the prohibitive price of its inflicting wounds upon itself from which it found itself unable to recover; and, if this had been the ultimate effect of imposing universal peace by violence in a pre-atomic age, what were the Western Civilization's prospects in the event of its falling into a third world war in which a knock-out blow would be delivered with the unprecedented violence that had now been imported into the conduct of War by the invention of atomic weapons ?

If the Western Society took this traditional war-path now that it was equipped with unprecedentedly potent armaments, would it not be condemning itself to purchase an ephemeral peace at a price that would be prohibitive ? Would not the spiritual ravages of War, which had always been much harder to repair than its physical ravages, be likely, this time, to exceed all imaginable measure? Would not the agonies inflicted by atomic warfare make even a once humane and generous-hearted victor turn savage? These were considerations that might well deter the most fanatical Russian mind from allowing itself to believe that a third world war was the necessary price for completing the conversion of Mankind to the Communist Faith, and, a fortiori, deter the most sanguine American mind from allowing itself to believe that, the sooner a third world war was fought and won, the sooner the American people would be rid of the distracting anxieties of international politics and be free once more to devote themselves to the normal pursuits of private life. A sober-minded observer could foresee that after a third war fought with atomic weapons there would no longer be any possibility of life as it had previously been lived either in the United States or in the Soviet Union.

In these perilous circumstances the best hope for the future of Mankind lay in the possibility that the governments and peoples of the United States and the Soviet Union might have the imagination, wisdom, tolerance, self-restraint, patience, and fortitude to seek and ensue the one alternative to a third world war that, at this stage, was practical politics: that is to say, a pacific partition of the Oikoumenê between these two surviving Powers for an indefinite time to come. All the virtues enumerated above would be required on both sides if this policy was to have any chance of success, since it was evident that a society which had tapped atomic energy could never rest easy until it had brought under the control of some single oecumenical authority a newly released titanic physical force which would be a menace to the existence of at least half the Human Race, or, more probably, to the existence of the whole of it, so long as two mutually independent and antagonistic
{p.526} Powers each remained at liberty to use this appalling weapon in waging war against its neighbour. Yet, if this risk of a Third World War fought with atomic weapons was the consideration that made the establishment of some kind of world order imperative, it would be a reductio ad absurdum of Mankind's quest for freedom from, fear if, in seeking the solid and lasting security against a social catastrophe that was to be found in the establishment of a unitary control over atomic energy, the governments and peoples of the two surviving Great Powers were to precipitate the very catastrophe that all Mankind was concerned to avert. If the establishment of a world order was imperative for the sake of avoiding an atomic war, the avoidance of an atomic war must be imperative a fortiori, as an end in itself.

In the circumstances of the time the greatest menace to the welfare and existence of the Human Race was not the invention of atomic weapons, but the rise in living human souls of a temper reminiscent of a mood once prevalent in an Early Modern Western World for about a hundred years beginning with the outbreak of the Western Wars of Religion in the seventh decade of the sixteenth century of the Christian Era. At the opening of the second half of the twentieth century there were Capitalists and Communists who, like their Catholic and Protestant forerunners, felt it to be impracticable as well as intolerable to acquiesce in leaving the allegiance of Society divided, for an indefinite time to come, between an orthodoxy that they identified with their own faith and a heresy that they identified with the ideology of their adversaries. The wrong-headedness of this attitude was betrayed by the conclusion, logically following from it, that Orthodoxy was called upon by duty and self-interest in unison to combat, suppress, and eliminate Heresy by the ruthless employment of every weapon at Orthodoxy's command. The history of the Western Wars of Religion bore witness that spiritual issues could not be settled by force of arms; and the acquisition of atomic weapons gave warning that it would not be open to Capitalists and Communists in a post-Modern Age of Western history to learn the futility of religious warfare, and the necessity for religious toleration, by an empirical method of prolonged trial and chastening error that had been practicable for Catholics and Protestants in an Early Modern Age in which gunpowder was the deadliest weapon at the command of wrong-headed crusaders.

In the nineteen-fifties, as in the fifteen-sixties, the advocate of a patience that could claim to be the highest form of fortitude laid himself open, no doubt, to the charge of being a contemptible procrastinator who could offer no prospect of being able ultimately to avert the 'show-down’ that he was cravenly seeking to postpone; but in the nineteen-fifties, at any rate, this taunt did the Fabian policy an injustice; for it failed to take account of the positive advantage that Mankind stood to gain by a successful pursuit of a policy of playing for time in the particular social circumstances of the Westernizing World of the day. The vehemence of the animosity, at this date, between the respective adherents of Communism and of a traditional Western way of life was one of the psychological effects of the sudden coalescence and shrinkage
{p.527} of the Oikoumenê under the masterful impulsion of an ever faster advancing Western technology. It was an emotional reaction to the malaise that a Western and a Russian Society were both feeling as a result of finding themselves brought abruptly into an immediate physical contact with one another before either society had had time to become spiritually intimate with the other. Either party was having to accommodate itself to the sudden epiphany of a neighbour who had been a stranger to it during the centuries in which its own peculiar culture-pattern had been taking shape. What, on both sides, was now needed above all was time to allow a Subconscious Psyche, whose pace was the tortoise's gait, to adjust itself to the revolutionary situation created by the technological conjuring tricks of a Practical Intellect that had been racing ahead of its subconscious yoke-fellow at the pace of a march hare.1

This common-sense consideration is clearly brought out in the following passage from the pen of a nineteenth-century Chinese philosopher :

'Now that the ingenious inventions of the steamship and the railway are enabling the European peoples to reach every corner of the Earth and every strange tribe of Mankind, the beginning of a world unity is here. When scattered races and nations are brought together, then divers civilisations will also gradually become unified. Our ancient sages made a distinction between the Tao [the Way of Life] and the Ch’I [the Tools]. The ways of life cannot be immediately unified; they must first be brought together by the tools or implements of human invention. The steamship and the railroad are the carriages of the ways of life. . . .Therefore, these great inventions, which the Western Powers are using for their encroachment upon China, are the very things which the sages of a future age will utilise as the means for the unification of the ways of life of all the nations of the Earth.’ 2

This shrewd Chinese observation brings out the further point that the psychological discomfort, and consequent animosity, that had been caused by Technology's feat of ‘annihilating' physical distance, were not peculiar to the relations between a twentieth-century Western Society and a contemporary Russian Society. The same psychological disturbance had been produced by the same technological revolution in the West's relations with a Chinese Society and with all the other living non-Western civilizations. There had been a simultaneous and similar disturbance in the relations of these living non-Western civilizations with one another in so far as they had been brought abruptly into closer contact with one another through the introduction of Western means of communication; and these divers twentieth-century psychological tensions were so many examples of regular consequences of encounters between contemporaries that, in a previous Part of this Study,3 have also been illustrated from the histories of other arenas.

1 See pp. 210-11, above.
2 Wang T’ao (natus A.D. 1828), quoted by Hu Shih in The Chinese Renaissance: The Haskell Lectures, 1933 (Chicago 1934, University Press), pp. 34-35. The contrast, in point of comparative effectiveness, between the respective careers of Wang T’ao and the contemporary Japanese pioneer of Westernization, Ito, is pointed out by Hu Shih, ibid., pp. 10-12. Cp. Pp. 33-34.
3 In IX. viii, p. 522-629.

{p.528} Our foregoing study of encounters between contemporaries has lit up one truth that, in A.D. 1952, was most pertinent to the consideration of a Westernizing World's prospects. History showed that the psychological disturbance inevitably produced by an encounter was apt to be aggravated to a disastrous degree if either party sought impatiently to cut the Gordian knot by which he found himself unwelcomely tied to an uncongenial fellow-traveller, whereas the same disturbing effect of the same encounter might be turned to account as a supreme opportunity for an act of spiritual creation by evangelists who came to bring, not a sword, but peace, and who found their mission, not in striving to make one of two colliding cultures prevail over the other, but in seeking to make the challenge of an encounter yield the response of a new spiritual vision opening up the vista of a new way of life.

If this was indeed the truth, then the World's first need on the political plane in the sixth decade of the twentieth century of the Christian Era was a détente between the United States and the Soviet Union in the spirit of the détente which, at an equally critical moment of Hellenic history, the Roman and the Arsacid Power had jointly achieved in 23-20 B.C.—to their common credit and to the general benefit of a world whose fate had lain in the hands of those two Powers between them. In 23-20 B.C. the Roman and Arsacid governments virtually agreed to partition between them, uti possidebant, an Hellenic World which had been expanded by previous Macedonian conquests to embrace a Hittite, Syriac, Egyptiac, Babylonic, and Indic Society's domains in addition to the Hellenic Civilization's own patrimony.1 Augustus was abandoning a Roman aspiration—inspired by a consciousness of Rome's decisive superiority over Parthia in military resources, and entertained since the year 53 B.C. by Crassus, Julius Caesar, and Mark Antony in succession—to reassert by force of Roman arms, as far eastward into the heart of the Continent as Alexander the Great had ever penetrated, an Hellenic ascendancy that, in the course of a century ending in 53 B.C., had been all but extinguished east of the Euphrates. In return for this tacit assurance that Rome was now renouncing an ambition whose achievement would have required the overthrow and destruction of the Parthian Empire, the Arsacid Government was now making it possible for Rome to forget her rankling resentment at the humiliating defeat of an aggressive Roman military adventure by giving back the captured standards and releasing the surviving prisoners of war that had been the trophies of a Parthian victory over an invading Roman army thirty years back.

It is true that the Romano-Parthian détente of 23-20 B.C. did not eliminate all the friction from the relations between the two surviving Powers in a war-stricken Hellenic World. For another four centuries and more, Rome and Ctesiphon were to contend for the prize of paramountcy over a buffer state in Armenia which was to play the part played by Afghanistan in the relations between the British and Russian empires in the nineteenth century of the Christian Era. There were

1 The outlying Indian province of this expanded Hellenic World was the only fraction of it which, at this date, was not under either Arsacid or Roman rule.

{p.529} also to be other bones of contention between Rome and Parthia besides Armenia, and these divers chronic disputes were to erupt into occasional wars. Nevertheless, the détente of 23-20 B.C. was as auspicious as it was historic; for it set a tone which governed the relations between the Roman Empire and its eastern neighbour on the whole for not much less than six hundred years thereafter;1 and the tradition of moderation that thus came to prevail in the relations between the western and the eastern Power in a partitioned Hellenic World was not easily overcome by the deliberately banned spirit of militancy.

When Trajan strained Roman resources almost to breaking-point by reverting to the Alexandrine Oriental ambitions of Mark Antony, Caesar, and Crassus, the Augustan policy of self-restraint was promptly readopted by Trajan's immediate successor Hadrian; and, after this Hadrianic liquidation of a Trajanic adventure, a 'temperate and undecisive' border warfare that continued occasionally to interrupt a normal state of peace was not converted into a holy war either by the hold that Zoroastianism gained over the later Arsacid princes of the Parthian line or by their Sasanid successors' act of officially establishing the Zoroastrian Church as the state church of their empire. The friction between the Roman trustees of Hellenism and the Iranian trustees of a temporarily submerged but never extinguished Syriac Civilization did not rankle into a life-and-death struggle until the two Powers fell into the reduplicated Romano-Persian war of A.D. 572-91 and A.D. 603—28; and it was only in the course of the second of the two bouts of this long-drawn-out struggle that a political conflict came to be inflamed into an ordeal by battle between the fanatical adherents of two rival faiths.

In the particular social circumstances of a Westernizing World in the twentieth century of the Christian Era, in which time was needed for the breeding of familiarity, the danger of an atomic world war, which loomed large in A.D. 1952, might be expected to recede if American and Russian statesmanship could contrive to keep the peace even for a much shorter period than the time for which it had been kept between the Roman and Parthian empires in virtue of the détente of 23-20 B.C.; but in this case, as in that, the task of statesmanship would not be easy.2 A consideration that seemed likely to tell in favour of a preserva-

1 From first to last the Euphratean frontier of the Roman Empire endured for nearly seven hundred years, running from Pompey's organization of the province of Syria in 64 B.C. to the irruption of the Primitive Muslim Arab barbarian invaders into the Roman and Sasanian empires simultaneously in and after A.D. 632 (see I. i. 75).
2 Professor William McNeill comments: 'I feel that the Rome-Carthage relationship is a far more convincing parallel to contemporary conditions than the Rome-Parthia relationship. In the relations between Rome and Parthia mortal fear and the density of contact were, I believe, absent.’ The present writers comment on this comment is that it was not too much to expect of American and Russian statesmanship in the sixth decade of the twentieth century of the Christian Era that it should stabilize the relation between the United States and the Soviet Union on a Romano-Parthian basis and save it from degenerating into a Romano-Carthaginian 'irrepressible conflict'. Some of the obstacles to the achievement of the statesmen's task in the encounter between the United States and the Soviet Union are examined in the remainder of this chapter. These obstacles were manifestly formidable. Yet the present writer would submit that, when the obstacles had been looked in the face and had been estimated at their highest possible magnitude, it would still be a culpable surrender to despair—or, more culpable still, to mere impatience—if the statesmen were to resign themselves to the conclusion that a third world war could not be averted by a saving combination of the spiritual forces of wisdom, good will, and, above all, forbearance.

{p.530} tion of the peace was the current disparity between the two Powers' respective military resources.

In an age in which the sinews of war were technological and organizational experience and ability commanding man-power and non-human raw materials in quantities sufficient to ensure a full investment of the fund of human skill, the United States possessed in A.D. 1952 a superiority, in potential military strength, not only over the Soviet Union and her satellites, but over the whole World outside the United States' own frontiers;1 and, though this present American superiority might, as has been noted,2 be diminished, or even eventually converted into an inferiority, if the Russians were ever to succeed in fully developing the latent resources of the Soviet Union and in gaining effective control over the developed and latent resources of the rest of the Old World, the United States' present superiority seemed likely to last as far into the future as it was possible to see ahead, since the fund of skill which was the key to industrial power was, in the nature of things, an asset that it would take the Russians much longer to build up than material resources that could be converted into military strength only to the extent to which the skill to exploit them was forthcoming.3

On this showing, the present disparity between the United States and the Soviet Union in potential military strength seemed likely to endure. Yet it would have been rash to jump, on this account, to the conclusion that the Soviet Union would be willing or able in all circumstances to refrain from challenging her rival's decisively superior potential strength; for the competition between Rome and Parthia for paramountcy over Armenia after the détente of 23-20 B.C., and the competition between Athens and the Peloponnesian Confederacy for the accession of Corcyra after the peace settlement of 445 B.C., were warnings that, in any society that was partitioned politically between two Powers, and two only, a Balance of Power, even when this had been deliberately established by overt or tacit agreement, was in constant danger of being upset, even against the parties' will, by their falling into an involuntary yet unavoidable competition for the allegiance of forces, hitherto neutral, whose added -weight might be expected to give the scales a decisive inclination to one side or the other—whichever of the two sides should succeed in securing this accession of strength for itself.

1 Professor William McNeill comments: 'United States superiority is less than statistics of steel production would suggest, since, in the United States, more effort and material has to be devoted to civilian consumption, and more of military man-power and supply to services, than is required in the Soviet Union, where the lowness of the people's standard of living and the hardihood of their spirit makes them able to live and fight on a much smaller allowance of comforts and amenities than is demanded by Americans.'
2 On pp. 488-9, above.
3a 'Les atouts actuels de l'Europe ne paraissent pas reposer sur des nécessités physiques, mais sur un acquis historique qui ne peut lui échapper que par une évolution prolongée et sur les qualités morales et intellectuelles de ses populations. Notre civilisation surindustrialisée ne peut avoir d'autres centres que l'Europe et les États-Unis, tant que les autres régions n'ont pas atteinte méme degré de surindustrialisation, done de technique, de capitalisation, de standard de vie; les courants ne peuvent done être détournés que très insensiblement’ (Dupriez, L. H.: Les Mouvements Économiques Généraux (Louvain 1947, University Press, 2 vols.)> vol. i, p. 380).

{p.531} In a twentieth-century Oikoumenê that, since A.D. 1947, had been virtually partitioned into an American and a Russian sphere of influence, there were at least two pawns on the board that imperilled the maintenance of peace between the two rival Powers through being assets on which neither Power's hold was secure, and consequently being objects for which the two Powers were bound to compete. One of these disputable assets was the industrial war-potential of Europe, which at this date amounted in the aggregate—including the Russian as well as the American sphere of Europe—to more than a quarter of the total industrial war-potential of the World; the other disputable asset was the man-power of the non-Western and non-Russian peasant countries in Asia, Africa, and Indian America (from Mexico to Paraguay inclusive), which amounted in the aggregate to about three-quarters of the living generation of Mankind. In A.D. 1952 each of these two assets was partly in American and partly in Russian hands; if either of them were to fall wholly into the hands of only one of the two competitors for possession, the effect might be to give the Russo-American balance a decisive inclination in the successful competitor's favour; and, in either field, the hold of one of the two competitors was precarious. While the United States had good reason for fearing that the secession of China from the American to the Russian camp in A.D. 1948-9 might be followed by further landslides in the same direction in other Asian or African countries, the Soviet Union had no less good reason for fearing that she might not be able permanently to retain her control over those eastern fringes of the Western Society's Continental European patrimony on which she had imposed her domination during the last phase of the Second World War. Thus either Power was vulnerable, on one of two critical fronts, to the danger of formidable encroachments at its expense on the rival Power's part; and the consequent instability of the current balance made it difficult to hold the political scales even, and proportionately difficult to keep the political temperature low.

A Russian observer, drawing an interim balance sheet in A.D. 1952, and entering in his credit column the accession of China over against an entry in his debit column recording the defection of Jugoslavia, might find it hard to say whether, on balance, the Soviet Union had been a loser or a gainer. If the triumph of Communism in China were indeed an augury of what was to come in the South-East Asian countries, in India, in Pakistan, in Persia, and in an Arab World extending westward from the oil-fields of ' ‛Irāq and Sa'udi Arabia to the Atlantic seaboard of Morocco, this might seem in Russian eyes to be a winning card on a long view; for, in a competition for the allegiance of all Mankind between Communism and a traditional Western way of life, the suffrages of a peasant three-quarters of Mankind might be expected to be the determining factor in the long run; and, in appealing to this vast primitive electorate, Russia enjoyed advantages that America lacked.

The chief of these Russian advantages was that Russia herself, till yesterday, had been one of the primitive peasant countries at the mercy of a Western Society which had outstripped the rest of the World in its technological progress; and that, since yesterday, Russia had
{p.532} discovered a method of catching up with the Westerners by a forced march, and had by this means transformed her own economy at short notice with a success that had been registered in her victory in the Second World War over a Germany who, next to the United States, had been the strongest industrial Power in the Western World of the day. The Russians could thus use their own striking technological achievements under a Marxian dispensation as an impressive argument when they were commending Communism to other peasant peoples who still found themselves in the Russians' pre-Stalinian, or even in their pre-Petrine, plight of individual poverty and collective impotence. Russian propagandists could appeal in the same breath to an ancient Asian peasantry's new aspiration to raise its standard of living, and to a parvenu Asian intelligentsia's aspiration—which was as old and as young as this intelligentsia itself—to make itself mistress in its own house by throwing off the ascendancy of Western intruders who, for their own purposes in Asia, had called this Asian intelligentsia into being.1

At this point an alert Western counter-propagandist might try to put a spoke in the Russian propagandist's wheel by pointing out to the Asian intelligentsia that in reality the Russians were inviting them to exchange a Western ascendancy for a Russian ascendancy, and not for the national independence that the Russians were dangling before Asian eyes, and by simultaneously pointing out to the peasantry that in reality the Russians were inviting them to exchange the familiar woes of rack-rented tenants, not for the Utopia of peasant proprietorship, but for the prison-house of a mechanized collective farm.2 Such home truths, however, were likely to fall on deaf ears. The Asian peasants would not easily be deterred from making the common human blunder of exposing themselves to hitherto unknown evils in their eagerness to escape the known evils from which they were suffering at the moment. As for the Asian intellectuals, they might pay heed to a Western warning against a Russian imperialism if they happened to be natives of Manchuria, Outer Mongolia, or Soviet Central Asia, where this warning would evoke an echo in their memory of their own experience; but the voice of this handful of land-locked intellectuals would not carry far. In the experience of an overwhelming majority of the Asian intelligentsia of the day the typical alien imperialist was not a Russian; he was an Englishman, a Frenchman, a Dutchman, or some other variety of Frank. For the past 450 years the West European conquerors of the Ocean had been taking advantage of the conductivity of their physical medium of aggression to perpetrate indiscreet actes de présence in every corner of the Oikoumenê—'going to and fro in the Earth, and . . . walking up and down it'3 with the assiduity of Satan himself. These ubiquitous Western mariners’ Cossack contemporaries who had made the toilsome trek overland from the Urals to the Sea of Okhotsk had contrived hitherto to commit their aggression less conspicuously. In A.D. 1952 the Russian imperialist, in his missionary warfare with the Western imperialist, enjoyed the advantage of being relatively unknown

1 See V. v. 154-8.
2 See IX. viii. 674-5.
3 Job ii. 2.

{p.533} that had sometimes proved to be a winning card in American presidential elections. At this date the Russian candidate for the spoils of Imperialism was no more than a specious name to most of the peoples to whom Imperialism was now anathema.

By contrast, Eastern Europe was a region where, for the last two hundred years or so, the Russians had been acquiring the self-same bad reputation that, in the world at large, had been pre-empted by the Franks; and in A.D. 1952 a Russian observer, contemplating the entry of Jugoslavia's name on the debit side of his balance sheet, must have been ruefully conscious of Russia's weakness in this quarter. If Slavonic-speaking ex-Orthodox Serb Communists had broken with Slavonic-speaking ex-Orthodox Russian Communists—whose support was of vital importance to Jugoslavia in her dispute with the Western Powers over Trieste—because they could not bear the domineering behaviour of the Soviet Union Communist Party, how could the Soviet Union hope to win any voluntary adherents anywhere in Eastern Europe, or hope permanently to retain her hold on any East European countries if once she found herself reduced to holding them down by sheer physical force? The ominous symptom here, from Russia's point of view, was her unpopularity in East European countries that, as peasant countries, as Orthodox Christian countries, and as Slavonic-speaking countries, ought, on any a priorii ideological theory, to have felt themselves drawn towards the Soviet Union rather than towards the West.

An Orthodox Christian Georgia, for example, had not been reconciled to Russian rule by the freak of chance that had saddled Russia with a Georgian dictator; a Bulgaria that was Slavonic-speaking as well as Orthodox Christian was apparently as recalcitrant to Russian domination in A.D. 1952 as she had shown herself to be on the morrow of her liberation from Ottoman rule by Russian arms in A.D. 1878; Slavonic-speaking Bosniak Muslims and Croat and Slovene Catholic Christians, who were apt to resent their Serb fellow Jugoslavs’ ascendancy, had followed the Serbs' lead with alacrity in the stand that the Serbs had now taken against a Communist Russian imperialism. The Czechs had once looked confidingly to their Russian fellow Slavs to rescue them from the toils of Pan-Germanism; they had cherished this hope all through a century ending in A.D. 1945 with the arrival of a liberating Russian army in a Bohemia that, since the 15th March, 1939, had been a Third German Reich's 'Protectorate'; but the same Czechs had been quickly cured of their sentimental attachment to Russia by the experience of meeting Russians in the flesh in the role of representatives of an officially benevolent occupying Power. As for the Poles, the Magyars, and the Finns, History had demonstrated, long before A.D. 1945, that the Russians had no chance of reconciling them, and a fortiori none of assimilating them. The outcome of the Russian Empire's suzerainty over Finland from A.D. 1809 to A.D. 1918, and of her dominion over 'Congress Poland' from A.D. 1815 to A.D. 1915, indicated that a Slavonic-speaking Catholic Poland and an Ugrian-speaking Lutheran Finland were, both of them, proof against any attempts at Russification. As for the Ugrian-speaking Catholic and Carvinist Magyars, Russia had been
{p.534} their bugbear since A.D. 1849, when her military intervention in support of a Hapsburg Imperial Government at bay had enabled the Emperor Francis Joseph to put down a Magyar national insurrection with which he had been finding himself unable to cope unaided. After the Austro-Hungarian Ausgleich of A.D. 1867 Russia had come to figure in Magyar, as in Czech, imaginations as the champion of Panslavism; and, when invading Russian armies had arrived in Hungary in A.D. 1945 as the champions of Communism instead, this had not, of course, mollified the Magyars' by that time traditional Russophobia.

Nor could the Russians look forward to offsetting their general unpopularity in Eastern Europe by establishing an advanced post for Communism in Eastern Germany; for, in East German as well as West German minds, the Russian régime was bound to be abhorrent on account of its association with the partition of Germany, like Korea, between a Russian and an American hemisphere and with the annexation of Germany's eastern marches to Poland as far west as the Oder-Neisse Line. In the feelings of all Germans under all régimes after the Second World War, the Soviet Zone of Germany and the German territory annexed to Poland might be expected to fuse together into a monumental Germania Irredenta.

Thus, in a world that had been partitioned between the Soviet Union and the United States in A.D. 1947, either Power's hold on important portions of its provisional domain was decidedly precarious; this element of uncertainty made the current Russo-American Balance of Power unstable; this instability was inimical to the statesmen's task of keeping the peace until mutually alien societies, which the progress of Technology had suddenly brought into close quarters with one another, should have had time to become better acquainted; and, though the length of time required for allowing this psychological adjustment to work itself out seemed unlikely to be of the order of magnitude of the six centuries for which the Romano-Iranian frontier had endured after the Augustan détente of 23-20 B.C., it was nevertheless evident that a long period of precarious peace would be needed before there could be any practical possibility of placing this peace on the surer foundation of a genuinely good understanding between the Russian and the Western camp.

In the Western peoples' experience, in their intercourse with one another, the key to collective friendships between nations had been individual friendships between human beings whose personal comprehension of one another and goodwill towards one another had spun a network of human links across the psychological barriers set up by politico-military frontiers. In the light of this Western experience the Soviet Union's Western allies had taken the initiative, before the close of the Second World War, in proposing arrangements on a large scale for the promotion of personal intercourse between her nationals and theirs—especially in the promising form of an interchange of students. In the Westerners' belief it was not their fault that these overtures had not met with any response on the Russian side. They deplored the Soviet Government's evident unwillingness to let its subjects take

{p.535} advantage of these opportunities that were being offered to them of sampling the Western way of life at first hand for themselves; and, while they read in the Soviet Government's opposition to their proposals for intercourse a lack of confidence in the spiritual power of Communism to hold its own against the contemporary Western way of life in the judgement of Soviet citizens, if these were once given a chance of making a comparative personal trial of the two dispensations, this reading of the motives inspiring the Soviet Government's policy of seclusion was no comfort for those Westerners who saw no salvation for the World except in the achievement of a détente between the Western Society and its Russian neighbour. If the Politburo's belief in the hold of Communism upon the hearts and minds of Soviet citizens were ever to become robust enough to outweigh the Soviet Government's fear of allowing their subjects to see the Western World for themselves, then (so it would appear to Western minds) a positive approach would have been made towards the healing of a spiritual schism that was a menace to the prospects, not merely of the Western Civilization, but of Mankind itself, not excluding the garrison of a Communist camp.

In circumstances that were so plainly precarious but in other respects so enigmatically obscure, a dogmatic optimism was as unwarrantable as a dogmatic pessimism, and the living generation of Mankind had no choice but to reconcile itself as best it could to the disturbing knowledge that it was facing issues in which its very existence might be at stake, and that it was at the same time impossible at this stage to guess what the event would be,

In A.D. 1952 these perennial waifs on board Noah's Ark were in the situation in which Thor Heyerdahl and his five fellow vikings on board a balsa-log raft found themselves on the morning of the 7th August, 1947. On that fateful morning a westward-flowing current that had borne the raft Kon-Tiki 4,300 nautical miles across the breadth of the Pacific Ocean was now carrying her towards the Raroia Reef. Beyond the line of surf breaking over this barrier the approaching seafarers could descry the feathery tops of palm trees, and they knew that these palms bedecked idyllic isles set in a still lagoon; but between them and this haven where they would be1 ran the foaming and thundering reef 'in one line from horizon to horizon',2 and the set of the current and the wind gave the voyagers no chance of circumnavigation. They were heading perforce towards an inevitable ordeal; and, though they might know what were the alternatives awaiting any voyagers in this plight, they could not guess which of these alternatives was to be the ending of their own saga.

If the raft were to be broken up by the breakers, the crew would be torn to pieces by the knife-edged coral if they were not saved by speedy drowning from that more painful death. If the raft were to hold together, and if its crew were to succeed in holding on to it, until the breakers had defeated their own malice by washing the raft up on to the reef

1 Psalm cvii. 30.
2 Heyerdahl, Thor: Kon-Tiki (Chicago 1950, Rand McNally), p. 243.

{p.536} high and dry, a shipwrecked crew might swim across the still lagoon beyond, and so reach one of the palm-crowned isles alive. If the moment of the raft's arrival at the reef should happen to coincide with the flood of one of those high tides that periodically submerged the reef to a depth that compelled the breakers temporarily to subside, the Kon-Tiki might, after all, clear the death-line in calm water, and so come through unscathed. In the event, a high tide did flow in to lift her battered frame off the reef into the lagoon1 some days after the surf had cast her up on to a bare coral crest; but on the morning of the 7th August, 1947, no man on board the Kon-Tiki could tell which of these alternative destinies was going to be hers and theirs.

The experience of these six young Scandinavian seafarers on that day was an apt allegory of an ordeal that still lay ahead of Mankind at the opening of the second half of the twentieth century of the Christian Era. In A.D. 1952 an Ark of Civilization that had travelled a time-distance of some five or six thousand years across the ocean of History was now making, like the Kon-Tiki, for a reef which its crew would not be able to circumnavigate. This unavoidable danger ahead was the perilous line of transition between a world partitioned into an American and a Russian sphere and a world united under the control of the single political authority which, in an age of atomic weapons, must supersede the present division of authority sooner or later in one way or another. Was the eventual transition to be pacific or catastrophic, and, if catastrophic, how dire was the catastrophe to be? In A.D. 1952 no one in the World could foreknow the outcome of the ordeal towards which the World was then manifestly moving. One thing alone was certain, and this was that the spirit in which an inevitable ordeal would best be met was the spirit shown by Thor Heyerdahl and his companions at the moment when the Kon-Tiki struck the Raroia Reef.

1 See Heyerdahl, op. cit., pp. 273-4.



(IV) POSSIBLE CONSTITUENT ELEMENTS OF A FUTURE WORLD ORDER

{XII.D.IV, p. 536} Without waiting for a facile wisdom after the event, an observer of world affairs in A.D. 1952 might perhaps usefully speculate on the shape of things to come so long as he confined his consideration of a future world order to elements that an oecumenical dispensation seemed likely to have in common with each of the two demi-mundane dispensations that had been crystallizing round the United States and round the Soviet Union since A.D. 1947.

If the construction of a world order had depended on the Technology in which Man was so accomplished an adept, and not on the Human, Nature that Man found it so difficult to govern and guide, Mankind in A.D. 1952 could have contemplated the future with complacency; for a simultaneous coalescence and shrinkage of the Oikoumenê that had made it more dangerous than ever before to go on waging war had also made it less difficult than ever before to put Mankind in a position to preserve the peace by finding technological solutions for the administrative prob-
{p. 537} lem of bringing the whole of the Oikoumenê under the undivided control of a single oecumenical government.

In terms of facilities for human intercourse no point in the Oikoumenê was so remote from Washington in A.D. 1952 as Georgia and New Hampshire had been when, in A.D. 1792,1 the Congress of the United States had provided for a four months' delay in the inauguration of a President after the election of his electors, in order to give the successful candidate the time that he would need for winding up his affairs at home and making his way to the seat of the Federal Government on horseback. For purposes of human intercourse the United States at the time of its establishment was of about the same size as the Achaemenian Empire in the fifth century B.C., when it took three months to travel to Susa, the imperial capital, from Ephesus, the Aegean terminus of the Great North-West Imperial Highway;2 and the Roman Empire may be reckoned to have been of about the same size in human terms, if we may assume that the centurion who took charge of Saint Paul after the Apostle had appealed to Caesar would not have taken more than three months in conveying his prisoner from the Palestinian port of Caesarea to the Italian port of Puteoli if he had been able to book a direct passage and if he had been less unlucky in his weather.3 In A.D. 1952 three months seemed an inordinate length of time to allow for any journey imaginable. Yet the Roman Empire, the Achaemenian Empire, and the United States in her pre-railroad age were effectively administered commonwealths, though in each of them a period of three months had to be allowed for making the journey from the frontier to the capital; and, in this pre-railroad age, a Darius, Alexander, Demetrius, Caesar, Constantine, and Napoleon were able repeatedly to confound their antagonists by the speed at which they managed to dart from one extremity to another of an Oikoumenê whose radius, in human terms, was a three months' journey for ordinary official travellers, and a proportionately longer time than that for anyone not entitled to travel by the public post.

While in point of conductivity an eighteenth-century United States had been a polity of the same order of magnitude as the Roman or the Achaemenian Empire, in point of constitution it bad been more ambitious. In contrast to the Roman and Achaemenian imperial régimes, which had been content to impose upon their subjects an authoritarian government maintained by a professional army and administered by a professional civil service responsible to an individual autocrat, the Constitution of the United States had provided for democratic government in a polity of the Roman or Achaemenian size by combining the Medieval Western device of parliamentary representation of an electorate with the

1 In an Act approved on the 1st March, 1792, the Congress of the United States laid down that the members of the Electoral College, provided in the Constitution (Art. II, § 1, par. 2) for electing the President, should themselves be elected on the Tuesday following the first Monday in the November of a presidential election year, and that the term of office of the President elected by the Electoral College should run from 'the fourth day of March next succeeding' the date of election. The initial date of the President's term of office was eventually advanced from the 4th March to the 20th January by the Twentieth Amendment to the Constitution, which was proclaimed on the 6th February, 1933—a date by which the United States had moved out of the Horse Age through the Railroad Age into the Air Age.
2 See VI. vii. 82, n. 1.
3 See Acts xxvii. 1-xxviii. 16.

{p.538} Hellenic device of federalism. A representative system in which the people's control over the government was exercised at one remove would, no doubt, have seemed an anaemic dilution of Democracy to citizens of city-states like Florence or Athens, for whom Democracy had signified the direct participation of all the citizens in public affairs; and, for the sake of making a reality of this political ideal, most of these Hellenic and Medieval Western democracies had been content to see the size of their commonwealths limited for ever to the maximum within which a direct participation of the whole citizen body in the government was still practicable. When this was taken as the touchstone for testing the genuineness of Democracy, a country with the area and population of Attica in the fifth century B.C. was the largest that could be governed democratically in the Athenian and Florentine sense; for in Attica the points farthest from the capital—an Eleusis, a Marathon, a Sunium—were none of them farther away from Athens than a single day's journey on foot,1 while a citizen body that, at a maximum estimate, may have approached a total strength of sixty thousand at its peak,2 was unlikely, except on rare occasions, to present itself on the Pnyx in such force as to make the conduct of public business unmanageable.3

1 On the 10th December, 1911, four students of the British Archaeological School at Athens, one of whom was the writer of this Study, verified this by walking from Sunium to Athens between the dawn and the dusk of a winter's day. Starting from Sunium at 6.30 a.m., our party reached Athens as night was falling. We should have arrived in daylight if, when approaching Vari, we had not wasted an hour or so by swerving off the track and scouring the south-eastern spurs of Hymettus in a vain search for the Cave of Pan. A citizen of fifth-century Athens whose home was at Sunium, Marathon, or Eleusis would, no doubt, have had to spend at least one night in the capital when he made the journey thither on foot in order to transact business there.

2 That is, if M. N. Tod, in The Cambridge Ancient History, vol. v (Cambridge 1947, University Press), p. 11, is right in interpreting Thucydides' figures in The History of the Atheno-Peloponnesian War, Book II, chap. 13, to mean that the total number of male Athenian citizens of all classes, of the age of eighteen years and upwards, was something between 55,000 and 61,000 in 431 B.C. Whatever the figure actually was in 431 B.C., it may have been higher before 445 B.C., when some 5,000 men were struck off the register in execution of a law, passed in 451-450 B.C., restricting the Athenian franchise to the children of married couples in which both parents had been Athenian citizens at the time of the child's birth. We do not know the extent to which this reduction of the total by 5,000 in 445 B.C. had been offset by natural increase during the next fourteen years.

3 In composing their nostalgic political Utopias, in which Sparta was their ideal and Athens was their bugbear (see III. iii. 90-97), Plato and Aristotle agreed with one another in setting the optimum number of citizens for the citizen body of a city-state at a figure that was very much lower than the actual numerical strength of the Athenian citizen body in their day, when its strength was considerably smaller than it had been at its peak. In the Republic (423 A.D.) Plato declares that, so long as his ideal city-state has the constitution that he has laid down for it in this dialogue, he does not mind if the number of citizens capable of bearing arms is no higher than a thousand; and he stipulates that, if the number is to be higher than that, it must not be raised to a figure at which the community will lose its unity. In The Laws (737 C-738 A) Plato takes as his criterion for the scale of his ideal city-state the need for the community's man-power to be sufficient to enable it to defend itself successfully if attacked by its neighbours, and on this criterion he opts for a figure of 5,040 citizens capable of bearing arms. Aristotle, in his discussion of the optimum magnitude in The Politics (1225 B-1226 B), refrains from committing himself to any precise figure and merely stipulates that the number of the citizens must not be so large as to make it impossible for them to be all personally acquainted with one another, or impossible for an announcer without a loud-speaker (κήρυζ μὴ Στεντόρειος) to make himself heard by the whole assembly. A popular assembly even of this size would, of course, have been unmanageable if it had been the only organ of government. In a competently managed Hellenic democracy such as the Athenian in the sixth and fifth centuries B.C., the popular assembly was enabled to transact its business effectively thanks to an infusion of the representative system into the Cleisthenean Constitution of 508-507 B.C. Public business was pre-digested and presented, and its subsequent transaction in the popular assembly was controlled, by a grand jury, or general purposes committee, of the citizen body which was, not elected, but picked by lot on a representative system in which the quota allocated to each local administrative district of Attica was proportionate to the fraction of the total citizen body that was estimated to be represented by the citizens resident in that district. Since this committee (the Boulê) was itself five hundred strong and was therefore, like the general assembly, too unwieldly to dispatch executive business in plenary session, it was divided into ten sections which took it in turns to serve as an executive sub-committee for periods of thirty-six or thirty-five days each within the Boulê twelve months’ term of office. This executive subcommittee had a chairman picked by lot, who changed every twenty-four hours. The task of presiding over meetings of the Boulê and the general assembly was entrusted to a presidential body of nine members, picked by lot ad hoc, with a chairman of their own, likewise picked by lot, from the nine sections of the Boulê that were not serving as the executive subcommittee at the moment hours.' (see Aristotle: The Constitution of Athens, chaps. 43-44).

{p.539} The size of the territory of the Roman Commonwealth was perhaps hardly more than a third of the size of the territory of a contemporary Athens at the time when, at some date in the fifth century B.C., the Ager Romanus was divided into twenty districts in order to articulate a national popular assembly into as many companies of voters, each consisting of the citizens whose domicile lay in one of these 'tribal' districts;1 and the maximum distance that any Roman citizen would have to travel from his home to the capital in order to take part in national public business remained well within Attic limits even after the territory of Rome had been enlarged by the addition of one new district (the Tribus Clustumina) up the left bank of the River Tiber2 and four further new districts into which the territory of Veii, across the Tiber, was subsequently carved up after its conquest in 396 B.C.3 When in 358 B.C. two more districts (the Pomptina and the Publilia) were carved out of conquered Volscian territory4 in the lowlands south-east of the Alban Hills, Roman citizens now resident there might find it still just possible to

1 The date of the division of the Ager Romanus into the twenty 'tribal’districts is discussed by K. J. Beloch in his Römische Geschichte bis zum Beginn der Punischen Kriege (Berlin and Leipzig 1926, de Gruyter), pp. 270-1 and 298-303. The only certain chronological facts are that these first twenty tribal' districts must have been instituted before the addition of a twenty-first (the Clustumina), and that the territory of Crustumeniim, out of which this twenty-first district was constituted, must have been annexed to the Ager Romanus before the annexation, in 396 B.C., of the territory of Veii, on the opposite bank of the river, which was subsequently carved up into four more districts (the twenty-second to the twenty-fifth inclusive). It can also be deduced from the lie of the land that the territory of Fidenae, along the left bank of the Tiber between the territory of Urustumerium and Rome, must have been annexed to the Ager Romanus before the annexation of Crustumerium, and Beloch (in op. cit., pp. 298-302) gives reasons for thinking that Fidenae was conquered by Rome in either 428 B.C. or 426 B.C. We do not know, however, whether this conquered Fidenate territory was included in one of the first twenty Roman 'tribal' districts or in the twenty-first district, i.e., the Chasrumina.
Even, however, if the Ager Fidenae was already included in the Ager Romanus at the date at which the original twenty Roman ‘tribal’ districts was instituted, the aggregate area of the Ager Romanus at the time would have been no more than 861.5 square kilometres, as against 8aa if at that time Fidenae was still independent (these figures will be found in Beloch, op, cit., p. 178). On the other hand the area of Attica, within her frontiers as they ran in the fifth century B.C., was as much as 2,440 square kilometers according to Beloch's reckoning in his Die Bevölkerung der Griecfrisch-Römischen Welt (Leipzig 1886, Duncker and Humblot), p. 56, if we include the island of Salamis, which had been colonized by Athenian citizens, but omit the two districts of Oropus and Eleutherae, adjoining the land-frontier between Attica and Boeotia. Thucydides describes the Oropians as 'subjects of Athens' (Book II, chap. 23; cp. Book IV, chap. 09), while it is not certain that the Eleuthereis possessed the full Athenian franchise (the status of the inhabitants of these two districts is discussed by G. de Sanctis in his Atthis (Turin 1912, Bocca), p. 333, n. 1).
2 See Beloch, Römische Geschischte, pp. 159, 174, 265, and 270.
3 See ibid., p. 607.
4 See ibid., pp. 265 and 356-8.

{p.540} exercise their public rights and duties in the capital by making, within the day, a journey that was rather longer than the journey from Sunium to Athens. This physical feat would certainly have been practicable for Roman citizens domiciled in two other new districts (the Maecia and the Scaptia) that were carved in 332 B.C.1 out of territory, ceded to in 338 B.C. by the Confederation of Latin City-States, between the two previously acquired outlying districts in the Pomptine Marshes and the metropolitan domain of the Roman Commonwealth containing the original twenty districts. A Roman citizen domiciled in another new district (the Oufentina), carved in 318 B.C. out of territory, ceded to Rome by Privernum,2 in the Pomptine Marshes south-east of the two districts established there in 358 B.C., might have been able to reach Rome within the day by an athlete's tour de force; but the task would have defeated the classical Athenian long-distance runner Philippides himself if Philippides had been a Roman citizen domiciled in a district (the Falerna) that had been constituted in 332 B.C.3 out of territory, ceded to Rome by Capua along the north bank of the Lower Volturnus, more than a hundred miles away from Rome as the aeroplane flies;4 and, when in the course of the years 268-241 B.C. the territory inhabited by Roman citizens legally invested with the active rights of citizenship was progressively extended from the northern environs of Rome northward across the Appennines to the shores of the Adriatic, and when these fully enfranchised Sabines and Picentes were enrolled in 241 B.C. in a newly created Tribus Quirina and Tribus Velina,5 the territory of the Roman Commonwealth flagrantly burst the bounds within which it was physically possible for every citizen to participate in the national government directly.

Thus, long before the time when the Roman Empire became co-extensive with the Hellenic World, and when local communities of transplanted or naturalized Roman citizens were scattered all over the territory of this Roman-built Hellenic universal state, an ever increasing majority of the total Roman citizen body had come to find itself unable in practice to exercise its rights and duties in the forum of Roman national politics simply because its domiciles were too far distant from a capital city that was the only place where, under Rome's city-state constitution, national public business could legitimately be transacted.6

1 See Beloch, Römische Geschichte, pp. 164-5, 388, and 525.
2 See ibid., pp. 390 and 526.
3 See ibid., p. 388.
4 The writer flew over this stretch of country, from Ostia to the gap between Terracina and Monte Circello, on the 28th October, 1948, after having traversed it by train on the 14th November, 1911.
5 See Beloch, op. cit., p. 265; eundem: Der Italische Bund unter Roms Hegemonie (Leipzig 1880, Teubner), pp. 76 and 123-3.
6 As late as A.D. 69, when the Pax Augusta was a century old, and when a quarter of a millennium had passed since the date when Rome had made herself virtually mistress of the Hellenic World by overthrowing Macedon, the last other Hellenic Great Power capable of challenging Rome's supremacy, the Roman public was surprised at the discovery that the post of autocrat in constitutional disguise (princes), which had long since become an indispensable organ in the government of the Roman Commonwealth, could be filled by a pronunciamiento on the part of Roman citizens serving in the garrisons of the imperial frontiers ('Finis Neronis . . . varios motus animorum non modo in urbe apud patres aut populum aut urbanum militem, sed omnes legiones ducesque concivetat, evolgato imperii arcano posse principem alibi quam Romae fieri' (Tacitus: Histories, Book I, chap. 4).

{p.541} These outlying Roman citizens had to satisfy their Hellenic craving for direct participation in the government of a city-state by participating in the local government of the praefectura, forum, conciliabulum, colonia Romana, or municipium of which they were also citizens under a Boeotian system of dual citizenship that had been adopted by the Roman Commonwealth as well as by its post-Alexandrine contemporaries the Seleucid Monarchy and the Aetolian and Achaean confederacies;1 but this municipal franchise was no compensation for the virtual disfranchisement that had been inflicted on them in the forum of Roman national politics, not by any narrow-hearted policy of making the control of the Roman national government a monopoly of a metropolitan minority of the citizen body,2 but by the inability of pre-mechanical means of communication to enable the outlying citizens of the Roman Commonwealth to put in an appearance in the capital city when the territory inhabited by Roman citizens had become as extensive as it had actually come to be some two or three centuries before the Emperor Tiberius, upon his accession in A.D. 14, at last took cognizance of the stultification of Rome's city-state constitution by her territorial expansion in the long since overdue act of liquidating the anachronistic Roman national popular assemblies in the capital city.

It was, in fact, technologically impossible for the Roman citizen body in the first century of the Christian Era—and a fortiori in the third century, after the enfranchisement of almost all Rome's alien subjects in A.D. 212 by the Emperor Caracalla (imperabat A.D. 211-17)3—to take, in the government of a Pan-Hellenic Roman Empire, the direct part that the Athenian citizen body in the fifth century B.C. had been able to take in the government of Attica; and this would likewise have been impossible in the eighteenth century of the Christian Era for the citizen body of a United States whose populated territory was then still confined to the eastern seaboard of North America between the Atlantic and the Appalachian Mountains. On the other hand, by A.D. 1952 the progress made by Western technology within the 177 years that had elapsed since the Declaration of Independence had, in terms of human intercourse, reduced to the dimensions of a Periclean Attica a United States that now stretched from coast to coast of the North American island. On the 10th October, 1950, it took the writer of this Study a shorter time, by four hours, to fly from New York to Los Angeles than it had taken him to walk from Sunium to Athens on the 10th December, 1911. By A.D. 1952 it was possible for any politician in Washington, on any day of the year, to present himself, within the day, in person before an audience in any part of the United States; and, though it was not possible for him to be present in the flesh in every city, town, village, and homestead in the country at the self-same moment, it was possible at the self-same moment

1 See IV. iv. 310-13.
2 It was true that Roman citizens organized in local communities with the status of municipia had originally been saddled with the duties of Roman citizenship without enjoying the corresponding rights; but Roman citizens organized in local communities with the status of coloniae Romanae had always enjoyed these rights, besides being bound by those duties, subject to their being physically able to exercise these rights by making the journey to Rome.
3 See V. vi. 7, n. 4; VI. vii. 156, n. 3; VI. vii. 375; and pp. 553-4, below.

{p.542} for every inhabitant of all these homesteads, villages, towns, and cities to enjoy the edifying experience of listening to Cleon by radio and viewing him by television.

Thanks to these recent chefs-d'œuvre of Western Technology, it was in fact possible for all citizens of the United States at any moment to listen in and look in to the public discussion of political issues; and it was also possible for the spokesmen of any ‘lobby' to take a more active part than this in American national politics by flying within the day from Portland, Oregon, or from San Diego, California, to Washington, D.C., and bringing Cleon to bay in his den on Capitol Hill before the demagogue had had time to forestall a Pacific Slope 'pressure group's' offensive by winging his own way to the Pacific Coast and cajoling a Californian or Oregonian audience face to face. It was true that the citizen body could not yet descend on Washington at a day's notice en masse pending the requisite multiplication of seats on aeroplanes and rooms in hotels. Yet, if in this respect the United States in A.D. 1952 might be deemed still to be not quite so close-knit, in terms of human intercourse, as Attica had been in 449 B.C., the United States was already closer-knit than Attica had ever been on the new plane of intercourse that the inventions of broadcasting and television had opened up. In Hellenic history there had never been a time when the entire population even of a Lilliputian Belbina, not to speak of a Brobdingnagian Attica, had been able to listen to the voice, and watch the countenance and gestures, of a politician talking to an assembly in the agora at the capital. On this plane the United States hi A.D. 1952 was as diminutive in size, expressed in terms of human intercourse, as Abraham Lincoln's Springfield or as Demosthenes' Paeania; and the United States' size today gave the measure of the World's size tomorrow, since, if any one thing could be predicted with assurance in the apprehensive World of this date, it was that a rapidly growing fleet of aeroplanes, flying at a rapidly accelerating speed, would become capable of reaching their destinations in a rapidly diminishing number of minutes, and that a rapidly growing host of radio and television sets would become capable of picking up sights and sounds at a rapidly increasing distance from the points where these importunate instruments were located.

It will be seen that in A.D. 1952 world government was already within Mankind's grasp in so far as Technology could avail to thrust this now urgent political necessity into human hands. As soon, however, as we ascend—or descend—from the plane of Technology to the plane of Human Nature, we find the earthly paradise skilfully assembled by the ingenuity of Homo Faber being reduced to a fool's paradise by the perversity of Homo Politicus.

In A.D. 1952 a democratic world government that had now become technologically feasible was not within sight of becoming practical politics, because the ripe fruits of Technology could not be harvested without a change of heart of which, so far, there was little sign. In a coalescing and shrinking Oikoumenê whose human inhabitants were finding themselves at ever closer quarters with one another, an urgently needed, but not yet inaugurated, world order was still awaiting the

{p.543} fulfilment of a prophecy made in the Syriac World in the eighth century B.C. by the Judaean seer Isaiah:

'The wolf . . . shall dwell with the lamb and the leopard shall lie down with the kid, and the calf and the young lion and the fatling together; and a little child shall lead them. And the cow and the bear shall feed; their young ones shall lie down together; and the lion shall eat straw like the ox. And the sucking child shall play on the hole of the asp, and the weaned child shall put his hand on the cockatrice' den. They shall not hurt nor destroy in all My holy mountain; for the Earth shall be full of the knowledge of the Lord, as the waters cover the sea.' 1

This Hebrew prophecy had not been left altogether unfulfilled by the Earth's non-human fauna; for it was a scientifically verified fact that the beasts of prey did have a habit of granting a' truce to fellow creatures that were normally their quarry when a drought drove them all to the same still welling spring, or a forest fire to the same still unscorched glade, or a flood to the same still unsubmerged holy mountain; and these habitual signs of grace in the dumb animals' response to the challenge of emergencies threatening the lives of all creatures alike were the foil against which a Syriac prophet or a Western naturalist would contemplate the twentieth-century spectacle of human carnivores that still could not or would not bring themselves to enter into a Truce of God, even when they were being forced to rub shoulders with one another by the menacing rise of a tide of atomic science round the coasts of a shrinking Oikoumenê.

In A.D. 1952 the nearest approach to political co-operation that a Russian bear and an American eagle found themselves able to make to one another was their common participation in the activities of the United Nations Organization. The inability of the two surviving Great Powers to come closer together than this had been the limiting factor that had prevented the architects of the constitution of the U.N.O. from making of it anything more intimate than a forum for international debate between delegates of the governments of sovereign independent states, of which three, besides the two titans, were armed with a veto on resolutions passed by a majority of their fellow states-members. During the five years of its existence up to date, the U.N.O. had demonstrated its value, notwithstanding the severity of these limitations, by proving to be a decidedly more conductive means of political communication than 'the usual diplomatic channels'. Delegates of the United States Government and the Soviet Government could still continue to talk to one another here when the traditional channels of communication had become choked; and at Lake Success they were parleying in the presence, and with the participation, of delegates of governments of states of lesser calibre which, in this forum, had a constitutional right to make their own voices heard.

These were no mean services to the cause of peace and concord; and an oecumenical institution that provided these services was one with which Mankind could not afford to dispense in their perilous situation at the time. Yet these merits did not make the U.N.O. capable of be-

1 Isa, xi. 6-9.

{p.544} coming the embryo of a world government. The realities of the distribution of power in the World that had emerged from the Second World War were not adequately reflected in the clumsiness of a constitution that had embodied the unrealistic principle of 'one state one vote', and that had then found no better means of bringing a fictitious 'equality of states' into line with a harsh reality than the concession to five Powers of a veto that was denied to their nominal peers. The best prospect in sight for the U.N.O. was a possibility that it might evolve from being a forum into becoming a confederacy; but there was a great gulf fixed between any confederacy of sovereign independent parochial governments and any federation of peoples with a central government claiming and receiving the direct personal allegiance of each individual citizen of the union; and it was notorious that the history of political institutions knew of no case in which this gulf had been crossed by any other process than a revolutionary leap.

On this showing, the U.N.O. seemed unlikely to be the institutional nucleus out of which an eventually inevitable world government would develop, though it seemed likely to remain an indispensable instrument for the preservation of peace unless and until a unitary world government had grown out of some other germ. In A.D. 1952 the probability seemed to be that, if and when an effective world government did come into being, it would take shape through a development, not of the U.N.O., but of one or other of two older and tougher political 'going concerns' which, as a result of the outcome of a Second World War, had already partitioned the Oikoumenê between them. The world government of the future seemed likely to stem either from the Government of the United States, which in A.D. 1952 was already in effect the government of more than one-half of the Oikoumenê, or from the Government of the Soviet Union, which at the same date was already in effect the government of the rest of the Habitable and Traversable World. If the living generation of Mankind had been free to choose

utrorum ad regna cadendum
omnibus humanis esset terrâque marique,1

there could be little doubt in a contemporary Western observer's mind that a decisive majority of all living men and women that were competent to make any judgement at all upon this issue, and an overwhelming majority of such people in all Western countries, would have opted for becoming subjects of the United States, and not subjects of the Soviet Union, so long as these two Powers continued to divide between them the dominion over the Oikoumenê; and there could be equally little doubt that the same millions would also have prayed for the victory of the United States in the event of a war between the two Powers for the prize of world-wide supremacy that the elimination of one competitor would leave exclusively in the surviving competitor's hands. In Western eyes, at least, it seemed self-evident that, if Mankind were indeed to be confronted with a choice between destroying itself or acquiescing in the enforcement of peace by the fiat of some single Power, and if they were


1 Lucretius: De Rerum Naturâ Book III, 11. 836-7, quoted on p. 484, above.

{p.545} then to be confronted with a choice between the United States and the Soviet Union as the only possible two candidates for this necessary yet invidious political mission, the United States would be preferable, out of all comparison, to the Soviet Union as the victor in this fateful competition for being the Power whose fiat the rest of Mankind was henceforth to obey.

The virtues that made the United States incomparably preferable to the Soviet Union as a candidate for this imperial role stood out conspicuously against a Communist Russian foil.

America's cardinal virtue in the sight of her present and prospective subjects was her transparently sincere reluctance to be drawn into playing this role at all. An appreciable portion of the living generation of American citizens, as well as all the ancestors of all American citizens who were not themselves immigrants, had been moved to pluck up their roots in the Old World and to start life again on the farther side of the Atlantic by a yearning, not to meddle in, but to extricate themselves from, the affairs of a Continent whose dust either they or their forebears had once demonstratively shaken from off their feet;1 and the buoyancy of the hope with which the forebears had made their deliberate withdrawal from the Old World in the seventeenth, eighteenth, and nineteenth centuries was matched by the poignancy of the regret with which the living generation of Americans was making its compulsory twentieth-century return. The compulsion, as we have seen,2 was taking the form of an 'annihilation of distance' through the progress of a Western technology; and the Americans themselves had done perhaps more than any other Western people to develop this peculiarly Western art in the direction in which its course was now running directly counter to its American adepts' cherished political aims and ideals. The flaming sword wielded by this inexorable angel of their own creation who was expelling the Americans from their Utopian earthly paradise had been flaring in the skies since the invention of the aeroplane at the turn of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. Yet nothing less cogent than the experience of finding themselves involved willy nilly in two world wars in one lifetime could have moved the American people between A.D. 1941 and A.D. 1947—as the Japanese people had been moved between A.D. 1853 and A.D. 1868 by the logic of comparably portentous events—to recognize that they could no longer safeguard their interests, independence, or even existence unless they broke with a traditional policy of isolation which still retained a hold on their hearts even when it was ceasing to convince their intellects. Shrinking, as they did, from involvement in international politics, the Americans shrank still more vehemently from being cast, as they were being cast by their inescapable preponderance in power, for the role of serving as their neighbours' leaders and masters; and their manifestly genuine regrets for a lost idyllic seclusion were their best credentials for commending them to foreign peoples over whom the force of circumstances was constraining them to assume authority.

’The truth is, and must be, that social life is happiest and most har-

1 Matt, x, 14; Mark vi. 11; Luke ix. 5 and x.11; Acts xiii. 51 and xviii. 6.
2 On pp. 479-86, above.

{p.546} monious where those who have to rule are the last people who would choose to be rulers, and is least happy and least harmonious where the rulers are of the opposite disposition.’1

On the morrow of the Second World War, Plato's dictum was as exculpatory for the Americans as it was damning for the Russians.2

The Americans' second outstanding virtue was their generosity. It has been noticed in a previous chapter,3 as one of the auspicious features in the situation after the Second World War, that the Soviet Union, as well as the United States, was a 'sated' Power; but the economic and social situations of the two countries were identical only in the general sense that Russia, like America, was a country commanding vast still undeveloped human and non-human resources. In contrast to America, Russia had hardly yet begun to exploit her potentialities, and the developments that she had carried out at such cost in human effort and suffering during the twelve years immediately preceding the German assault upon her in A.D. 1941 had been largely sabotaged by her abominable Western invaders. Thereafter, the Russians had taken an unjust advantage of finding themselves on the winning side by recouping themselves for the Germans’ destruction of Russian industrial plant by seizing and removing plant, not only from a guilty Germany, but from East and Central European countries that the Russians professed to be liberating from the Nazis, and from Chinese provinces in Manchuria that they professed to be liberating from the Japanese. This was a contrast indeed to the United States' post-war reconstruction policy of first making, on a vote passed in the House of Representatives at Washington on the 25th January, 1944, a major contribution to the resources placed at the disposal of the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration, and then following up this short-term emergency measure for the relief of the war-stricken peoples of the World by launching, on the 5th June, 1947, a long-term plan for reconstruction in Europe that was to be payable entirely out of the American tax-payer's pocket.

The Marshall Plan was perhaps not quite unprecedented. There was a classical precedent in a post-Alexandrine chapter of Hellenic history that had seen the states of the Hellenic World of the day vie with one another in the generosity of their gifts to the city-state of Rhodes after Rhodes had been smitten by an earthquake in 227 B.C.4 This, however, had been a case of many countries contributing towards the relief of one country, whereas the Marshall Plan was a case of one country offering help to all the rest, and making this offer at a time when the donor was

1 Plato: Respublica, 520 D, quoted in III. iii. 252.
2 Damning, that is to say, for the Russians in the role of rulers, in which the Russians had always been at their worst. There had, however, been another role in which the Russians had always been at their best since the days of Boris and Gleb (passorum A.D. 1015), and that was the role of martyrs. The noble army of Russian martyrs, whose ranks had been perpetually recruited by one generation after another of intrepid volunteers from the eleventh century to the twentieth, bore witness to the historical fact that Russian history, looking forward in A.D. 1952, would be slow to believe that this other vein in the Russian ethos had run dry.
3 On p. 478, above
4See Polybius: Oecumenical History, Book V, chaps. 88-90, cited on p. 271, above.

{p.547} already the strongest single Power in the World of the day. In the past it had been customary for dominant Powers, not to give, but to take,1 and there had been no departure from this evil custom in the policy that the Soviet Union had been following. In setting a new moral standard for 'power polities' by launching the Marshall Plan, American statesman-ship was putting Russian post-war actions to shame and Russian post-war intentions to an 'acid test',2 and on both these counts Russian statesmanship made a poor showing in its response to this searching American challenge. In declining Marshall Aid for the peoples of the Soviet Union, the Soviet Government might be held to be acting within its rights, and foreign critics, at any rate, had no locus standi for objecting to a decision against which no effective protest had been made by the misera plebs Sovietica at whose expense their government's decision had been taken; but, in using her hold over her satellites in order to compel them too to reject the American offer, the Soviet Union was guilty of an abuse of power that was particularly flagrant in cases in which countries at her mercy whom she was forbidding to accept American assistance happened to be countries that were doubly in need of it because they had been stripped by the Soviet Government, since the end of the Second World War, of industrial plant which the war itself had spared.

It will be seen that Russia's behaviour would have made a present to America of the beau role even if America's behaviour had not been as handsome as in fact it was; and this contrast between the post-war records of the two surviving Great Powers comes out even more sharply when we pass from the economic plane to the political and the military. A post-war world that was craving for freedom from want had a still greater yearning for freedom from fear; and, while the fear inspired by the Soviet Union was as intense as it was ubiquitous, fathers of families in countries under the hegemony of the United States were not being kept awake at night by any fear that a United States Government that had them in its power might abuse this power by coercing them with the threat of taking their children's lives with atomic weapons which, in 'the Free World', were an American monopoly.

Citizens of West European countries were, however, now haunted by fears that some American decision, in which the West European peoples

1 Imperial Powers which, like the Roman Empire in the Hellenic World and the British Rāj in India, had plumed themselves on their disinterestedness, had been apt to claim credit, not for having subsidized their subjects out of their own pockets, but for having (as Clive saw it) shown an astonishing moderation in leaving even a shred of wool on the backs of defenceless sheep whom the imperialists had been at liberty to sheer. It was true that, in the British dominions in India, Lord Cornwallis had restrained a British rapacity, and stamped out a British corruption, that had been running riot for a generation, and that in the Roman Empire Caesar and Augustus had put an end to the still more disgraceful orgies of Roman business men after these had run riot for longer than a century and a half; but such testimonials are not easy to distinguish from indictments. 'What shall we say then? Shall we continue in sin, that grace may abound? God forbid’ (Rom. vi. 1-2).
2 In A.D. 1947 the reigning government in Russia was a fair target for a telling phrase which in A.D. 1918 had been levelled primarily at the government then reigning in Germany by a President of the United States speaking on Russia's behalf. ‘The treatment accorded to Russia by her sister nations in the months to come will be the acid test of their good will’ (Point VI of President Wilson's Fourteen Points announced in his address at a joint session of the two houses of the Congress at Washington on the 8th January, 1918).

{p.548} might have had no say, might inadvertently bring Russian atomic missiles hurtling down on Dutch, Danish, French, and British heads. Such West European fears of dire consequences descending upon Western Europe as unintended by-products of some impulsive American retort to some provocative Russian act of aggression were anxieties that might or might not be well founded, but their currency in Western Europe was a fact, and this psychological fact exposed a constitutional flaw in the structure of a commonwealth of Western nations in which all the partners, with the crucial exception of one partner whose 'fiat' was law', were exposed to the risk of being involved in a perhaps irretrievable catastrophe as a consequence of decisions in which they might have had no voice, on issues in which, for them, the stakes were life and death. It was proverbial that in a society articulated into a number of sovereign independent parochial states every people was apt to get the government that it deserved;1 and even this political nemesis was not easy for human souls to bear, notwithstanding the undeniable justice of it. In a commonwealth of nations indissolubly associated under the hegemony of a paramount Power, the lot of all the subordinate participants was the intolerable injustice of getting a government that had been deserved, not by them, but by their predominant partner; and this was the plight of America's, as well as Russia's, satellites in A.D. 1952.

It was, moreover, a plight that could not be mitigated appreciably by resorting either to 'the usual diplomatic channels’ or to the new forum provided by the United Nations Organization. Under the current unwritten constitution of a nascent Western Community, issues of vital or lethal moment to its West European, Canadian, and Australian citizens were being decided by the play of party politics in the domestic political arena of the United States. The non-American citizens of the Western Community had no institutional means of taking part in the working out of Western policy at this domestic American formative stage; and the most that their municipal governments could do on their behalf was to take the ineffective gesture of tabling motions pleading that a stable door should be locked after an apocalyptic steed had flown.2

By A.D. 1952 a celebrated American definition, dating from A.D. 1895, of the standing of the United States in the Western Hemisphere had come to be no less true of her standing in a world-wide Oikoumenê in which all countries were under the United States' hegemony save those that were under the Soviet Union's domination.

'To-day the United States is practically sovereign' ['in the United States' portion of a partitioned world', as an observer, quoting Olney's despatch in

1 'Toute nation a le gouvernement qu'elle mérite’ (de Maistre, J.: Lettres et Opuscules Inédits (Paris 1851, Vaton), vol. i, p. 215, 15th August, 1811).
2 By the end of the year A.D. 1950 these painful truths had been borne in upon the minds of the West European citizens of the Western Community by their experience of an international crisis over a local war in Korea that had been threatening to rankle into a war of world-wide dimensions. The contemporary reaction of a West European nationalist was expressed in caricature in the aphorism 'America was thus clearly top nation, and History came to a.' (Sellar, W. C., and Yeatman, R. J.: 1066 and All That (London 1930, Methuen), p. 115). The reaction of a West European federalist, addressing himself to an American public, might be expressed in the slogan: 'No annihilation without representation.'

{p.549} A.D. 1952, would be inclined to amend the text in substitution for the original words 'on this continent'], 'and its fiat is law upon the subjects to which it confines its interposition. Why? It is not because of the pure friendship or good will felt for it. It is not simply by reason of its high character as a civilised state, nor because wisdom and justice and equity are the invariable characteristics of the dealings of the United States. It is because, in addition to all other grounds, its infinite resources, combined with its isolated position, render it master of the situation and practically invulnerable as against any or all other Powers.'1

This dictum on the standing of the United States had not lost any of its cogency in coming to be applicable to a far wider sphere of hegemony than had been in the mind of the Secretary of State at Washington who had written those sentences in A.D. 1895 and, though a patriotic non-American citizen of a twentieth-century Western commonwealth of nations might be content to make the pertinent comment that the most lacerating American whips were, at any rate, less grievous instruments of political chastisement than even the least venomous Russian scorpions, 'a philosopher’ might 'be permitted to enlarge his views' 2 by taking some meteorological observations. In the first place he would observe that the virtual monopoly, by a paramount Power, of the determination and execution of policies in which the lives and fortunes of satellite peoples were at stake was pregnant with a constitutional problem that could not be evaded; second, that, in the partitioned Oikoumenê of A.D. 1952, this problem was a live one both in the American and in the Russian sphere of hegemony or domination; third, that the problem would still present itself, and still demand a solution, if the two spheres were eventually to be amalgamated; and, fourth, that this problem could not be solved without recourse to some form of federal union.

The mere recital of these observations made it clear that the constitutional issues raised by the advent of a supra-national order on the political plane were unlikely to be settled easily or rapidly. One promising feature in the situation was that the United States and the Soviet Union—one or both of whom would have a decisive say in the constitutional development of a commonwealth of nations under its hegemony—were, as it happened, both of them morally committed to an approval of federalism in principle in virtue of having written it into their own constitutions.

The Constitution of the United States was the product of a deliberate choice of full federal union in preference to a looser form of political association—between states only, and not also between human beings—that had quickly been proved inadequate by painful experience; and the people of the thirteen original states-members of the Union had federated with one another on terms that had left a door open for the admission of new-comers. In the minds of latter-day citizens of a United States that had increased its membership from the original figure of thirteen states to an eventual figure of forty-eight between A.D. 1792 and A.D, 1912, a

1 Secretary of State Richard Olney, in a dispatch of the 20th July, 1895, to the United States Ambassador to the Court of St. James’s.
2 Gibbon, Edward: The History of the Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire, 'General Observations on the Fall of the Roman Empire in the West', at the end of chap, xxxviii.


{p.550} familiarity with the history of their country during those 120 years had associated the idea of federalism with the idea of progressively incorporating additional constituents; and against the historical background of this domestic American precedent a suggestion that the American people themselves might one day enter into a federation with other peoples would not be startling even to Americans who found it unpalatable. A federation between the peoples of the United States and other English-speaking countries would, indeed, be very closely in line with domestic American constitutional tradition. A proposal to extend a federation of English-speaking Western peoples to Continental West European peoples that were akin to the English-speaking peoples in their way of life without being linked with them by a community of language might, on the other hand, look, in American eyes, like a hitherto untried venture for which no adequate precedent was to be found in the domestic American experience of incorporating into the citizen body of the United States a small French-speaking population in Louisiana in A.D. 1803 and small Spanish-speaking populations in California and New Mexico in A.D. 1848. Yet the United States' next-door neighbour Canada was a successfully working model of a federation between two peoples, speaking different languages and professing different religions, who were approximately equal to one another in numbers; and another cue was offered by the letter of the law officially in force in the Soviet Union.

In Western eyes the federal constitution with which the Soviet Union had equipped itself might look suspiciously like a facade put up to mask the retention or re-establishment of a centralized despotism that had the momentum of six hundred years of Russian history behind it. The Petrine Russian Empire from which the Soviet Union had inherited its immense patrimony had been the heir of a Muscovite principality that, from the fourteenth century of the Christian Era onwards, had added field to field by extinguishing the independence of one after another of its neighbours. Was not the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics merely a disingenuous new title for a unitary autocracy of which no concealment had been made by Stalin's franker predecessors Peter the Great and Ivan the Terrible? As far as any Western observer could judge, this current Western critique of the constitution of the Soviet Union was fair comment on the whole. Yet there was one point in which the Bolsheviki’s professed constitutional new departure appeared to have some substance, and this was a point in which Stalin's hand was credibly reported to have been at work. Thanks to his own Georgian origin, Stalin seems to have appreciated the strength of the nationalist opposition aroused among the non-Russian subjects of the former Russian Empire by a policy of Russification; and he seems to have drawn the conclusion that, if this policy were not repudiated and reversed by the Tsardom's Communist successors, the effect would be to alienate the non-Great-Russian citizens of the Soviet Union from a Communism which they would then write off as a new disguise for a familiar Russian imperialism.

Accordingly, when the constitution of the Soviet Union was being worked out during the years A.D. 1918-24,1 the internal administrative

1 The constitution in force in A.D. 1952 was that of the 6th December, 1936.

{p.551} map of the former Russian Empire was entirely recast—and this apparently on Stalin's initiative—on lines that brought it into correspondence with the linguistic map; and the non-Great-Russian nationalities of the Union—including even the smallest and the most backward peoples in the Caucasus, the Urals, and Central Asia—were thus granted at least the boon of having their local administration and education conducted in their own mother tongues, however illusory their official autonomy might be in other respects. This Stalinian administrative map of the Soviet Union, drawn on a linguistic basis, was no Magna Carta. For example, the erection of an Autonomous Republic of Bashkiristan within the framework of a Russian Socialist Federative Soviet Republic in A.D. 1920 did nothing to abate the centralization at Moscow of the control of police, communications, economic affairs, and, indeed, all the effective levers of power; and, more than that, it did nothing in this case—under a local government on which the Bashkirs themselves were not represented—to check the continuation under the Soviet régime of the unedifying process of chicanery, expedited by brute force, through which, under the Tsardom, the Bashkirs' lands had been, passing into Great Russian hands.1 No doubt the Bashkirs, like the Five Civilized Indian Nations in the South-Eastern United States, were marked out for being made the victims of spoliation by the fact of their happening to lie in the fairway of a mighty tide of aggressive colonization; but the Bashkirs were not the only non-Russian people to suffer adversity under the Soviet régime. Thereafter, in the Great Purge of A.D, 1936, the non-Great-Russian personnel in the governments of some of the non-Great-Russian units on Stalin's administrative map was reported to have been liquidated,2 and in the Russo-German War of A.D. 1941-5 both the Crimean Tatar Republic and the Kalmuck Republic on the Steppe between the Lower Don and the Lower Volga seem to have foundered on the charge that their peoples had been guilty of disloyalty to the Soviet cause.

It will be seen that Stalin's administrative map of the Soviet Union was not to be taken at its face value; but a moral commitment cannot be wiped out through being dishonoured by its makers; and, in the world that had emerged from the Second World War, Stalin's map might live to be translated, after all, from the limbo of camouflage into the realm of reality if, on either side of the dividing line between a Russian and an American demi-monde, the letter of the Soviet Union's federal constitution were one day to be applied in the spirit of the Pan American Union of Republics and the British Commonwealth of Nations.

On the constitutional plane neither of these two political associations between a number of fully self-governing parochial states was a stage on any road leading towards world government, since the basis of both associations was the scrupulousness of the associated states' reciprocal respect for one another's independence. The members of the Pan American Union were not moving towards a federation between these

1 See Pipes, R. E,: 'The First Experiment in Soviet National Policy: The Bashkir Republic, 1917-1920', in The Russian Review, October 1950 (New York), pp. 303-19.
2 See Toynbee, A. J., and Boulter, V. M.: Survey of International Affairs, 1937, vol. i (London 1938, Milford), pp. 13-20.

{p.552} successor-states of four different West European Powers' colonial empires,1 and the members of the British Commonwealth had been positively moving away from the former political unity of an old-fashioned British Empire governed from Westminster. The British Commonwealth was, in fact, an entente between mutually independent states that had disengaged themselves from a unitary empire, while the Pan American Union was an entente between mutually independent states that had never been united politically in the past and were not moving towards unity now. Yet, just because the weaker parties to the association were aware—as they were in either case—that the strongest member of the partnership had no intention of misusing his superior strength in order to impose his will upon the rest, both the Pan American Union and the British Commonwealth had achieved a felicitous relation of psychological parity between states of widely different calibre whose peoples not only spoke different languages but were also divided from one another by the more formidable barrier of a diversity in their ways of life. In this favourable psychological climate it had proved possible for Great Britain and Ceylon, the Indian Union and New Zealand, the United States and Guatemala, Brazil and Hayti, freely to co-operate with one another as moral equals; and the spirit animating these ententes might be enlisted in the cause of federation.

Though the practical possibility of federation, either with the United States or with the Soviet Union, was limited by the notorious fact that, hitherto, so intimate a form of political association had proved practicable only between communities closely akin to one another in their ways of life, the cultural and social circumstances of the time gave scope, within these limits, for federal union on a considerable scale. Federation with the Soviet Union did not, it is true, seem likely, in the dubious judgement of a Western observer, to prove an attractive proposition either to the Soviet Union's Orthodox Christian satellites to the south of her or to her Western Christian satellites to the west of her; but a federal union between the United States, the other English-speaking peoples, and the Continental West European peoples would already have been within sight above the horizon of practical politics if an affinity in culture and a community of interests had been the sole, or even the decisive, considerations. The obstacle—and it was a formidable one—was a human political animal's proneness to give prejudice the precedence over common sense and to allow itself to be swayed by feelings instead of taking rational decisions on the merits of a constitutional case. An American people which had once had to fight in order to win its independence would be reluctant to pool its sovereignty in a federal partnership with other peoples, even if the candidates for partnership were peoples of like passions with itself2 and also even if the principal partner were assured that her own representation in the prospective federal government would be proportionate, not merely to the relative numerical strength of her population, but to an index figure registering

1 The United States was a successor-state of the British Empire, Brazil of the Portuguese, and Hayti of the French. All the other seventeen members of the Pan American Union were successor-states of the Spanish Empire.
2 Acts xiv. 15.

{p.553} the United States’ overwhelming preponderance over the rest of the world in economic productivity. On the other side, West European satellites of the United States might be reluctant, for their part , to sacrifice a shadow of sovereignty that they still retained in a dependent relation which actually left them at the United States’ mercy; and, for the sakes of clinging to this shadow , they might refrain from making any attempt to win the substance of an equitable share in the joint conduct of common affairs which could be obtained only at the price of pooling in a federal union with the United States, a sovereignty which, in this form, could be revalidated within limits corresponding to current political and economic realities.

The mulish perversity of Human Nature that thus threatened to assert itself on both sides, if and when a proposal for a federation was brought forward, was an obstacle that could not be expected to yield easily of quickly to common sense and goodwill; yet there were historical precedents which indicated that, in any commonwealth of nations that had originated in the establishment of one dominant Power’s paramountcy over a cluster of satellites, the passage of time would likely bring with it a gradual approach towards political equality through the progressive enfranchisement of the imperial people’s former subjects of subordinates.1

In the history of a Roman Commonwealth whose arcanum imperii had been its liberality in conferring the Roman citizenship upon aliens who had fallen under Rome’s rule or hegemony, successive narrow-hearted reactions against this characteristic manifestation of a Roman political genius had all, in turn, been successively transcended sooner of later. Between 338 B.C. and 241 B.C., the inhabitiants of about one quarter of Cisappennine italy, extending along the south-west coast as far down as Cumae, and along the north-east coast as far as far up as Pesaro, had been progressively incorporated into the Roman citizen body, and this politic generosity had enabled Rome to establish her dominion over the whole peninsula. The door that had thus been held open for a century had then been closed and had ben kept bolted and barred thereafter for the next 150 years; but in 90-89 B.C., the rest of Rome's Italian satellites had extorted the Roman franchise from the paramount power by force of arms; and, when, after this tardy further step forward, the reactionaries had brought the process of enfranchisement to a halt again, this time along the line of the River po, the door had been broken open by Caesar and had never been closed again. Caesae's enfranchisement of Rome's Transpadine satellites in 49 B.C., restarted a process which this time n Caracalla's enfranchisement of virtually all the residue of Rome's then still unenfranchised subjects throughout an empire that embraced all but a fragment of the Hellenic World; and the readiness of the Roman citizen body at this stage to share its political privileges with the rest of the the inhabitiants opf the Hellenic Oikoumenê that had been united politically under Rome's aegis seems to hve been matched by the readiness on the paret even of ancient and famous non-Roman hellenic communitites now

1 See, for example, VI. vii. 146-58.

{p.554} to accept Roman citizenship at the cost of, at long last, merging in an oecumenical body politic a parochial identity which they had been jealously preserving through the ages. In earlier chapters of Hellenic history there had been at least two critical occasions—the first in 431 B.C. and the second in 228 B.C.1—on which Athens and Sparta had remorselessly sacrificed the Hellenic Society's prospects of attaining an urgently needed political unity to their own parochial corporate egotism. There is no record of the reemergence of this spirit in either Spartan or Athenian hearts on the historic occasion at the turn of the second and third centuries of the Christian Era.2

In the history of the Caliphate a corresponding evolution was accomplished more swiftly. Little more than a hundred years elapsed between the political reunification of the Syriac World by the arms of Primitive Muslim Arab conquistadores in the fourth and fifth decades of the seventh century of the Christian Era and the Gleichschaltung of the Arab Muslim 'ascendancy' with their non-Arab ex-Christian and ex-Zoroastrian converts and clients as a result of the Khurāsānī Iranian Muslim marchmen's victorious insurrection against the Umayyad régime in A.D. 750.3

These precedents from Syriac and Hellenic history were good auguries for the prospect that, in a post-Modern chapter of Western history, a supra-national commonwealth originally based on the hegemony of a paramount Power over its satellites might eventually be put on the sounder basis of a constitutional partnership in which all the people of all the partner states would have their fair share in the conduct of common affairs. A constitutional development on these lines seemed as probable in the long run as it was desirable, but in A.D. 1952 this was not the first business on Mankind's political agenda. The rock immediately ahead was a sooner or later inevitable transition from a present political partition of the Oikoumenê between two rival Powers to a

1 See III. iii. 340-1 and IV. iv. 265.
2 Professor William McNeill comments: 'Was Roman citizenship still a privilege by the time of Caracalla? Or was it a burden? Some historians think that the franchise was extended to all free men for the purpose of making them liable to the citizens' taxes on inheritances, etc., [in addition to the subjects' taxes, to which they were liable already]. In any case the willingness of the existing citizen body to see new-comers allected to its ranks will hardly have counted. The act of enfranchisement was surely an administrative act of a bureaucracy which was by then more or less immune from public opinion—at least in most matters.'
The present writer's reply would be, in general, that bureaucratic or autocratic governments, as well as elected representative governments, are amenable to public feeling and opinion—though their reaction to it may sometimes be slower, and though they may perhaps be able to go rather farther in the dangerous game of flouting it without being called to order. In regard to the case in question, his reply, in particular, would be that this enfranchisement of virtually the whole of the still remaining non-citizen element in the population of the Roman Empire was followed by the growth of a corporate sense of imperial patriotism which eventually expressed itself in the coining of the new word 'Romania' to denote a now undivided and homogeneous Roman imperial people's oecumenical fatherland. This sequel to the Act of A.D. 212 suggests that this Act was well timed in the sense of having been enacted at a date at which the public feeling of the divers elements in the population of the Empire was ripe for it; and if it had not been 'practical polities' in this sense in A.D. 212 it would not, so the writer would guess, have been possible to enact it in that year merely because of its fiscal attractiveness in the professional eyes of an imperial bureaucracy. The writer would also guess that even as recently as the reign of Hadrian (imperabat A.D. 117-38) it would not yet have been 'practical politics' to enact the provisions of the Canstitutio Antoniniana of A.D. 212, however attractive the measure might have been to the bureaucracy already at this earlier date.
3 See II. ii. 141 and VI. vii. 147-52.

{p.555} future political unification of the Oikoumenê under the control of some unitary political authority; and the first concern of the living generation of Mankind was that this perilous transit should be accomplished without a third world war.

In an age of atomic warfare there were no peoples for whom this was not a matter of life and death in a world whose unification was already an accomplished fact on the military plane, but there were three peoples that had also incurred a special measure of moral responsibility for seeing to it that an urgently needed world order should be established without another catastrophe. In bringing about, between them, the defeat of Germany in the World War of A.D. 1939-45, the peoples of Great Britain, the Soviet Union, and the United States had taken it upon themselves on behalf of Mankind to reject Hitler's offer of a lasting peace at Hitler's price. If in A.D. 1940-1 Hitler had been allowed by these three Powers to have his way, peace would have been imposed on the World by the establishment of a Pax Germanica that would have relieved Mankind from the fear of another world war for as far ahead into the future as any human eye could see. Hitler's price for this boon had been so exorbitant that the three victor Powers' decision to reject his offer was likely to win for them the blessings of Posterity supposing that they were now to succeed, between them, in bestowing the same boon on Mankind at an appreciably lower cost in the coin of standardization, regimentation, injustice, and tyranny. On the other hand, these same victors over Hitler would bring down upon their own heads Posterity's curses if they were to allow a third world war to rankle out of their victory. In denying to Mankind the opportunity of enjoying the substantial benefits of an odious Pax Germanica, the peoples of the United States, the Soviet Union, and Great Britain had taken upon themselves a binding moral obligation to provide Mankind with a better world order than Hitler's without inflicting on Mankind the third world war that a German victory would have spared them.

Should the ex-victors now fail to accomplish this self-imposed task, they must expect to share with the Germans the execrations of an intolerably tormented Mankind so long as any memory survived of Mankind's history in the twentieth century of the Christian Era. On the other hand, if, between them, they were to succeed in piloting Noah's Ark intact into the still waters of the lagoon beyond the perilous reef, they could look forward to being remembered throughout the rest of the Human Race's term of life on Earth as the heroes who, by an unprecedented moral triumph over the perversity of their own human nature, had closed a chapter of human history branded with the ghastly mark of Cain1 as the abominable Age of Civilization, Human Sacrifice, Slavery, and War, and had opened the way for Mankind to acquit itself better than before in its perennial struggle with an innate Original Sin. A generation which, in A.D. 1952, was thus bound over to render a strict account of a morally onerous stewardship might take heart from the words of an Athenian philosopher who had witnessed the breakdown of the Hellenic Civilization.

1 Gen. iv. 15, 17, and 22.

{p.556} 'In the struggle that will decide whether good or evil is to prevail in us, the issue is immeasurably greater than at first sight it might seem to be. . . . We must do everything that lies in our power to attain to Virtue and Wisdom in This Life. The prize is so splendid and the hope is so great.' 1

1 Plato: Respublica, 608 B, and Phaedo, 114 C, quoted in V. vi. 168.


(V) PROBABLE FUNCTIONS OF A FUTURE WORLD ORDER

{XII.D.V, p. 556} Supposing that a world government were to be established, what would its functions be? Presumably these functions would be much the same whether the establishment of this prospective world government were to be achieved pacifically or at the cost of a third world war, and whether it were to remain fixed in its initial form of a domination or hegemony exercised by a paramount Power or were eventually to acquire a federal constitution in which all the people in a supra-national commonwealth might hope to receive something like their fair share in the conduct of common affairs. Evidently the choice between these divers alternative roads might make a world of difference to the possibility of a world government's being able to perform its functions satisfactorily, whatever these functions might be; but the functions themselves would presumably have been determined in advance by the play of those historical forces that, in A.D. 1952, seemed to be making the establishment of some kind of world government, at some price, inevitable. Was the nature of these future functions then perhaps already discernible ?

A world government would be the government of a universal state; and the specific characteristics of universal states, as well as the generic characteristics of states of all the divers historic species, were revealed in the history of Man in Process of Civilization within the last five or six thousand years.

A state was an institution in which part of the psychic power-charge of an individual human being was impounded and combined with parts of the power-charges of other men and women to constitute a pool of power at the disposal of persons controlling and operating a government. A state might be defined as a piece of social mechanism designed for the twin purposes of accumulating power and of applying it; and the preservation of the power of a state was consequently bound to be the first concern of the persons, whoever these might be, who had one of these political pools of power at their command. The most dangerous threat to the survival of any parochial state had always been the existence of other parochial states within striking distance of it, and therefore the most urgent business of any parochial sovereign government had been to maintain its own power against encroachments on the part of other parochial governments in the same politico-military arena and, if possible, also to increase its own power at the expense of each and all of its neighbours. At the same time, every parochial government had always had to fight for the preservation of its power on a domestic front as well as on a foreign front, since, even when it was not being threatened by

{p.557} the aggressiveness of some foreign Power, a government would still have to reckon with the perennial recalcitrance of its own subjects; and, while it might be true that even in the smallest and weakest state the most powerful private individual would be impotent to resist the government's will so long as he was trying to resist it in isolation from his fellows, it was an obvious move for a number of individuals to take a leaf out of the state's own book by making common cause among themselves in order to pit against the pooled power of the state the pooled power of a family, clan, fief, faction, class, or interest.

In view of this possibility of a concerted private challenge to a state's corporate power, the concern felt by every government for the preservation of its power would force any government to set limits to its subjects' freedom of private enterprise. A government could not afford to allow any individual subject, and a fortiori not any organized group of subjects, to enjoy an unregulated licence to accumulate and apply power on their own private account, even in private relations with one another in which the state's interests were not involved directly and were perhaps not involved ostensibly at all. In order to safeguard its authority against threats to it on the domestic front, every government found it necessary to impose laws on its subjects and to see to it that these laws were effectively enforced. States had learnt, for example, that they could not afford to let their subjects take the law into their own hands, or even to let them keep it in their own hands in spheres in which the application and execution of the law had traditionally been, not a public, but a private, affair regulated by non-state institutions like the Blood Feud and the Wergeld. Equity demanded, of course, that a law drafted, promulgated, and enforced in the name of a state by the persons controlling and operating that state's government should not discriminate either to the advantage or to the detriment of any particular member or group of members of the political community, and should not be devised to serve the selfish interests of the ruling group of members constituting the government. In practice, even those states that had achieved the highest standards of justice so far known in the history of Civilization had never been able to preserve their legislation from being affected to some extent by the current domestic balance of power. It would, indeed, probably have been possible for a competent student of human affairs, possessed of full information about the content and application of the laws of any state at any date, to reconstruct, by inference, the domestic balance of power prevailing in that state at that time.

Thus, during the first five or six thousand years of the currency of this institution, a struggle—in which the government of every state that had ever existed had been constantly engaged—for the preservation and increase of a state's power had led, in the lives of parochial states, to a concentration of governmental activity on two functions: the function of competing with foreign Powers by waging war with them for objects unattainable by diplomacy and the function of regulating the private relations between the state's own subjects by legislation in which the current domestic balance of power was invariably reflected to some extent. The existence of states had thus been bound up with the

{p.558} perpetuation of two social evils, namely warfare between states and conflict between classes; and the wickedness that had thus proved to be inseparable from an institution which had been found to be indispensable by Man in Process of Civilization had been pilloried in the Christian doctrine that the incubus imposed by the existence of states upon the lives of human beings during their terrestrial pilgrimage was a consequence of, and self-inflicted punishment for, Mankind's Original Sin. This Christian proposition had, no doubt, latterly become a hard saying for politically sanguine-minded ci-devant Christian citizens of Modern Western states adorned with parliamentary representative institutions; yet in A.D. 1952 this doctrine still accurately represented the genuine attitude (as distinct from any officially prescribed theory) of all that vast majority of Mankind in Russia, Asia, Africa, and Indian America that was still subject, at this date, to the rule of authoritarian régimes.

These two activities—War and Police—through which a state asserted its power abroad and at home respectively, were characteristic, not only of parochial states, but of states of every species, including those universal states that, in the instances on record up to date, had come into existence, in the course of the disintegration of broken-down civilizations, through the eventual liquidation of litters of parochial states which had failed to keep their warfare with one another within non-lethal limits. Although, however, the revolutionary substitution of a single universal state for a multitude of parochial states had not ever put either of the two traditional functions of a government altogether out of court, it had been apt to make both the war-function and the police-function less imperative. Functions whose ultimate purpose was the state's own self-preservation would be less imperative for a universal state than for its parochial predecessors because, ex hypothesi, a universal state would have no adversaries of its own calibre to face within the bounds of its own world, and because the same antecedent Time of Troubles that had eliminated all states in this particular society save the single survivor could also be trusted to have broken the spirit of private individuals, factions, classes, and interests.

In a domestic field that had come to be coextensive with the entire domain of a disintegrating society, the oecumenical government of a universal state that had come into existence in the traditional catastrophic way had been apt to find the familiar task of asserting its own authority less pressing than the novel task of saving a disintegrating society from going into a final dissolution in which the universal state now embodying this society would be bound to perish with it.1 In the pursuit of this more far-sighted concept of its own self-interest an oecumenical government might, no doubt, be prone still to see the salvation of Society in a policy of conserving the vested interests of a dominant minority and repressing the unrest of a dissatisfied proletariat. Yet, even if the oecumenical rulers' conception of the interests and welfare of Society might still appear to be prejudiced, one-sided, and inequitable in the eyes of a philosopher, the salvation of Society was, at least in principle and intention, an altruistic objective for the government of any state to

1 See VI. vii. 57-61.

{p.559} pursue; and the addition of this altruistic aim to a government's avowed agenda, over and above the original self-regarding aim of striving to maintain the state's own power, was therefore a landmark in political history.1

This positive concern of Mankind's rulers for Mankind's welfare had been born into the World at the births of universal states, and till recently it had always displayed the image and superscription,2 and shared the fortunes, of one or other of those representatives of this type of polity that had risen and fallen up to date. The concern for welfare shown by oecumenical governments could not be more enlightened than these governments themselves were, and it could not survive their wrecks. In the dark night of Mankind's political life in the Age of the Civilizations, this flicker of light had accordingly come and gone with the universal states in which it had been momentarily kindled; yet the visionary gleam, intermittent though it had been, had never completely vanished from the Oikoumenê since the inauguration of a Sumeric Empire of the Four Quarters and an Egyptiac Middle Empire3 at the close of the third millennium B.C. ; and in the recent history of a post-Modern Western World the still awaited advent of a world government had been anticipated by a revival of the ideal of government for welfare in parochial states that were also still engaged in a familiar fratricidal struggle for existence. This post-Modern Western World at the time of writing presented the spectacle of a neck-and-neck race, at a speed that was already break-neck and that was still rapidly accelerating, between two ultimately incompatible conceptions of what the objective of a state ought to be. The Western parochial states of the day were war-and-peace states and welfare-states simultaneously; and, though these Janus-faced parochial polities might perhaps be written off the political map

1 This historic recognition that it was part of the duty of a government to concern itself with social welfare was undoubtedly a landmark in the political history of Man in Process of Civilization; but it is not so certain that it was an altogether new departure; for it might have been difficult to find, among the multitude of states known to History, any that had been concerned with the maintenance of its own power to the entire exclusion of all concern for the welfare of its subjects. It seems improbable that either force or habit or even the strongest combination of the two could avail for very long to keep a state in being if its subjects were once convinced that the sole object of their rulers was to misuse the state's coercive powers in order to promote the interests of a dominant minority at the expense of the rest of the community. When governments had indulged in activities that were patently anti-social, they had usually found it politic to refrain from carrying these activities to lengths at which they would constitute a serious tax upon their subjects' prosperity and happiness. For example, we have observed (in IV. iv. 144-50) that, in an eighteenth-century Western Society in which War was avowedly 'the sport of kings', the royal sportsmen took care to set discreet limits to the social costs of their anti-social pastime. The peoples could not be persuaded to sacrifice themselves for the sake of winning wars until they had been persuaded that the wars which they were being asked to fight were the peoples' own serious business in which the public welfare was at stake. On this showing, it seemed likely that some measure of concern for its subjects' welfare as well as some measure of concern for its own power must always have entered into the policy of any state that had ever succeeded in making itself a going concern. The most tyrannical government could perhaps never afford altogether to disregard its subjects’ interests; and, conversely, the most benevolent government could perhaps never afford altogether to disregard its own self-preservation.
2 Matt. xxii. 20; Mark xii. 16; Luke xx. 24.
3 In IV. iv. 412-13 we have already noticed that under the political dispensation of the Middle Empire the Pharaonic autocracy was regarded as having its reason d'étre in its services to Society, whereas the political dispensation of the Old Kingdom had found the raison d'étre of Society in its services to the Pharaonic autocracy.

{p.560} of the future as being patently peritura regna, this struggle within their bosoms between two competing and ultimately incompatible ideals was a new event of abiding interest because the struggle would be bequeathed by them to the world government, whatever this might be, that was to become the doomed parochial states' residuary legatee.

In the obscurity that at this time still veiled Mankind's political future, it could at any rate be foreseen that, if and when something in the nature of a world government did take shape, the task of maintaining its own power would cost it less effort and less anxiety than this had cost any universal state known to History. A single authority holding a worldwide monopoly of the control of atomic energy employable for military purposes would not be confronted by any rival of its own calibre, and it would also not have anything to fear from any residual pockets of recalcitrant barbarians in fastnesses encircled by a global polity that would already have embraced the rest of Mankind. A world government of the future would therefore be free to concentrate its efforts on the promotion of human welfare with a singleness of purpose that had not been feasible for any universal state in the history of any other society.

When a future world government eventually went into action in pursuit of this objective, what would be likely to be its first move? The pursuit of human welfare by political means would raise, as we shall see, for any political authority embarking on it the problem of striking a balance between the competing claims of individual freedom and social justice; but it might be prophesied that this would not be the first concern of a world government in the initial stage of its political operations. The best-intentioned world government would not have its hands free to work either for Justice or for Liberty or for a practical compromise between these two goals of human endeavour unless and until it had succeeded in making adequate provision for Police, in the broadest construction of the term, in a world in which all tools had now become edged tools and in which every act—deliberate or impulsive, wise or foolish—was now charged, no longer just with the innocuously feeble force of human muscles, but with the titanically high-powered 'drive' of machinery 'possessed by atomic energy.


E. TECHNOLOGY, CLASS-CONFLICT AND EMPLOYMENT

(1) THE ORIGIN AND NATURE OF THE PROBLEM

{XII.E.I, p. 561}



(2) Mechanization and Private Enterprise
(3) Alternative Approaches and Social Harmony
(4) Possible Costs of Social Justice
(5) Living happy ever after?





XIII. THE INSPIRATIONS OF HISTORIANS

A. THE HISTORIAN'S ANGLE OF VISION

B. THE ATTRACTIVENESS OF THE FACTS OF HISTORY

C. THE IMPULSE TO INVESTIGATE THE RELATIONS BETWEEN THE FACTS OF HISTORY

I. CRITICAL REACTIONS

II. CREATIVE RESPONSES
(a) MINUSCULA
(b) PAULLO MAIORA
1. Inspirations from Social Milieux
Clarendon, Procopius, Josephus, Thucydides, Rhodes
Polybius



Josephus and Ibn al-Tiqtaqā

{XII.C.II.(b) 1, p. 66} The opportunity, which Polybius found and seized, of making his conquered fellow-countrymen acquainted with their Roman conquerors was equally open to Josephus, who repaired to Rome some 236 years after Polybius had been deported thither; but the account of Roman institutions and policy which Josephus was so well qualified to write for the instruction of an Aramaic-reading Jewish public might not have found a market among the remnants of a shattered yet still Zealot-minded Jewry, in whose eyes the victorious Romans were still the same uninterestingly abominable Gentiles that they had always been, and in whose judgement the victory of Roman over Jewish arms was due, not to any notable human strength or virtue in the Roman Commonwealth, but to the inscrutable will of an omnipotent Yahweh. Josephus did emu-
{p.67} late Polybius in turning to good account his intellectually advantageous footing in two culturally diverse camps, but the use that Josephus made of his opportunity was to address himself, as Polybius had done, to an Hellenic public whose curiosity was still insatiable. The supplementary question that Josephus took up after he had responded to the question raised by the Great Romano-Jewish War of A.D. 66-70 was, not 'Who are these Romans who have crushed an insurgent Palestinian Jewry?', but ‘Who are these Jews who have brought this fate upon themselves by daring to challenge the might of an oecumenical empire commanding all the resources of a politically united Hellenic World?' This was the question that Josephus answered by writing, for an Hellenic public, The Ancient History of the Jews.

In this work Josephus commemorated, for the instruction of their conquerors, the history and êthos of a Jewish advance-guard of the Syriac Society which had gone down to disaster in a forlorn hope in one of the many engagements in the course of a one-thousand-years-long struggle between a post-Cyran Syriac and a post-Alexandrine Hellenic Civilization; and what Josephus had thus done for a Palestinian Jewry was done for the Syriac Society as a whole, in the last phase of its history, by the Shī‛ī Muslim historian Ibn al-Tiqtaqā of Hillah1 (natus circa A.D. 1262).

Ibn al-Tiqtaqā had been born in the metropolitan province of a reintegrated Syriac universal state on the morrow of the extirpation of the ‛Abbasid Caliphate and incidental devastation of ‛Irāq2 by the Mongol war-lord Hūlāgū in A.D. 1258. The question presented to him by his social milieu was: 'How has this world in which I have grown up—a world in which ‛Irāq is economically derelict and politically subject to the rule of a Eurasian Nomad barbarian war-band—come out of the world in which my forefathers lived from one generation to another over a Time-span of more than five hundred years: a world in which ‛Irāq was the garden and granary of the Oikoumenê in which an ‛Abbasid oecumenical government ruled from Baghdad a universal state extending north-eastward to the Jaxartes, northward to the Caucasus, westward to the Atlantic, and southward to the Arabian and Sindī shores of the Indian Ocean?' The supplementary question that arose for Ibn al-Tiqtaqā, as it had arisen for Josephus, was: 'What have been the history and the êthos of this society that has met with this disaster?’ And, in Ibn al-Tiqtaqā’s generation, as in Josephus’s, this was a question that was of some interest to the alien conquerors by whose hands the disaster had been inflicted; for Ibn al-Tiqtaqā lived to see a militarily subjugated Dār-al-Islām begin to take its savage Eurasian Nomad conquerors captive.3

1 ‘Ibn al-Tiqtaqā’, 'the son of a chatterbox', was an onomatopoeic nickname for Jalāl-ad-Dīn Abu Ja’far Muhammad b. Tāji’d-Dīn Abi’l-Hasan ’Ali, the spokesman of the Shi’ī community in the Shi’ī holy cities—Hillah, Najaf, and Karbalā in an ‛Irāq that was to remain the stronghold of Shī’ism (see the note by Professor H. A. R. Gibb, printed in the present Study, I. i. 400-3) until the forcible conversion of Iran by Shah Ismāl‛īl Safawī. See the notice of Ibn al-Tiqtaqā by Clement Huart in the Encyclopedia of Islam, vol. ii, (Leiden 1927, Brill) , pp. 423-4. According to E. G. Browne’s English version Of Mīrzā Muhammad b. ‛Abudi’l-Wahhāb-i—Qazwīni’s edition of ‛Alā-ad-Dīn ‛Ata Malik-i-Juwaynī’s Ta’rīhh-i-Jahān Gushā (London1912, Luzac) , p.ix, Ibn al-Tiqtaqā’s name was Safiyu’d-Din Muhammad b. ‛Ali b. Muhammad b.Tabātabā.
2 See IV. iv. 42-45.
3 See Horace: Epistulae, Book II, Ep. i, 1.156.



{p.68} After the Mongol conqueror Hūlāgū son and second successor Ahmad Takūdar (dominabatur A.D. 1252-4) had paid for his conversion to Islam by losing both his throne and his life at the hands of his outraged pagan Mongol comitatus1 Hūlāgū’s sixth successor Ghāzān Khān embraced Islam in the year of his accession, A.D. 1295, without suffering his great-uncle Takūdar's fate;2 and this definitive conversion of the House of Hūlāgū inaugurated a change of attitude on the converts' part towards a religion and culture that had now become theirs as well as their subjects'.3 The question 'What have been the history and êthos of this society that is now captivating its conquerors?' was answered by Ibn al-Tiqtaqā in a history of Islam from the epiphany of the Prophet Muhammad down to the sack of Baghdad by the Mongols in A.D. 1258, and a work that has become celebrated as Al-Fakhrī obtained its title from the name of Ghāzān Khān governor of Mawsil, Fakhr-ad-Dīn‛Isā, to whom the book was dedicated by the author. In this answer to the supplementary question that the historian's social milieu had presented to him, Ibn al-Tiqtaqā has succeeded in recapturing and reproducing something of the freshness and radiance of a dawn in which the Primitive Muslims Arab, as they went 'from strength to strength',4 had found it 'bliss to be alive'5 under a new dispensation in which the long despised and rejected6 Children of Ishmael were fortified by the conviction that they had been chosen by God to become the instruments of His will and purpose in place of the Jewish and Christian People of the Book.

’The same stone which the builders refused is become the headstone in the corner. This is the Lord's doing, and it is marvellous in our eyes.'7

1 See Browne, E. G.: A Literary History of Persia, vol. iii (Cambridge 1928, University Press), pp. 25-26.
2 See I. i. 363.
3 On the 4th Sha'bān, 694 (the 19th June, 1295), Ghāzān 'and ten thousand Mongols made their profession of faith in the presence of Shaykh Sadr-ad-Dīn Ibrāhim, the son of the eminent doctor Sa‛d-ad-Dīn al-Hamawī. Nor did Ghāzān lack zeal for his new convictions; for, four months after his conversion, he permitted [the Mongol amir] Nawrūz [, a previous convert who had been instrumental in converting Ghāzān,] to destroy the churches, synagogues, and idol-temples at Tabrīz. He also caused a new coinage bearing Muhammadan inscriptions to be struck, and by an edict issued in May 1299 prohibited usury, as contrary to the Muhammadan religion. In November 1297 the Mongol amirs adopted the turban in place of their national head-dress’ (Browne, E. G.: A Literary History of Persia, vol. iii (Cambridge 1928, University Press), pp. 40-41).

Ghāzān Khān’s conversion secured for Islam not merely its survival but the recovery of its supremacy in the Il-Khāns' dominions, which included Iran, Armenia, and Eastern Anatolia, as well as ‛Irāq. On this occasion the anti-Islamic reactions in the converted Il-Khān's pagan Mongol comitatus were successfully repressed (see Browne, op. cit., p. 41); and Ghāzān's brother and successor Khudābandah, alias Ūljaytū (accessit A.D. 1305), who had been converted to Islam by his wife, promptly confirmed his predecessor's re-establishment of Islam as the official religion of this Mongol successor-state of the ‛Abbasid Caliphate (see Browne, op. cit., p. 48), though his Christian mother had had him baptized as a child under the name Nicholas (op. cit., p. 46).

The tragic losing battle fought by the Nestorian Christian Church in the Il-Khāns’ dominions against a refluent tide of Muslim fanaticism, which the triumphant conversion of Ghāzān Khān had let loose, is graphically described in The History of the Life and Travels of Rabban Sāwmā, Envoy and Plenipotentiary of the Mongol Khāns to the Kings of Europe, and Markōs who, as Mār Yahbhallāhā III, became Patriarch of the Nestorian Church in Asia', translated from the Syriac by Sir E. A. Wallis Budge under the title The Monks of Kūblāi Khān, Emperor of China (London 1928, The Religious Tract Society).

4 Psalm lxxxiv. 7.
5 Wordsworth, W.: The French Revolution, as it appeared to Enthusiasts = The Prelude, Book XI, I. 108.
6 Isaiah liii, 3.
7 Psalm cxviii. 22-23.

{p.69} In this portrait of Primitive Islam, painted by a scion of the House of ’Alī, on the morrow of the death of a pre-Mongol Islamic commonwealth, to satisfy the slayers' posthumous curiosity about their victim, there is a touch of the serenity that comes over a human countenance when the hand of Death smoothes away the lines drawn there by the struggles of life.



‛Alā-ad-Dīn Juwaynī and Rashīd-ad-Dīn Hamadānī

{XII.C.II.(b) 1, p. 69} The ‛Irāqi historian Ibn al-Tiqtaqā's attractive history of the pre-Mongol Muslim Commonwealth in his own Arabic tongue was not the only notable historical work that was written under a Eurasian Nomad domination in the eastern half of Dār-al-Islām, on the morrow of the catastrophe of A.D. 1258, in response to questions raised by this harrowing experience; nor was this the only historical motif that was suggested by the spectacle of the ‛Abbasid Caliphate's fatal collision with an erupting Mongol Eurasian Nomad Power.

One of the incidental and undesigned effects of the overthrow of the ‛Abbasids and devastation of ‛Irāq was, as we have noticed already in an earlier context,1 the birth, in a ci-devant Syriac World's now derelict north-eastern provinces, of an Iranic Muslim Civilization, affiliated to the Syriac, in which, for most purposes other than the exposition of Islamic theology, a New Persian language and literature were to supplant the Arabic language and literature that had been dominant in all provinces of Dār-al-Islām during the six centuries intervening between the overthrow of the Sasanids by the Primitive Muslim Arab ghazis and the overthrow of the ‛Abbasids by the pagan Mongols. When a previously oecumenical Arabic culture retreated westwards before the face of the oncoming Mongols into a fastness in Egypt with a glacis in Syria and an eastern frontier at the western elbow of the River Euphrates, a New Persian literature that, by this time, had been on the rise for some three hundred years now at last came fully into its own; and this was perhaps the only creative cultural activity in the conquered and devastated half of Dār-al-Islām that benefited from the disaster on the very morrow of it. During the lifetime of the survivors of a generation in Dār-al-Islām that was old enough to have completed its education in a classical Arabic language and literature before the catastrophe of A.D 1258, the cultivation of the New Persian language and literature was already relieved of the incubus of the cultural ascendancy of Arabic without being yet impoverished by being cut off from the living sources of Arabic literary inspiration. The period of Mongol domination in Iran and ‛Irāq (currebatt A.D. 1258-1337) was an age in which the leading Persian men of letters were still bilingual in the full sense of still being able not merely to read Arabic but also to write in it, as well as in their native Persian tongue;2 and it was also an age which produced

1 See I. i. 71, with n. 3.
2 This point is made by Browne in op. cit., vol. iii, pp. 62-65. The historian Rashīd-ad-Dīn (vivebat circa A.D. 1247—1318), for example, made it his practice to arrange for the translation of his Persian works into Arabic and the translation of his Arabic works into Persian. Rashīd-ad-Dīn’s own account of these arrangements of his is quoted verbatim, from man arabe No. 356, foll, i et seqq, in the Bibliothèque Nationale [ci-devant Royale] in Paris, by E. M. Quatremère in his life of Rashīd-ad-Dīn prefixed to his edition of part of Rashīd-ad-Dīn's Jāmi‛-al-Tawārīkh ('A Comprehensive Collection of Histories'), Histoire des Mongols de la Perse, vol. i (Paris 1836, Imprimerie Royale), pp. cxxxiv-cxxxvi. A student of History will be reminded of the cultural situation in Italy under an Ostrogoth domination (durabat A.D. 493-535), when the leading Italian men of letters were still conversant with Greek as well as with their native Latin.

{p. 70} incomparably eminent Persian historians,1 in contrast to both the previous and the subsequent age, in which the brightest stars in the firmament of a New Persian literature were, not historians, but poets.2

The ascendancy of the historians in the intervening Il-Khānī Age is significant; and it is no less significant that the two greatest members of this pleiad—‛Alā-ad-Dīn ‛Ata Malik-i-Juwaynī (vivebat A.D. 1226-83) and Rashīd-ad-Dīn Fadlallāh Tabīb al-Hamadānī (vivebat circa A.D. 1247-1318)—were also eminent civil servants in the Mongol Il-Khāns' service, and that two of the lesser lights, Wassāf-i-Hadrat ‛Abdallah b. Fadlallāh of Shīrāz and Hamdallāh Mustawfī of Qazwīn, both of whom were protégés of Rashīd-ad-Dīn's, were officials of the Il-Khānī Government's Internal Revenue Department.3

The pagan barbarian conquerors of Iran and ‛Irāq, who held out for thirty-seven years (A.D. 1258-95) after their conquest of Baghdad before succumbing to Islam themselves, had found themselves from the outset unable to dispense with the services of their newly acquired Muslim subjects; for the conquerors' purpose in invading Dār-al-Islām and overthrowing the Caliphate had been to step into the Caliph's shoes; and the only means by which these interloping barbarians could ensure that, after they had extinguished the Caliphate, the Caliph's government should be carried on for their benefit was by drawing upon an existing panel of native Persian Muslim professional administrators. The historian ‛Alā-ad-Dīn ‛Ata Malik-i-Juwaynī ‘s brother, Shams-ad-Dīn Muhammad Juwaynī, managed the administration of Hūlāgū's appanage for the conqueror and for his first two successors during twenty-one years (A.D. 1263-84) of the Il-Khānī régime as their sāhib-dīwān,4 and the two brothers were the sons of a mustawfi’l-mamālik (minister of finance) and the grandsons of a prime minister of a by then already fainéant) ‛Abbasid Caliphate's Khwārizmian successor-state in the north-eastern marches of Dār-al-Islām, over against the Eurasian Steppe, on which the Mongol storm had broken in its full fury in A.D. 12205 at the fiat of a world-conquering Chingis.

The grandfather had accompanied the last of the Khwārizm Shahs, Sultan Muhammad, and his indomitable son and successor Jalāl-ad-Dīn Mankubirnī, when they had 'gone on the run', fighting rear-guard actions as they went.6 The father, who had lingered in Khurāsān, had

1 See Browne, op. cit., vol. iii, pp. 62 and 65.
2 The pre-Mongol age of New Persian literary history had been made illustrious by Firdawsī (vivebat circa A.D. 932-1020/1) and by Sa‛di (vivebat circa A.D. 1184-1292); the post-Mongol age was to be made illustrious by Hāfiz (obiit A.D. 1389) and by Jāmi (vivebat A.D. 1414-92). See I. i. 360, n. 1, and II. ii. 77, n. 1.
3 See Browne, op. cit., pp. 67 and 87.
4 For the dates, see Browne, apud Juwaynī, ed. cit., pp. xxix and xlvii-xlviii.
5 See II. ii. 142, with n, 2.
6 See Browne, E. G., in Mirzā Muhammad Qazwīnī’s edition of ‛Alā-ad-Dīn Juwaynī’s, Ta’rīkh-I-Jahān Gushā (London 1912, Luzac), p. xxi

{p. 71} been rounded up at Tūs by the Mongol governor Jintirmūr and taken, willy nilly, into the Mongols' service in A.D. 1232-3,1 and his two sons, Shams-ad-Dīn and ‛Alā-ad-Dīn, had followed in his footsteps. Shams-ad-Dīn had been in the service of Chingis grandson and Qūbilāy's brother Hūlāgū, the commander of the Mongol forces on an anti-Islamic front in the Khwārizm Shahs' already conquered domain to the north-east of the Caspian Gates, two years before his Mongol master's extirpation of the Ismā‛īlī Shī‛ī Assassins at Alamūt in A.D. 1257, and three years before his sack of Baghdad in A.D. 1258.2 Shams-ad-Dīn's brother ‛Alā-ad-Dīn, the historian (natus A.D. 1226), had entered the Mongol public service before he was twenty years old3 as the protégé of his father's Mongol patron Arghūn, who had been the governor of the Mongol Empire's anti-Islamic march before Hūlāgū Khān's arrival on this front in A.D. 1256,4 and he was one of three commissioners to whom Arghūn had entrusted the administration of Khurāsān when he had handed over his own command to Hūlāgū,5 ‛Alā-ad-Dīn Juwaynī had then accompanied Hūlāgū Khān on his campaigns (gesta A.D. 1256-8) against the Ismā‛īlī Power in Central and Western Iran and against the remnant of the ‛Abbasid Power in ‛Irāq;6 he was appointed governor of Baghdad by Hūlāgū in A.D. 1259, within a year of the conquest;7 and he continued—save for a few months in A.D. 1281-2, when he was under a cloud8—to hold this responsible administrative post till his death in A.D. 1283.9 The historian Rashīd-ad-Dīn, who gained his first access to the II-Khānī Court as a professional physician during the reign of Hūlāgū's first successor Abāqā Khān (dominabatur A.D. 1265-82),10 was taken by Abāqā into the public administration, was appointed Grand Vizier by Ghāzān Khān (dominabatur A.D. 1295-1304),11 and was retained in this post throughout the rest of Ghāzān’s reign and the whole of his successor Khudābandah Ūljaytū (dominabatur 1305-16). Both Shams-ad-Dīn Juwanyī and Rashīd-ad-Dīn Hamadānī obtained important posts in the public service for their sons and other relatives. One of Shams-ad-Dīn 's sons, Bahā-ad-Dīn, had made his mark as governor of ‛Irāq-i-‛Ajam (the Jabal) and Fars before his death at the age of thirty;12 and Rashīd-ad-Dīn 's son Ghiyāth-ad-Dīn was appointed to his father's post of Grand Vizier13 by Abu Sa‛īd (dominabatur A.D. 1317-34), the last effective ruler of the Il-Khānī line.

Public service proved to be as dangerous a trade for Persian men of

1 See Browne, ibid., pp.: xxi-xxii.
2 See Browne, A Literary History of Persia, vol. iii, p. 20.
3 See Browne, apud Juwaynī, op. cit., p. xiii.
4 See Browne, ibid, p. xxv.
5 See Browne, ibid., p. xxvi.
6 See Browne, ibid., pp. xxvii-xxviii,
7 See Browne, ibid., pp. xxviii-xxix, eundem: A Literary History of Persia, vol. iii, p. 20, n. 1.
8 See Browne, apud Juwaynī, ed. cit., pp. xxxix-xliv.
9 Browne, A Literary History of Persia, vol. iii., p. 66.
10 See Quatremére, E. M., in his life of Rashīd-ad-Dīn prefixed to his edition of part of Rashīd-ad-Dīn’s Jāmi‛-al-Tawārīkh (‘A Comprehensive Collection of Histories'), Histoire des Mongols de la Perse, vol. i (Paris 1836, Imprimerie Royale), p. viii.
11 See Quatremére, ibid.
12 See Browne, A Literary History of Persia, vol. iii, p. 21. Another of his sons Sharaf-ad-Dīn, was a poet.
13 See Quatremére, op, cit., p. ilvii.

{p. 72} letters under a Mongol régime in Iran and ‛Irāq as it had been for Roman men of letters under an Ostrogoth régime in Italy. The historian-governor ‛Alā-ad-Dīn 'Ata Malik-i-Juwaynī, after his fall in A.D. 1281 and reinstatement in A.D. 1282, was so fortunate as to die, as Cassiodorus had died, in his bed; but Boethius's fate overtook first the historian's brother, the sāhib-dīwān, and then Rashīd-ad-Dīn and Rashīd-ad-Dīn's son, Ghiyāth-ad-Dīn, in turn. Shams-ad-Dīn Muhammad Juwaym and his surviving sons were Ahmad Takūdar Khān's fellow-victims in the anti-Islamic émeute among the II-Khān's pagan Mongol comitatus that was provoked by Takūdar's rashly premature conversion to Islam.1 Rashīd-ad-Dīn, after having been dismissed from office by Ūljaytū Khān's successor Abu Sa‛īd Khān in October 1317, was put to death, with his young son Ibrāhim, on the 18th July, 1318, at the age of seventy-three, as the penalty for his having incautiously allowed himself to be persuaded to resume office.2 Ghiyāth-ad-Dīn and a surviving brother of his met their deaths by violence in A.D. 1336, in the anarchy in which the Mongol régime in Iran and ‛Irāq foundered after the death of Abu Sa‛īd.3 In a Mongol Iran, as in an Ostrogoth Italy, the civil service was thus a hazardous occupation4 for a man of letters, but it was also a stimulating one.

The Persian civil servant historians of the Il-Khānī Age were stimulated by their social milieu to ask Polybius's questions as well as Josephus's and their own Josephan-minded Arab contemporary Ibn al-Tiqtaqā's.

Like Josephus, ‛Alā-ad-Dīn ‛Ata Malik-i-Juwaynī has commemorated, in the history of the Khwārizm Shahs that constitutes the second part of his tripartite Ta’rīkh-I-Jahān Gushā (‘A History of the World-Conqueror Chingis Khān),5 the forlorn hope of an advance-guard of his society that had put up a valiant resistance to the onslaught of an overwhelming alien power, while Rashīd-ad-Dīn in his Jāmi‛-al-Tawārīkh

1 See Browne, A Literary History of Persia, vol. iii, pp. 27-29.
2 See Quatrèmere, op. cit., pp. xxxix-xliv.
3 See ibid., p. lii.
4 In both situations the danger arose from the interaction of two untoward factors. One of these was the barbarian rulers' proneness to suspect disloyalty in alien subjects whose professional services were indispensable to them because the intricacies of a civilized administration were beyond their own comprehension. The second untoward factor was the mutual rivalry and jealousy of the native professional civil servants themselves, who found it difficult to resist the temptation to further their own careers by denigrating their colleagues in the eyes of their ignorant and therefore credulous barbarian masters. Under the Il-Khānī régime the principal Persian officers of state were almost driven into falling foul of one another by the practice—introduced, no doubt, by the Mongol rulers deliberately, as a safeguard against possible abuses of power on the part of their Persian employees—of appointing a pair of Grand Viziers, equal with one another in status, without any demarcation, either territorial or functional, between their respective competences (see Quatremére, op. cit., pp. xxxii-xxxiii).
5 An edition by Mirzā Muhammad b. ‛Abd-al-Wahhāb of Qaswīn has been published in the E. J. W. Gibb Memorial Series, No. xvi, in three volumes (London 1912, Luzac). See also Browne, A Literary History of Persia, vol. iii, pp. 65-66. This work, which was completed in A.D. 1260, stops short of the fall of Baghdad in A.D. 1258, but tells, in the third of its three parts, the story of the fall of Alamūt in 1256. The whole of this Part III is devoted to the history of the Isrna'ilis down to Hūlāgū's overthrow of their last Grand Master, Rukn-ad-Dīn Khurshāh, in Kuhistan and the Elburz. Juwaynī's work has been continued in Wassāf ‘s, who has carried the regional history of Mongol rule in Iran and ‛Irāq on from A.D. 1257, where Juwaynī's history stops, down to A.D. 1328 in his Tajzīyat-al-Amsār wa Tazjīyat-al-A‛sar (see Browne, op. cit,, vol. iii, pp. 67-68).

{p.73} ('A Comprehensive Collection of Histories') has commemorated the history and êthos of the whole of the Syriac Society to which the Mongol invaders had given the coup de grace that the Western Christian Crusaders had previously tried and failed to deliver. Moreover, in this part of his work, Rashīd-ad-Dīn has taken a broader view of the Syriac Civilization than has been taken by Ibn al-Tiqtaqā in Al-Fakhīr. The ‛Irāqi Sayyid's historical vision is limited to the history of a pre-Mongol Islamic Commonwealth, whereas Rashīd-ad-Dīn treats the history of the Caliphate, from Abu Bakr to Musta‛sim, merely as the second of three chapters of an essentially Iranian story in which the first chapter runs from a mythical dawn down to the fall of the Sasanian Dynasty, while the third chapter is occupied with the histories of the ‛Abbasid Caliphate's Persian and Turkish successor-states down to the bursting of the Mongol Nomad tornado that has swept them all away.1 The history of the same Syriac Civilization, seen from the same Iranian angle of vision, and presented within the same framework on the same lines, is the subject of the whole of Mustawfī's Ta’rīkh–i-Guzīdah ('A Select History'),2 in which the author thus shows himself to be, on this point, Rashīd-ad-Dīn 's disciple as well as his protégé.

Moreover, for Rashīd-ad-Dīn, the history of a Syriac Civilization that has fallen a victim to the Mongols is not, even on the broader lines on which the Persian historian approaches it, either a whole in itself or an end in itself, as it is for the contemporary Arab historian Ibn al-Tiqtaqā. In Rashīd-ad-Dīn's work the history of his own civilization is introduced as an integral part of Universal History, and he has included Universal History in his 'Comprehensive Collection’ because he has undertaken to answer the three questions that have likewise been the inspirations of Polybius's Oecumenical History:3 'How has this revolution in human affairs come about?’ 'Who are these previously obscure barbarians who have suddenly made their mark by conquering the World in our time?’ 'What is the intelligible field of historical study?’ According to Rashīd-ad-Dīn's own account of his intellectual history, he had begun to study the history of the Mongols on his own initiative;4 but he had not thought of writing history5 till he was commanded by his master Ghāzān Khān to write the history of the Eurasian Nomads6 (the part of his work corresponding to Polybius's account of the institutions and policy of the Romans), and thereafter, by Ghāzān’s successor Khudābandah Ūljaytū, to write a Universal History and Geography7 (corresponding to the remainder of Polybius's work). Rashīd-ad-Dīn implies

1 See Browne's arrangement of the component parts of Rashīd-ad-Dīn's 'Comprehensive Collection’ in op. cit., vol. iii, p. 74. In this Iranocentric presentation of Syriac history the Arab Caliphate is treated, as will he observed, as the successor of the Iranian Empire of the Sasanidae, and not of the Arabian principality established by the Prophet Muhammad. Since Muhammad's career was contemporary with the last days of the Sasanian régime, his biography finds its place in this part of Rashīd-ad-Dīn's 'Comprehensive Collection', as a postscript to the volume devoted to the Sasanidae.
2 See the table of contents of Mustawfī's 'A Select History', as reproduced by Browne in op. cit., vol. iii, pp. 90-94.
3 See pp. 64-66, above.
4 Rashīd-ad-Dīn: Jāmi‛-al-Tawārīkh, preface, pp. 80-81 in Quatremére's edition and French translation of the Persian text.
5 See Rashīd-ad-Dīn, preface to the Jāmi‛ Quatremere's translation, p. 47.
6 See ibid., pp, 7-9,47, 51, 75, and 81.
7 See ibid., pp. 37-39 and 59.

{p.74} that he might have shrunk from embarking on this vast scholarly and literary enterprise in the narrow margin of leisure left to him by his exacting official duties if he had not felt it to be part of these duties to obey, as best he could, these royal commands in a field outside the normal range of a civil servant's activities.1 The credit due to the two Mongol princes for having thus set Rashīd-ad-Dīn to work is proclaimed in the titles given by the author to the two parts of his 'Comprehensive Collection’. His special history of the Mongols and Turks is called the Ta’rīkh–i-Ghāzānī,2 while his General History of Mankind is dedicated to Ūljaytū.

The historian's elemental intellectual question 'How has this come out of that ?' presented itself in Rashīd-ad-Dīn's social milieu in the same terms as in Polybius's, 'What', this social milieu inspired the Persian historian to ask himself, 'has been the process by which almost the whole World has fallen under the undisputed ascendancy of the Mongols within a period of less than fifty-five years ?'3 And this question has been put by Rashīd-ad-Dīn in the preface to his A Comprehensive Collection of Histories in terms reminiscent of the corresponding passage4 in Polybius's preface to his Oecumenical History.

'The beginning of every new religion or new empire constitutes a distinctive new era (Ibtidā-i-har milleti wa har dawlati ta’rikh5-i-mu‛ayyan bdshād). Now what fact or event has ever been more memorable than the beginning of the dynasty of Chingis Khān, or has better deserved to be taken as marking a new era? The fact is that, within the span of a small number of years, this monarch . . . subjugated a great number of the kingdoms of the World and conquered and exterminated a host of unruly people.... When world-wide dominion devolved upon Chingis Khān and his noble kinsmen and illustrious descendants, all the kingdoms of the Oikoumenê—Chīn and Māchīn (South China), Khitāy (North China), Hind and Sind (India), Transoxania, Turkistan, Syria, Rūm, the Ās (Alans), the Russians, the Circassians, Qipchāq, Kalār (?),6 the Bashkirs—or, to put it in one word, all the countries within the four quarters of thecompass—submitted to these princes and became subject to their ordinances ... [Chingis Khān] gave the whole Universe one and the same physiognomy and instilled identical feelings into all hearts. He purified the domains of the empires by delivering them from the domination of perverse usurpers and from the oppression of audacious enemies. He handed his empire on to his illustrious kinsmen and noble descendants.'7

1 See Rashīd-ad-Dīn, preface to the Jāmi‛, Quatremére's translation, pp. 47-51.
2 The second volume of the Ta’rīkh–i-Ghāzānī, covering the history of the Mongol Khāqāns from the accession of Chingis' son Ogotāy to the death of Qūbilāy's grandson Timūr, has been edited by E. Blochet in the E. J. W. Gibb Memorial Series, vol. xviii (London 191 J, Luzac). The chapters on the career of Hūlāgū Khān in the third volume, which covers the history of the Il-Khāns of Iran and ‛Irāq down to the death of Ghāzān, have been edited, together with the preface to the whole of the Jāmi‛-al-Tawārīkh, by E. M. Quatremére in Histoire des Mongols de la Perse, vol. i (Paris 1836, Imprimerie Royale).
3 i.e. from the overthrow of Wang Khān the Karāyit by Chingis Khān the Mongol in A.D. 1203 (see II. ii. 237-8) to the overthrow of the ‛Abbasid Caliph Musta‛sim by Chingis’ grandson Hūlāgū in A.D. 1258.
4 Quoted on p. 64, above.
5 In the two preceding sentences the author has pointed out that 'new era’ is one of two meanings of the word ta’rikh, the other meaning being 'chronicle’.—AJ.T.
6 See Quatremére's learned but inconclusive note 88, in op. cit., p. 72, on this enigmatic name.
7 Rashīd-ad-Dīn, ibid., pp. 60-63 and 70-73.

{p. 75} This epoch-making revolution in the World's affairs raised, in minds that had grown up on the morrow of it, the two Polybian supplementary questions 'Who are these conquerors of the World?' and 'What is this World that they have conquered ?' Rashīd-ad-Dīn addressed himself to the first supplementary question at Ghāzān’s instance, and to the second at Ūljaytū’s. In taking up the first of the two, Rashīd-ad-Dīn had been anticipated by ‛Alā-ad-Dīn ‛Ata Malik-i-Juwaynī; for the Ta’rīkh-I-Jahān Gushā was finished in A.D. 1260,1 forty-six years before the Ta’rīkh–i-Ghāzānī was presented by Rashīd-ad-Dīn to Ghāzān’s successor Ūljaytū on the 14th April, 1306,2 and the first of the three parts of Juwaynīs work deals with the history of Chingis Khān, his predecessors, and his successors down to his son Chaghatāy, whose appanage lay in Transoxania and the Zungarian Gap ('Mughalistan').3 It was, indeed, only to be expected that a Persian Muslim historian whose father and grandfather had been in the public service of the Khwārizm Shahs should have written his answer to the question 'Who are these irresistible Mongol invaders ?' forty-six years before the same question was answered by a Persian Muslim historian whose birthplace was Hamadān; for the Mongol storm had broken upon the Kwārizrnian march of Dār-al-Islām as early as A.D. 1220, while Western Iran had not been exposed to it till A.D. 1256, when the Mongols forced the passage of the Caspian Gates in their campaign of that year against the Ismā‛īlīs.

The purpose of the special history of the Mongols and Turks which Rashīd-ad-Dīn wrote in accordance with Ghāzān Khān's instructions was, in the author's own Herodotean words, 'to make sure that the memory of the extraordinary events and important facts that have signalized the epiphany of the dynasty of the Mongols should not be obliterated and annihilated by lapse of Time... nor suffer the fate of remaining concealed under an impenetrably thick veil [of ignorance]';4 and the civil servant historian proceeds to explain the grounds of his royal master's anxiety on this score. The history of the Mongols before and during their conquest of the World was by this time already unfamiliar to all but a few of Ghāzān Khān's subjects; it could be foreseen that the rising generation in the Il-Khān’s Mongol comitatus would cease to feel any interest in their own family histories and in their ancestors' achievements; and it would be particularly disgraceful to allow oblivion thus to overtake the deeds of Chingis Khān and his Mongol companions, who had achieved, in their day, the unique feat of conquering the World. Reading between Rashīd-ad-Dīn's lines, we can surmise that Ghāzān had instructed his Persian Muslim civil servant to put on record the history of the pagan Nomads of the Eurasian Steppe because he had realized that his own ci-devant Nomad retainers—who had

1 See p. 72, n. 5, above.
2 See E. Berthels’ article on Rashīd-ad-Dīn in the Encyclopaedia of Islam vol. iii (Leiden 1936, Brill), pp. 1124-5.
3 See II. ii. 145.
4 Rashīd-ad-Dīn, ibid., pp. 78-79. Compare the opening words of Herodotus's preface: 'Herodotus of Halicarnassus presents the results of his researches in the following work, with the twofold object of saving the past of Mankind from oblivion and ensuring that the extraordinary achievements of the Hellenic and Oriental worlds shall enjoy their just renown—particularly the transactions which brought them into conflict with one another’.

{p.76} migrated from 'the Desert' to 'the Sown' forty years before the date of his own accession in A.D. 1395,1' and who, in the act, had changed their trade by becoming herdsmen of human cattle in place of their former ungulate livestock2—would have been bound in any case soon to become assimilated to their more highly cultivated sedentary subjects and were destined to lose their Eurasian Nomad social heritage all the more quickly now that of Ghāzān himself had accelerated their assimilation by his policy of conversion to Islam. Ghāzān Khān had become a devout Muslim without having ceased to be a patriotic Mongol and a proud Chingisid; and, in commissioning Rashīd-ad-Dīn to write in the New Persian language a history of the Mongols and Turks, of Ghāzān was seeking to reconcile his new loyalty with his old one.

Rashīd-ad-Dīn—in constant attendance, as he had to be, upon his Il-Khānī masters in North-Western Iran in an age in which the Central Government of the Mongol Empire no longer had the power to summon the administrators of such outlying appanages to the Khāqān's Court to account to him there for their stewardship—had not enjoyed the opportunities, that had been thrust upon Juwaynī,3 of visiting Mongolia and

1 The expeditionary force with which Hūlāgū made his conquests west of the Caspian Gates had left Qāraqorum in July 1252 and had left the Steppe behind for ever upon entering Transoxania in A.D. 1255, one season before the campaign of A.D. 1256 against the Ismā‛īlīs (see Browne, E. G.: A Literary History of Persia, vol. ii (London 1906, Fisher Unwin, pp. 452-3)). Thus, by the date of Ghāzān’s accession, they had been vegetating for forty years in a demoralizing Land of Milk and Honey.
2 The social unhealthiness of this change in a Nomad horde's way of life has been noticed in III. iii. 22-25.
3 Both ‛Alā-ad- Dīn Juwaynī and his father Bahā-ad- Dīn Juwaynī before him had travelled more than once from Khurāsān to Mongolia and back in the course of their official duties in the Mongol public service. Bahā-ad-Dīn had been sent in A.D. 1235-6 by his captor and patron Jintimūr to the court of the Khāqān Ogotāy, who had confirmed the appointment to the post of sāhib-dīiwān which Jintimūr had conferred upon him (Browne, apud Juwaynī, ed. cit., p. xxii); and he had been taken to Qāraqorum again by Arghūn, Jintimūr's second successor in the government of Khurāsān (see Browne, ibid). ‛Alā-ad-Dīn 'spent some ten years of his life in these journeyings to and fro' (Browne, ibid., p. xxiv); and his third journey in Arghūn's company (peregrinabantur A.D. 1251-4, during the reign of the Khāqān Mangū) gave him the inspiration to write his history. On this occasion, he arrived at Qāraqorum on the 2nd May, 1252, and did not set out on his journey back to Khurāsān till September 1253.

‘It was during this stay of a year and five months at the Mongol capital that it was suggested to our author by some of his friends... that he should compose this history to immortalize the great deeds and conquests of the Mongol sovereigns. A certain diffidence as to his capacity for this task at first prompted him to refuse, but he was ultimately convinced that he possessed certain almost unique qualifications for it, to wit his extensive acquaintance with the Mongol Empire and its most notable administrators, the free access to the most authentic sources of information permitted to him by the high official position which he held, and his first-hand knowledge of many important political events. He therefore finally agreed to undertake the task, which he began in A.H. 650 and concluded inA.H. 658 (A.D. 1252-60).’—Browne, apud Juwaynī, ed. cit., p. xxv.

A similar journey to the ordu of the Mongol Khāqān Mangū, in the heart of the
Eurasian Steppe, inspired a notable work of Medieval Western Christian literature, the Itinerarium Fratris Willielmi de Rubruquis, de Ordine Fratrum Minorum, Galli, Anno Gratie 1255, ad Partes Orientales. Friar William of Rubruck arrived at Mangū's court some three months after the date of *‛Alā -ad-Dīn Juwaynī 's departure, and he attended on the Khāqān from January to June, inclusive, A.D. 1254.

Such journeys right across the breadth of the Old World were made possible by the
Mongols' organization of what was certainly the farthest-flung—though it was perhaps also the shortest-lived—of all the imperial postal-services known to History (see VI. vii. 99). See Marco Polo's account of it in The Description of the World, ed. by Moule, A. C.,and Pelliot, Paul, vol. i (London 1938, Routledge), pp. 342-7. The experience of travelling post-haste from the Great Western Bay of the Eurasian Steppe to the high plateau was as fatiguiing as it was inspiring. See William of Rubruck, op. cit., chaps. 23, 24, and 55: ‘In the space of two months and ten days, we did not rest except one single day, when we could not get any horses' (chap. 55). Friar William's predecessor, Friar John of Piano Carpini,... who had made the journey in A.D. 1245—47, paints the same picture: Tassing through Comania we rode most earnestly, having change of horses five times or oftener in a day.'—Libellus Historicus Joannis de Plano Carpini, qid missus est Legatus ad Tartaros A.D. 1246, chap. 21.

{p.77} collecting information about the Mongols at the fountain-head; yet in many respects the sources made accessible to Rashīd-ad-Dīn within the bounds of the Il- Khāns’ dominions could bear comparison with those towhich Juwaynī had had access at Qāraqorum.

'An authentic chronicle, written in the Mongol language and script,1 had been written and been brought up to date at intervals, and this was deposited in the [Il-Khānī] archives; but in this form it had no order or method in it; it was an assemblage of isolated and incomplete fragments; it remained inaccessible and unknown to any students who would have been capable of extracting from it some notion of the facts and events recorded in it; and no one had ever received authorisation or permission to make use of it....

‘Ghāzān Khān. . . conceived the idea of having these state papers brought together and put in order..„ and the author... was instructed to collect the facts concerning the origins and genealogies of all the Turkish peoples in contact with the Mongols and to put into writing [in the Persian language], article by article, the historical records relating to these peoples, part of which is in the Imperial Archives, while the remainder is to be found in the hands of the [Mongol] amirs and [other] members of the [Il-Khānī] Court.

'Down to that time, no one had been in a position to collect these records or been so fortunate as to have it in his power to put them in order and make a systematic history out of them; and those authors who had [previously] made the attempt to write the history of part of these events had had to do their work without possessing an exact knowledge of the facts.2 They had been reduced to collecting oral narratives from the mouths of plebeians, along lines dictated by their own preconceived ideas; and no one could count on these traditions being true or exact.

‘The present writer was commissioned to put these fragments of historical materials in order after having made a scrupulous examination of them; he was to digest them in plain language; and he was [thus] to bring . . . these hitherto completely inaccessible records to the light of day. If there were any events that were treated too summarily, or in too little detail, in these historical documents, he was instructed to fill the lacunae by collecting information on these subjects from the savants and doctors (dānīyān wa hukamā) of Khitāy [North China], India, Uighurland, Qipchāq and other countries—considering that representatives of all the peoples in the World are to be found at His Il-Khanian Majesty's Court.

1 As Quatremére points out in op. cit., p. lix, Rashīd-ad-Dīn must have been able to speak Mongol in order to transact official business with the Il-Khān and his comitatus. He had also written several works in Mongol, according to a statement of his own which his French editor cites from man. arabe 356, fol. 213 r.—AJ.T.
2 Is this an allusion to Juwaynī 's Ta’rīkh-I-Jahān Gushā If so, its depreciatory innuendo recoils on Rashīd-ad-Dīn’s own head; for Rashīd-ad-Dīn 'included in his great history... practically the whole contents of the three volumes of the Jahān-Gushāy, condensing some portions (such as the history of the Mongol governors of Khurāsān and other provinces of Persia, and the history of the Khwārazm Shahs), expanding others (such as the history of Chingiz Khān's youth and of his sons and grandsons, and the history of the Assassins), and leaving others (such as the history of Chingiz Khān 's conquests in the domains of the Khwārazm Shāhs and in Persia, and the anecdotes of Ogotāy Khān's domes) almost unchanged’ (Browne, apud Juwaynī, ed. cit., pp. lix-lx).—AJ.T.

{p.78} 'First and foremost, he was to consult... Pūlād Chingsang,1 who has a unique . . . knowledge of the genealogies of the Turkish peoples and the events of their history—particularly the history of the Mongols.'2

These were the oral and documentary sources that Rashīd-ad-Dīn had at his disposal for carrying out Ghāzān Khān instructions to write a Persian history of the Mongols; but, as the Persian historian tells us, Ghāzān’s successor Khudābandah Ūljaytū Khān, when he read Rashīd-ad-Dīn's Ta’rīkh–i-Ghāzānī, found the historian's answer to Ghāzān’s question 'Who were these Mongol conquerors of the World ?' raising in his mind the further question 'What is this World that the Mongols have conquered?' And Rashīd-ad-Dīn 's new employer also had the acumen to perceive that at least one of the sources of information on which the historian had drawn in answering Ghāzān question could also be turned to account for answering Ūljaytū's own. After having read the Ta’rīkh–i-Ghāzānī, Ūljaytū pointed out to the author, so Rashīd-ad-Dīn tells us, that, hitherto, no one had ever written a comprehensive history of the whole Oikoumenê and all the peoples in it, but that an unprecedented opportunity for producing a work of this scope had arisen

'now that the Oikoumenê, from end to end, is subject either to us or to [other] Chingisids, with the result that doctors, astronomers, savants and historians

(hukamā wa munajjimān, wa arbāb-i-dānish wa ashāb-i-tawā-rīkh), representing all religions and sects (adyān wa milel)—natives of Khitāy, Māchīn, Hind, Kashmir, Tibet, Uighurland and other nations, Turk, Arab, and Frank—are assembled in large numbers under Our eyes, and considering that each of them possesses books which set out his country's history, chronology, and religious beliefs, and has at least a partial acquaintance with these different subjects.'3

With these considerations in mind, Ūljaytū Khān, who had piously refused to have the dedication of Rashīd-ad-Dīn 's Ta’rīkh–i-Ghāzānī, covering the history of the Eurasian Nomads, transferred from his dead brother's name to his own,4 now commanded the dynasty's Persian civil servant historian to enlarge the Ta’rīkh–i-Ghāzānī into a Jāmi‛-al-Tawārīkh, by adding two new parts—a universal history and a universal geography5—which were to bear Ūljaytū's name. In this supplementary

1 See Quatremére's note 95 ibid., pp. 77-78. Pūlād was a Mongol of the Durban tribe. His father had been Chingis Khān's cook' (i.e. a confidential officer in his household). Pūlād himself had entered the service of Chingis' grandson and Hūlāgū's brother Qūbilāy, and had been invested by him with the Chinese title chingsang in addition to his hereditary Mongol title baurji, the Mongol word for 'cook*. He was the permanent diplomatic representative of the House of Qūbilāy at the Il- Khān Court. In the Il-Khāns' own Mongol comitatis there was also a wealth of historical tradition to be harvested; for, as Rashīd-ad-Dīn records in his history of Hūlāgū Khān (see Quatremére's edition, pp. 130-3), Hūlāgū's brother the Khāqān Mangū, when he sent Hūlāgū to enlarge the bounds of the Mongol Empire south-westwards, reinforced Hūlāgū's existing comitatus by making for him a special levy of two men out of every ten in the war-bands of all the other Chingisid princes. 'This is why in our countries [i.e. in the II-Khān's dominions] there always have been, and still are, [Mongol] amirs who are descendants and relations of each of the ajnirs of Chingis Khān, and each of these still holds his hereditary office.’
2 Rashīd-ad-Dīn: Preface to the Jāmi‛-al-Tawārīkh, Quatremére's edition: Persian text on pp. 74-7S; Quatremére's translation on pp. 75-79.
3 Rashīd-ad-Dīn, ibid., pp. 38-39.
4 See ibid., pp. 36-37,
5 No manuscript of Rashīd-ad-Dīn's universal geography was extant as far as was known at the time of writing.

{p.79} work, which was duly completed in A.D. 1310-11,1 the universal history fills four volumes. The first three are those presenting the history of the Syriac Civilization in terms of Iranian history which have already been mentioned.2 The fourth breaks new ground3 by bringing Turkish, Chinese, Israelite, Frankish, and Indian history into the picture.

Rashīd-ad-Dīn was exceptional among his co-religionists in the II-Khānī dominions in his day in being psychologically as well as intellectually well qualified for carrying out his second and major historical task. The majority of his fellow Muslims had been exasperated by the temporary favour which a local Christian and Jewish minority had been enjoying during the first phase of a revolutionary régime in which the barbarian conquerors had remained, not merely pagan in their practice, but also positively anti-Muslim in their feelings. The fanatical mood consequently prevalent in the Persian Muslim community is in sharp contrast with Rashīd-ad-Dīn 's respect and sympathy for non-Muslim scholarship.

'Although [he ventures to write in his preface]4 the tradition of the Muslims is greatly superior to that of the other peoples, all the same we cannot take it as our guide in dealing with the history of the non-Muslim peoples. It goes without saying that the facts which, in the traditions of any people, have been transmitted through a continuous chain of authorities have to be accepted as authentic,'

and he informs us that, in compiling his geographical gazetteer, he has lived up to his own principles.

'In his endeavour to draw on all available sources and to verify his results, the author, in this volume, has not been content merely to assemble everything that has hitherto been known in this country and has been described or delineated in [our] books; he has supplemented this existing information with the facts which, in this fortunate age, the doctors and savants (hukama wa damydn) of Hind, Chīn and Māchīn, Frankland and other foreign parts have found in their books and have certified as being authentic after having scrupulously verified them.'5

A Persian Muslim theologian-historian, Nāsir-ad- Dīn al-Baydāwī, who was Rashīd-ad-Dīn's contemporary, records6 that, when Rashīd-ad-Din was setting out to write his section on the history of Khitāy (North China), he consulted two Chinese scholars at Ūljaytū’s Court—Li Ta-chi and Mak Sun—who were authorities on Far Eastern medicine, astronomy, and history and who had brought with them, from China, books dealing with these subjects. On the strength of their recommendation, Baydāwī tells us, Rashīd -ad- Dīn based his account of Chinese history on a compendium, written by three Chinese Buddhist monks, which,

1 See Browne, op. cit., vol. iii, p. 72.
2 On p. 73, above.
3 Rashīd-ad-Dīn had, however, had at least one predecessor in this exotic field. Abū Rayhān al-Bīrūnī (natus A.D. 973) had not only published, circa A.D. 1000, A Chronology of Ancient Nations; he had also taken the opportunity, opened up for Persian Muslim scholars by Mahmūd of Ghaznah's conquests in India, to publish, soon after A.D .1030, his Indica (see Browne, A Literary History of Persia, vol. ii, p. 101).
4 In Quatremére's edition, pp. 44-45.
5 Rashīd-ad-Dīn, ibid., pp. 58-61.
6 See Quatremére in his life of Rashīd-ad-Din, p. lxxviii. Baydāwī’s historical work was still unpublished at the time of writing.

{p.80} his two Chinese consultants assured him, had been verified, approved, and passed for the press by a consensus of Chinese litterati.

The oecumenical outlook with which Rashīd-ad-Dīn was thus inspired by the social milieu of the Il-Khānī Court was transmitted by him to at least one disciple, Abū Sulaymān Dā’ūd of Banākat in Transoxania, who enjoyed the same intellectual advantages in virtue of being Ghāzān Khān’s poet laureate.

'His information about the Jews, Christians, Indians, Chinese, and Mongols, though largely directly borrowed, often in the same words, from the pages of Rashīd-ad-Dīn, was nevertheless undoubtedly supplemented by what the author learned orally from representatives of the peoples in question. In no Persian history before the Mongol period, and in few after it, do we find so many references to places, people, and historical events beyond the ken of most Muslim writers: places like Portugal, Poland, Bohemia, England, Scotland, Ireland, Catalonia, Lombardy, Paris, and Cologne; people like the Roman Emperors, from Romulus downwards, and the Popes from Saint Peter to the Pope contemporary with the author, who is said to be the two hundred and second in succession; and events like the different church councils, the conversion of Britain to Christianity in the time of Pope Eleutherius, the Nestorian heresy, and the like.’1

1 Browne, op. cit., vol. iii, pp. 101-2,


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